

Understanding Mixed Quotation

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It has proved challenging to account for the dual role that a directly quoted part of a 'that'-clause plays in so-called mixed quotation. The Davidsonian account, elaborated by Cappelen and Lepore, handles many cases well; but it fails to accommodate a crucial feature of mixed quotation: that the part enclosed in quotation marks is used to specify not what the quoter says when she utters it, but what the quoted speaker says when she utters it. Here I show how the Davidsonian can do better. The proposal rests on the idea that mixed quotation involves deferred demonstration: a mixed quotation specifies what the subject says partly by demonstrating the quoter's utterance of the unquoted part and partly by deferred-demonstrating the subject's utterance of the quotation-marked part.

1. Introduction

Mixed quotation, as in

Stig said that Dinsdale was 'vicious but fair'

has come in for a good deal of philosophical attention lately, sparked by the Davidsonian account elaborated by Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore in their 1997 *Mind* article 'Varieties of Quotation'. That account handles many cases well, but it nevertheless fails to accommodate a crucial feature of mixed quotation: that the part enclosed in quotation marks is used to specify not what the *quoter* says when she utters it but what the quoted speaker says when *she* utters it. The Davidsonian can do better than the Davidson-Cappelen-Lepore (DCL) account. Here I show how. The proposal rests on the idea that mixed quotation involves *deferred* demonstration: in the example above, the mixed quotation specifies what Stig said partly by demonstrating the *quoter's* utterance of 'Dinsdale was' and partly by using the quoter's utterance of 'vicious but fair' to deferred-demonstrate *Stig's* utterance of those words. Understanding mixed quotation requires knowing that it involves deferred demonstration. This is not something one knows merely in virtue of understanding direct and indirect quotations—or even in virtue of knowing the logical form of mixed quotations. Contrary to what some have claimed, understanding direct and indirect quotations does

not suffice for understanding mixed quotations. The deferred-demonstration account, unlike the DCL account, explains why.

First I will set out the DCL account and explain how it fails to accommodate the crucial feature of mixed quotation that I described above. Then I will explain the deferred-demonstration account, which is designed to accommodate this feature. Although the account is Davidsonian in the logical form and explanatory primitives it involves, it is non-Davidsonian in *not* incorporating a commitment to the claim that one must be able to samesay any utterance one can mixed-quote. That may be the right thing to say about indirect quotation. But to say it about mixed quotation is to neglect one of the main reasons we engage in the latter practice. For the entire point of a mixed quotation is often to allow the quoter *not* to undertake any commitment as to which—if any—of her utterances samesays the quotation-marked words as uttered by the subject.¹

I close by considering some objections to the proposal. I should emphasize at the outset that I will not address those that just come down to objections to Davidson's account of indirect quotation; my aim here is not to defend that account against all comers but to show—as the DCL account does not—that *if* Davidson's account of indirect quotation is right, then there is an extension of it that works for mixed quotation and thereby explains the usefulness of that quotational practice by showing how significantly it differs from indirect quotation.

2. The DCL account

Following Davidson (1979, p. 92), Cappelen and Lepore propose to account for mixed quotation by 'merging' Davidson's 1979 account of what they call 'pure' quotation with his 1968 account of indirect quotation. They claim that (1), below, has the same truth condition as (1')

(1) Alice said that life 'is difficult to understand'

(1') $\exists u(\text{says}(\text{Alice}, u) \ \& \ \text{samesays}(u, \text{that}) \ \& \ \text{sametokens}(u, \text{these}))$.
Life is difficult to understand.

Statement (1') is true just in case there is some utterance of Alice's that samesays what the first demonstrative ('that') denotes and sametokens what the second demonstrative ('these') denotes. These are, respectively, the subsequent utterance of 'Life is difficult to understand' and

¹ This could be either because the quoter really has no idea how a paraphrase would go, or because she is not confident of getting it *exactly* correct and exact correctness is important to her.

the sub-utterance of ‘is difficult to understand’ (Cappelen and Lepore 1997a, p. 444). In this case this seems to be the correct truth condition. So far, so good.

