Abstract
It is commonplace to distinguish between propositional justification (having good reasons for believing p) and doxastic justification (believing p on the basis of those good reasons).One necessary requirement for bridging the gap between S’s merely having propositional justification that p and S’s having doxastic justification that p is that S base her belief that p on her reasons (propositional justification).A plausible suggestion for what it takes for S’s belief to be based on her reasons is that her reasons must contribute causally to S’s having that belief. Though this suggestion is plausible, causal accounts of the basing relation that have been proposed have not fared well. In particular, cases involving causal deviancy and cases involving over-determination have posed serious problems for causal accounts of the basing relation. Although previous causal accounts of the basing relation seem to fall before these problems, it is possible to construct an acceptable causal account of the basing relation. That is, it is possible to construct a causal account of the basing relation that not only fits our intuitions about doxastic justification in general, but also is not susceptible to the problems posed by causal deviancy and causal over-determination. The interventionist account of causation provides the tools for constructing such an account. My aim is to make use of the insights of the interventionist account of causation to develop and defend an adequate causal account of the basing relation.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Granted some, such as Williamson (2000), deny that there can be any satisfactory analysis of knowledge in terms of its components. However, insofar as we do seek an analysis of knowledge, an account of doxastic justification will be necessary. And even if there is no analysis of knowledge, it is still plausible to think that doxastically justified belief is a necessary condition for knowledge.
Comesana (2006) and (2010) argues that any account of doxastic justification must utilize the basing relation. Bergmann (2006) disagrees. He argues that basing is not necessary for doxastic justification because propositional justification is not necessary for doxastic justification. Although it is not clear that Bergmann’s argument is successful; even if we assume that Bergmann is correct, any acceptable account of doxastic justification must still provide an explanation of the basing relation in order to account for inferentially justified beliefs.
See Korcz (1997) for a survey of various attempts to provide an account of the basing relation and problems with those accounts.
The sketch of the interventionist account of causation that we will consider draws heavily from James Woodward’s account. Readers seeking a more detailed explanation of the interventionist account of causation should see Woodward (2003) and Woodward (2008a). For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that the interventionist account of causation that Woodward develops is the (at least mostly) correct account of causation. Readers who are skeptical of Woodward’s account of causation can understand the current project as arguing for a conditional conclusion: if the relevant features of the interventionist account of causation are correct, then it is possible to use them to construct an adequate account of the basing relation.
Brad Weslake “Exclusion Excluded” (unpublished manuscript, p. 3) (His emphasis).
Woodward (2008b, p. 213).
Woodward (2003, p. 55).
Woodward (2003, pp. 86–90).
This is not to say that the relevant variable set will only include variables of this kind. It is plausible to think that neurological damage, chemical imbalances, etc. can affect basing as well.
Woodward (2003, p. 59).
Weslake “Exclusion Excluded” (unpublished manuscript, p. 6). It bears mentioning that although a variable’s actual value is always within its redundancy range, it is possible for non-actual values to be within the variable’s redundancy range as well. Further, there can be cases in which whether a value falls within a variable’s redundancy range depends on the values of other variables. For instance, there can be cases where the actual value of V1 is 1 and a value of 0 for V1 falls within its redundancy range only when V2 is held fixed at some particular value. So, in this case the value 0 is within the redundancy range for V1 relative to a particular value of V2.
Woodward (2003, p. 84).
Throughout the remainder of the paper we will be focused on IB-R instead of IB.
It should be noted that the fact that S does not believe that p is consistent with several states: S’s believing that not-p, S’s withholding belief that p, and S’s having no doxastic attitude toward p.
For our purposes, it will not be necessary to worry about the nature of this experience. That is, it is not necessary for us to determine the nature of the content of this experience (whether it is conceptual, non-conceptual, or perhaps a mixture). Also, for our purposes we will set aside issues of concept possession, which may lead one to think that S cannot have a belief solely on the basis of her experience if she lacks the relevant experiential background.
One who thinks that recognition of modus ponens as a valid inference form is necessary for q to be propositionally justified for Sally need not think that Sally has to have the ability to articulate this or even that she has the concepts of ‘validity’ or ‘modus ponens’. Instead, one might think that the sort of recognition needed is simply the awareness that modus ponens is a good way to reason, that is to say, an awareness that when one is presented with p and (p → q) it is reasonable to infer q.
This case can easily be modified to accommodate the intuition that Sally does not need this sort of recognition in order to have propositional justification for q by removing Sally’s recognition of modus ponens as a valid inference form from R and from the set of causally relevant features. In other words, the case can be modified so that the only causally relevant features are Sally’s beliefs p and (p → q).
