

## CORRIGENDA

Hugh J. McCann

Paralysis and the Spring of Action

PHILOSOPHIA Vol. 23 Nos. 1-4 (1994) 193-205.

On page 194, line 28, and on page 196, line 13,

replace “necrologic” by “neurologic”;

on page 196, line 12, replace “usual” by “unusual”;

on page 198, line 11, replace “baste” by “basic”;

on page 200, line 4, replace “t” by “it”;

on line 6, replace “Timex” by “time”, and on line 18,

replace “Caren” by “Green”;

on Page 205, list of references, add the following:

McCann, Hugh (1972). “Is Raising One’s Arm a Basic Action?”,

*Journal of Philosophy* 89, pp. 235-249.

McCann, Hugh (1974). “Volition and Basic Action”,

*Philosophical Review* 83, pp. 451-473.

Howard Sankey

The Semantic Stance of Scientific Entity Realism

PHILOSOPHIA Vol. 24 Nos. 1-2 (1994) 405-415.

Add Notes:

- <sup>1</sup> The label ‘scientific entity realism’ appears to be due to Ellis [1979, p. 45, fn. 15].
- <sup>2</sup> I follow Devitt in describing a version of scientific realism cast in terms of truth as semantic. Devitt [1984, p. 34] appears to take any construal of realism which makes use of the notions of truth or reference to be a semantic thesis, and elsewhere explains that a doctrine is semantic if it is “part of a theory of meaning” [1991, p. 46]. Thus, While the notion of truth is of most present relevance, a version of scientific realism is semantic if any semantic notion occurs in its formulation.
- <sup>3</sup> For the distinction between causal process theories, which are ontologically committed to the entities they employ, and theories whose employment of ideal entities engenders no such commitment, see Ellis [1990].