How about cases in which we mixed-quote because we have no idea how a full paraphrase would go? I agree with Cappelen’s and Lepore’s claim (p. 436) that I can truly mixed-quote Nicola, who says, ‘Alice is a philtosopher,’ by saying,

(2) Nicola said that Alice is a ‘philtosopher’

On their account, (2) is true just in case (2’) is true:

(2’) $\exists u(\text{says}(\text{Nicola}, u) \ \& \ \text{samesays}(u, \text{that}) \ \& \ \text{sametokens}(u, \text{these})).$ Alice is a philtosopher.

As before, here the truth of (2’) requires that there be some utterance of Nicola’s that *samesays* the quoter’s utterance of ‘Alice is a philtosopher’ and *sametokens* the quoter’s sub-utterance of ‘philtosopher’.

On the DCL view, then, the truth of (2) entails that the quoter’s utterance of ‘Alice is a philtosopher’ *samesays* Nicola’s. Many would deny that claim, however, for precisely the reason that Cappelen and Lepore describe: ‘an utterance of “Alice is a philtosopher” by a normal English speaker cannot express anything since “philtosopher” is not English; but, then, how can an utterance that fails to express anything *samesay* anything?’ (1997a, p. 445). Of course, rejecting this consequence of the DCL account does not amount to saying that there is anything wrong with (2); the objection is not to the claim that (2) could be true, but to the DCL claim that the truth of (2) entails that the quoter’s utterance of ‘Alice is a philtosopher’ *samesays* Nicola’s.

Cappelen and Lepore have a reply to this objection to the DCL account. It is that *since* mixed quotes like [(2)] are an important part of our indirect reporting practice and *since* the extension of the *samesay* relation is determined by our actual practice of indirect reporting, there can be no further question whether [the reporter’s utterance of “philtosopher”] can *samesay* an utterance of Nicola’s’ (1997a, p. 446). Their reply, then, is that the truth of (2) tells us something about the *samesaying* relation: it tells us that it obtains between the quoter’s utterance of ‘Alice is a philtosopher’ and Nicola’s.

However, this is baldly question-begging as a reply to the objection that since the quoter does *not* *samesay* Nicola, the DCL account does not get the truth condition of (2) right. Whether the truth of (2) entails that my utterance of ‘philtosopher’ *samesays* Nicola’s depends on what (2)’s truth condition is. If the DCL account is right, then it is the same

as that of (2'), and we have the entailment. But the truth of the DCL account is what is in dispute. One cannot rest a defence of the DCL account on the claim that (2)'s truth ensures that of (2'), unless one has some reason for *that* claim other than that it is entailed by the DCL account. Cappelen and Lepore present no such reason.

Of course, the failure of Cappelen's and Lepore's defence of their claim that (2') shares the truth condition of (2) is not evidence that (2') does *not* share the truth condition of (2). I cannot see any decisive reason either for accepting or rejecting the DCL claim that the truth of (2) entails that my utterance of 'philtosopher' samesays Nicola's. However, those inclined to reject it will have one reason to prefer the account I will offer to the DCL account, for it has no such consequence. Indeed, it allows for the possibility that an utterance by me of (2) can be true even if there is *no* utterance that my utterance of 'philtosopher' samesays—not even itself. (This is what one should maintain if one maintains that such an utterance is meaningless.)

So far we have found that there are some cases the DCL account seems to handle just fine, and some it handles only by making a questionable claim about the extension of the samesaying relation. Next I shall discuss cases where it clearly fails to accord with Davidsonian claims about the truth conditions of *indirect* quotations. This next consideration, unlike the one just discussed, is decisive against the DCL account.