The exact nature of inference rule X is not important for our purposes. All that matters for our concerns is that X is invalid, but it does lead Sally to infer q from p and (p → q) in this particular case.
It is stipulated in this case that Sally is using modus ponens in order to make it clear that this is not a case of bad inference like the preceding example.
In this case we will make use of wishful thinking, but the wishful thinking component could be replaced with any feature(s) of one’s situation that is not a reason for/against the truth of her belief that may, nonetheless, be causally relevant to her holding her belief.
Other cases that one might worry about are cases where one cause of S’s belief preempts another cause and cases where one cause of S’s belief trumps another cause. The interventionist account of causation provides IB-R with the conceptual tools necessary for yielding the intuitive results in these sorts of cases as well. The interested reader is advised to consult Woodward (2003) for an explanation of how the interventionist account of causation handles these sorts of cases, particularly, pp. 77–82.
Some, such as Moser (1989), simply build in a ‘nondeviant’ clause in their accounts. However, simply stipulating that the causal process resulting in S’s belief that p must not be deviant in order for the belief to be based on S’s reasons merely acknowledges the problem posed by causal deviancy without making any progress toward solving it. Others such as Pollock and Cruz (1999) merely note that causal deviancy poses a problem.
Plantinga (1993, p. 69).
Lehrer (1971, p. 311).
Kvanvig (2003)
Kvanvig (2003, p. 50).
Kvanvig (2003, pp. 50–51).
Kvanvig (2003, p. 61).
Kvanvig (2003, p. 61).
Kvanvig considers and rejects a number of attempts to explain Jim’s rational progress. However, he does not consider this explanation of Jim’s rational progress. Furthermore, his arguments against the attempts that he rejects do not impugn this response.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for mentioning this sort of example and for pressing the objection that follows.
It should be noted that the interventionist account of causation leaves open the question of whether causation is asymmetric.
See Frankel (1986) for an explanation of some of the costs thought to be associated with denying causal asymmetry.
These examples are borrowed from Frankel (1986).
See Frankel (1986) for a plausible asymmetric causal account of the influence the two cards exert on one another.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for mentioning this sort of example and for pressing the objection based on the example.
References
Audi, R. (1983). The causal structure of indirect justification. The Journal of Philosophy, 80, 398–415.
Bergmann, M. (2006). Justification without awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Comesana, J. (2006). A well-founded solution to the generality problem. Philosophical Studies, 129, 27–47.
Comesana, J. (2010). Evidentialist reliabilism. Nous, 44, 571–600.
Feldman, R., & Conee, E. (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies, 48, 15–34.
Frankel, L. (1986). Mutual causation, simultaneity, and event description. Philosophical Studies, 49, 361–372.
Goldman, A. (1979). What is justified belief. In G. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and knowledge. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Hausman, D. (1984). Causal priority. Nous, 18, 261–279.
Korcz, K. (1997). Recent work on the basing relation. American Philosophical Quarterly, 34, 171–191.
Korcz, K. (2000). The causal-doxastic theory of the basing relation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 30, 525–550.
Kvanvig, J. (2003). Justification and proper basing. In E. Olsson (Ed.), The epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Lehrer, K. (1971). How reasons give us knowledge, or the case of the gypsy lawyer. The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 311–313.
Lehrer, K. (1974). Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. (1986). Philosophical papers (Vol. II). New York: Oxford University Press.
Menzies, P., & Price, H. (1993). Causation as a secondary quality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44, 187–203.
Moser, P. (1989). Knowledge and evidence. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant: The current debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pollock, J. (1976). Subjunctive reasoning. Boston: D. Reidel.
Pollock, J., & Cruz, J. (1999). Contemporary theories of knowledge (2nd ed.). Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Price, H., & Weslake, B. (2009). The time-asymmetry of causation. In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, & P. Menzies (Eds.), Oxford handbook of causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
von Wright, G. (1971). Explanation and understanding. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Woodward, J. (2003). Making things happen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Woodward, J. (2008a). Causation and manipulability. In Zalta E. N. (Ed.). The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2008 ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/causation-mani/.
Woodward, J. (2008b). Cause and explanation in psychiatry: An interventionist perspective. In K. Kendler & J. Parnas (Eds.), Philosophical issues in psychiatry: Explanation, phenomenology and nosology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Acknowledgments
My thanks to Brandon Carey, Earl Conee, Andrew Moon, Bill Rowley, Philip Swenson, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and discussions. I am especially grateful to Rich Feldman and Brad Weslake for comments on numerous drafts and for hours of discussion.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
McCain, K. The interventionist account of causation and the basing relation. Philos Stud 159, 357–382 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9712-7
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9712-7