3. The problem

Fred said, 'The President does not care about people like me'. I can truly report Fred's statement by saying,

- (3) Fred said that the President does not care about 'people like me'²

² Some have wondered whether in English we do embed indexical words inside the quotation-marked parts of mixed quotations. We do, often. Cappelen and Lepore work with one such example from *The New York Times*:

Their accord on this issue, [Alan Greenspan] said, has proved 'quite a surprise to both of us'. Another from the *Times* (October 25, 2004):

In May, an internal I.A.E.A. memorandum warned that terrorists might be helping 'themselves to the greatest explosives bonanza in history'.

(That example also illustrates a point mentioned below, n. 17.) And, from *The Economist* (July 7, 2004):

[Vice-President Cheney] told a Democratic senator to 'fuck yourself', over the senator's involvement in investigations into Halliburton ...

On the DCL account, (3) is true if and only if:

- (3') $\exists u(\text{says}(\text{Fred}, u) \ \& \ \text{samesays}(u, \text{that}) \ \& \ \text{sametokens}(u, \text{these}))$.
The President does not care about people like me.

For (3') to be true, Fred's utterance of 'The President does not care about people like me' must *samesay my* utterance—demonstrated with 'that'—of 'The President does not care about people like me'.

The problem is that it does not. For it would be false for me to say, in the same context,

- (3'') Fred said that the President does not care about people like me.

(3''), being an indirect quotation, is part of the practice that (according to Cappelen and Lepore, following Davidson) determines the extension of the *samesaying* relation. If (3'') is false then my utterance of 'The President does not care about people like me' does *not* *samesay* Fred's, so (3') is false. And (3'') is false. So, therefore, is (3').³

For the Davidsonian, that (3) is true and (3'') false shows that the *that*-clause of a mixed quotation does not always *samesay* what its *quotiless* counterpart *samesays*. The DCL account could assign the correct truth conditions to mixed quotations only if the *samesaying* relation were never sensitive to the *stripping-out* of quotation marks. But that general claim is implausible.⁴

It will illuminate the problem to examine how one quick fix that might suggest itself does not work.⁵ One could think that since the problem is the falsity of '*samesays*(*u*, *that*)'—where '*that*' picks out *my* utterance of the *that*-clause—we should replace it with a different clause comparing Fred's utterance not with *my* utterance of the *that*-clause, but with the *that*-clause *considered as if Fred had uttered it*. The reason this does not work is that there can be indexicals outside the

³In their most recent discussion of their proposal Cappelen and Lepore take note of such data concerning indexicals and write, 'We still think a dual paratactic account (a paratactic account both of quotation and of indirect speech along the lines of our 1997 paper) succeeds' (2003, p. 64); but they do not explain how. Manuel García-Carpintero, too, notes the problem (2003, p. 104) but says that we can accept a theory's generating incorrect truth conditions for this class of examples, if we maintain that speakers 'derive then the intuitive messages as conversational implicatures'. The proposal I will offer avoids the need for this, as it does deliver correct specifications of truth conditions.

⁴Ken Akiba (2005, p. 164) also finds this an implausible claim.

⁵I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this useful point.

quotation-marked part of the that-clause, and these demand interpretation relative to the context of the report rather than relative to the context of the utterance made by the subject of the report. Consider, for example,

(4) Fred said that my father does not care about ‘people like me’

uttered by one of George W. Bush’s children. Here the proposal founders; in treating ‘me’ properly it forces an incorrect treatment of ‘my father’. For the truth of (4) does not turn on whether Fred uttered something that samesays ‘my father does not care about people like me’ *as if uttered by Fred*, because (4) does not entail that Fred was talking about his father.

Another point worth making about the problem is that it cannot be dismissed by invoking the pragmatic determination of the samesaying relation. Cappelen and Lepore correctly emphasize (1997a, p. 445) that the extension of the samesaying relation is fixed by our actual practice of offering and evaluating indirect quotations rather than by some general theoretical principle. (See also their 1997b, and 1998, p 665.) Indeed, as I noted two paragraphs back, it is only by *defending* such a claim that they can defend their account—the shoe is on the other foot. As long as there is one case in which a mixed quotation is true but its that-clause, shorn of quotation marks, does not (in the same context) samesay the utterance being mixed-quoted, the DCL account fails. My claim is that the example concerning Fred is such a case. This is not, nor does it rest upon, a general theoretical claim about the samesaying relation.⁶

(Incidentally, my argument to this point commits me to denying the claim made by Robert Stainton and François Recanati, that ‘mixed quotation is equivalent to indirect quotation—give or take some mimicry’

⁶This distinguishes it from the objections by Savas Tsohatzidis (1998) and Ray Elugardo (1999). Tsohatzidis rests one of his objections on the claim that any two sentences ‘identical in content’ (p. 663) samesay each other. In their reply (1998) Cappelen and Lepore this general claim. Elugardo claims that even when we ‘assume that samesaying is a pragmatically determined relation’ (p. 236), the DCL account still fails; but his objection relies on a general principle nevertheless. Elugardo claims, plausibly, that Ned can truly mixed-quote Sam by saying, ‘Sam said that he has a “hot” watch to sell me’ even though by ‘hot’ Ned means ‘popular’ while Sam means ‘stolen’. On the DCL account, claims Elugardo, Ned’s mixed quotation of Sam is false, since Ned’s utterance of ‘He has a hot watch to sell me’ does *not* samesay Sam’s utterance of ‘I have a hot watch to sell you’. Elugardo here appeals to the general principle that utterances that differ in speaker meaning do not samesay one another; his argument does not rest, as mine does, on a claim about the truth condition of a particular indirect quotation. (The relevant one in this case would be Ned’s saying ‘Sam said that he has a hot watch to sell me’. Unlike with (3’), which is clearly false, I find myself without a strong intuition on the truth value of that indirect quotation; so this case does not work as well in an argument of the sort I have made.)

(Stainton 1999, p. 275, quoted with agreement by Recanati 2001, p. 658).⁷ If that were right then (3) would have the same truth condition as (3''); but it does not.)

Note, finally, that this objection does not derive from any objection to Davidson's account of indirect quotation. That account has attracted many objections, none of which will be addressed here.

One might think that the problem tells against *any* approach that builds on Davidson's (1968) account of indirect quotation. For on that account, an indirect quotation is true just in case the samesaying relation obtains between the reporter's utterance (of the sentence in its that-clause) and one made by the subject. I rejected the DCL account of mixed quotation because it is not the case that my utterance of 'the President does not care about people like me' samesays Fred's. And the quick fix did not work because even the reporter's entire that-clause *as if uttered by the subject* need not samesay the subject's utterance. So where then might there be an utterance that does? The entire approach might seem hopeless.

But it is not. In what follows I will try to show that *if* Davidson's account of indirect quotation works, and *even though* the DCL extension of it clearly fails to handle mixed quotation, there is a rather different extension of it that works very well—and highlights some distinctive features of mixed quotation to boot.

4. An alternative proposal

When its logical form is made explicit, says Davidson, we see that an indirect quotation specifies that the samesaying relation obtains between an utterance by the subject and the utterance that is demonstrated by the quoter. Davidson, of course, said that this is the utterance by the quoter, subsequent to the indirect quotation proper, of the sentence in its that-clause. But this claim about how the demonstration works is not entailed by his claim about logical form. So there is room for proposals that are Davidsonian as far as logical form goes but that differ from Davidson as to how the demonstrations go.

⁷ It must be noted that a later part of Recanati's paper (pp. 677–80) gives a very different impression of his view. Below (n. 13) I briefly describe his account there of the 'context-shifting' at work in mixed quotations such as (3). It does appear that in this later part of his paper Recanati holds that when uttered in the same context, (3) and (3'') *differ* in truth condition, due to such context-shifting. My aim in this paper is to show how the Davidsonian can accommodate that fact; whether the approach that Recanati sketches towards the end of his paper does so also is not a question I will take up here.

The proposal I offer is one such. The motivation for it is the idea that often, the reason we mixed-quote someone is that there is some *part* of their utterance that we do not want to paraphrase—say, because we are not confident of getting it right. (Of course there are other reasons to want to leave some part unparaphrased, but this type of case is the hardest to handle and the way to handle it works well with the others, as we will see.) What is a mixed-quoter to do, then, if (according to the Davidsonian) she needs some utterance that *samesays* theirs? Well, she can use that very utterance to do the job. That is something that a Davidsonian logical form allows her to do, by deferred demonstration. Let me explain.

As concerns logical form, the alternative proposal is not very different from the DCL account. I claim that the mixed quotation (1), for example, is true just in case

$$(1^*) (\exists u, v)(\text{says}(\text{Alice}, \langle u, v \rangle) \ \& \ \text{samesays}(u, \text{this}) \ \& \ \text{samesays}(v, \text{that}) \ \& \ \text{sametokens}(v, \text{these})). \text{Life is difficult to understand.}$$

Here we treat Alice's utterance of 'Life is difficult to understand' partwise.⁸ (The parts are themselves utterances: the domain of quantification is the same as that in Davidson's account of indirect discourse. More on this in section 6.1, below.) It says of the first part—her utterance of 'Life'—that it *samesays* what 'this' demonstrates; and it says of the second part—her utterance of 'is difficult to understand'—that it both *samesays* what 'that' demonstrates and *sametokens* what 'these' demonstrates.

Structurally at least, this partwise treatment of Alice's utterance seems what we need. We do not need it just to be able to specify what it is that the second part, *v*, *sametokens*; the DCL account does do that.⁹ We need it primarily to be able to specify what it *samesays*. The problem, recall, was that it does not necessarily *samesay* the corresponding part of the *quoter's* utterance. So what could we point to that it does *samesay*, as the Davidsonian approach requires? Well, we could point to *it*, saying that it *samesays itself*. But how could the quoter point to an utterance of Alice's? By deferred demonstration. It is by deferred demonstration, I propose, that 'that' in (1*) denotes *Alice's* utterance of 'is difficult to understand' rather than mine. My utterance of those words is merely

⁸The account generalizes in the obvious way to cases in which an ordered triple, quadruple, etc. is required, as when the directly quoted part of the that-clause does not occur at its end, or when there is more than one quotation-marked part.

⁹Not exactly, of course, as Cappelen and Lepore note (1997, p. 444, n. 21): for it is not strictly true, as their (1') requires, that the entire utterance of Alice's that *samesays* the that-clause also *sametokens* the part of the that-clause that is enclosed in quotation marks. *Part* of it *sametokens* that *part* of the that-clause (and note that (1') does not even specify *which* part does this). The proposal I am making does not have this problem.

Now, whatever objections may be lodged against it—and I shall consider objections shortly—this is at least a *true* specification of the truth condition of (1). Before getting to the objections I want to explain how the account works for our other examples.

How about my mixed quotation of Nicola? Recall (2):

(2) Nicola said that Alice is a ‘philtosopher’

The account says that this mixed quotation is true, as uttered by me, just in case Nicola produced two utterances, one immediately after the other, the first of which samesays my utterance of ‘Alice is a’ and the second of which samesays Nicola’s utterance of ‘philtosopher’ and sametokens my utterance of ‘philtosopher’. Again this is the correct truth condition. Unlike the DCL account however, this account does not involve the claim that my utterance of ‘philtosopher’ samesays Nicola’s. In (2) I demonstrate *Nicola’s* utterance of ‘philtosopher’ in order to specify what she said; my utterance of that word is merely used to effect that demonstration. (Separately, of course, I do demonstrate my utterance of ‘philtosopher’—but for the different purpose of specifying what Nicola’s utterance sametokens.)

Finally, the proposal correctly handles my mixed-quoting Fred by saying,

(3) Fred said that the President does not care about ‘people like me’.

That mixed quotation is true just in case Fred produced two utterances in succession, the first of which samesays my utterance of ‘the President does not care about’ and the second of which samesays *Fred’s* utterance of ‘people like me’ and sametokens *my* utterance of ‘people like me’. It is what ‘people like me’ means in Fred’s mouth that the mixed quotation specifies, not what it means in mine. Our treatment, unlike the DCL account, is compatible with the Davidsonian treatment of ‘Fred said that the President does not care about people like me’ (3’). On that treatment, the falsity of (3’’) means that my utterance of ‘The President does not care about people like me’ does not samesay Fred’s. This is compatible with my proposal, according to which the truth of (3) entails nothing concerning whether *my* utterance of that entire sentence samesays Fred’s.

5. Remarks on the proposal

The idea behind the proposal is that in mixed quotation we specify *part* of what the subject said, with a certain utterance, as that which was said by *part of that utterance*. Doing that requires conceiving of what the subject said as composed of parts, corresponding to the part of the quoter's that-clause that is not enclosed in quotation marks and the part that is.

Since my aim in this paper is only to explain how the Davidsonian can do better than the DCL account, this is not the place for a serious comparison of this account of mixed quotation with Recanati's (2001).¹² But it is worth mentioning one point of parallel. The current proposal can be seen as showing how the Davidsonian can accommodate Recanati's claim that 'When we quote an utterance, the sentence within quotation marks is interpreted with respect to the context of the reported speech episode rather than with respect to the actual context in which the quotation is made' (p. 679).¹³ The shift arises on my account because the different parts of the subject's utterance—corresponding to the parts that are not, and the parts that are, quotation-marked in the mixed quotation—are assessed for samesaying in relation to different utterances: the former part is assessed in relation to the corresponding part of the *quoter's* utterance while the latter is assessed in relation to itself (although as I will explain in section 7, the account easily handles mixed-quotational practices that differ from ours on this point).¹⁴

¹² It is a nontrivial business even to calibrate the claims involved in the two proposals, given Recanati's various appeals to what he calls the 'pragmatic enrichment of semantic content' (pp. 671–3).

¹³ Recanati makes this claim after introducing the idea of 'context-shifting', which he calls a 'pre-semantic' affair, as follows:

An utterance is normally interpreted with respect to the context *k* in which it takes place. When an utterance is made, it is made at a certain location, by a certain speaker, in a certain language, and in a certain possible world. But sometimes the utterance is interpreted with respect to a context *k'* distinct from the context in which it is actually made. (p. 679)

Pairs such as (3) and (3'') do not differ in *this* way, of course, for the 'shifting' indicated by the quotation marks in (3) concerns not the entire utterance but only a part of it, as Recanati recognizes (p. 679). But this makes the 'pre-semantic' label problematic. Once a context of utterance is selected for the purpose of assigning a content to the entire utterance—this is indeed a 'pre-semantic' process—the quotation marks, in mixed quotation, determine a 'shift'; and it is the job of semantics to say how that shift works, *relative to* the selected context.

¹⁴ There is also a point of parallel with Akiba's (2005) claim that we can produce tokens that are of the same 'semantico-physical type' as that of the subject of our mixed quotation. I am not sure that Akiba's account works, though. For the claim that Fred's and my utterances of 'people like me' are to be interpreted *the same* does not entail that they are to be interpreted *as if uttered by him*, which is what I think a satisfactory treatment of mixed quotation requires.

The proposal supports a neat explanation of the utility of mixed quotation. That consists largely in mixed quotation's allowing one to specify things-said, *parts* of which one cannot oneself say—such as whatever it is that Nicola said when she said 'philtosopher'. (So too when it is not an inability to say, but an uncertainty how to say, at issue.) Without mixed quotation we would be stuck with just direct and indirect; and it is important to see that no combination of those would suffice to do for us what mixed quotation does. In *many* cases we can conjoin indirect and direct quotations so as to come near enough to the truth condition of some mixed quotation. For example, if Susan says, 'In France they have a different knife for everything', we can say,

Susan said that the French have a different knife for everything; and she did this using the words, 'a different knife for everything'

which is nearly¹⁵ equivalent in truth condition to the mixed quotation

Susan said that in France they have 'a different knife for everything'

But what could we do with Nicola's statement? We cannot say,

Nicola said that Alice is a philtosopher; and she did this using the word 'philtosopher'

because the indirect quotation is ill-formed: the word 'philtosopher' means nothing coming from me, hence neither does the that-clause. We could produce a direct quotation:

Nicola said, 'Alice is a philtosopher'

This is well-formed, but it accomplishes far less than the mixed quotation does: it entails nothing about what those words mean in Nicola's mouth—or even (on one meaning of 'said') that they mean *something*—while the mixed quotation tells us that she was referring to Alice and attributing some property to her. There are cases, then, where we can do with mixed quotation something we cannot do by conjoining a direct and an indirect quotation. (Similarly for cases in which it is not that we cannot come up with an indirect quotation but that we are not sure which one is right. Mixed quotation allows us to hedge our bets concerning some part of the subject's statement; indirect quotation does not.)

¹⁵The difference is that the conjunction of direct and indirect quotations does not tell us in which part of Susan's statement she used the words 'a different knife for everything', while the mixed quotation does.

Note that because the DCL proponent must *deny* that the indirect quotation ‘Nicola said that Alice is a philtosopher’ is ill-formed, that proposal does not support the explanation of the utility of mixed quotation that I have offered. It is hard to see what a mixed quotation achieves, on the DCL account, that the conjunctive form does not: on the DCL account, a mixed quotation’s utility would seem to consist entirely in its being *briefier* than the conjunction of an indirect and a direct quotation.

6. Objections

There are several directions from which objections to the account I have offered could come. There are objections to Davidson’s account of indirect quotation, on which the proposal is based. I have already explained why such objections are not my concern in this paper. However, the logical form involved in the proposal does incorporate some commitments that (unlike those of the DCL account) go beyond what is required by Davidson’s account of indirect quotation. I shall consider some possible objections to those commitments. Then I shall consider some possible objections to the particular use of them that I have made.

6.1 *Objections to assumptions about relations and relata*

There are four assumptions that my logical form proposal rests on that Davidson’s account of the logical form of indirect quotation does not rest on:

- (A) The set of utterances includes not just utterances of sentences but some utterances that are *parts of* utterances of sentences.
- (B) The *says* relation relates speakers not just to single utterances but to ordered sequences of utterances. We stipulate that this is true only if each utterance in the sequence is produced by the same speaker in immediate succession from its predecessor in the sequence and they are part of the same speech act. So John can *say* ‘Water slakes thirst’; he can also *say* the ordered pair whose first member is an utterance of ‘Water’ and whose second member is an utterance, produced by him immediately thereafter, of ‘slakes thirst’. John does not, however, *say* the ordered sequence whose first member is his utterance on Monday of ‘Water’ and his utterance on Wednesday of ‘slakes thirst’ (although he does, of course, *say* each of those utterances).

- (C) The ‘samesays’ relation can obtain not only between sentential utterances but between sub-utterances thereof. An utterance of one word, for example, can samesay another utterance of one word. (Note that this does not commit us to claiming that *every* one-word utterance that is a part of an utterance that stands in the samesaying relation itself stands in the samesaying relation.)
- (D) One can use an utterance of one’s own to deferred-demonstrate some other speaker’s utterance.

The need to specify ‘what is said’ partwise—something not possible in the DCL logical form—motivates claims (A)–(C). The Davidsonian idea that the specification is done demonstratively, for each part, motivates claim (D), once we realize that the only utterance guaranteed (by the truth of a mixed quotation) to samesay the subject’s utterance of the quotation-marked words is—that very utterance.

So, would anyone who has no objection to Davidson’s account of indirect quotation have any reason to object to the logical form I have proposed for mixed quotations?

Some have expressed qualms about my admission of non-sentential utterances. But note what (A) does not entail: it does not entail that everything that is in some sense a part of an utterance is itself an utterance. It does not entail, for example, that there is an utterance of ‘er slakes th’ whenever there is an utterance of ‘Water slakes thirst.’¹⁶ All (A) says is that *there exist* utterances that are parts of sentential utterances. This is all that is needed for the logical form given in the proposal to make sense. Of course, the treatment I gave of the three examples does commit me to claiming that Alice uttered ‘is difficult to understand’, Nicola uttered ‘philosopher’, and Fred uttered ‘people like me’; but these are not objectionable commitments concerning the ontology of utterances. My account only needs to involve those commitments concerning the ontology of utterances that are required for correct specifications of the

¹⁶I think that with this in mind we can see how Cappelen and Lepore might have replied more simply than they actually did to Fodor’s objection that on their account there could be a mixed quotation such as ‘Alice said that “l”obsters fight with their tail’ (1997, p. 445, n. 24). They could just have said that no vocalization or inscription of the letter ‘l’ (as part of an utterance of ‘lobsters fight with their tail’) is an utterance. The account I have proposed also allows a further reply: that such a report is false *because* even if such vocalizations of ‘l’ are utterances, none of them samesays anything (and the same goes for ‘obsters fight with their tail’).

truth conditions of well-formed mixed quotations—for example, the ones just listed.¹⁷

What about claim (C)? It is defensible by appeal to the way in which Davidson originally introduced the relation: as a stand-in for the synonymy relation, which intuitively applies in the first instance to pairs of *words*.¹⁸

One objection to (C) is this. The proposal treats a mixed-quoted utterance as decomposable into subutterances that are concatenative parts of it. It then allows the samesaying relation to be predicated of each part separately. But sometimes, some part of a sentential utterance has its content partly determined by another part, anaphorically; so how can we allow the samesaying relation to be predicated of such a part taken on its own? This objection neglects the fact that the utterances being quantified over are not types but tokens. The fact that the *type* ‘in his house’ cannot be said to samesay anything is neither here nor there; there are tokens of it in which the content of ‘his’ is determined by what goes on in some other utterance, and that content, so determined, is what matters to the samesaying relation.

As for (D), the Davidsonian should agree with Cappelen’s and Lepore’s claim that ‘we have no pre-theoretic intuitions about the nature of the demonstrative posited for indirect quotation by the paratactic account’ (1999, p. 281). Demonstratives are up for use in a variety of kinds of demonstrations; it would be *ad hoc* to insist that the demonstration involved in mixed quotation could not be deferred demonstration.¹⁹

6.2 Objection to the third conjunct

I mentioned that the third conjunct in (1*)—‘samesays(*v*, that)’—could strike one as vacuous: what work is done by saying that Alice’s utterance of ‘is difficult to understand’ samesays *itself*? My reply was that it entails

¹⁷ A point related to this is that it is *not* a necessary condition on something’s being an utterance, that it be either an utterance of a sentence or an utterance of a syntactic component of a sentence. Our mixed-quotational practice does allow for such quotations as:

Derek asked Jim to ‘throw the damn’ ball

This is a well-formed mixed quotation despite the fact that ‘throw the damn’ is not a syntactic component of ‘Throw the damn ball’. (Cumming (2003, p. 80) agrees with the general claim, giving several other examples.) Accordingly, if our account is to handle it, we cannot require syntactic elementhood of all our utterances.

¹⁸ Cappelen and Lepore (1997a, 1997b) do reject that characterization but their reasons for doing so have no bearing on (C).

¹⁹ It is worth noting that due to its similarity as concerns logical form, my proposal fares just as well with respect to Cappelen’s and Lepore’s constraints (C1)–(C4) (1997a, pp. 430–1) as the DCL account does.

that that utterance has linguistic significance. But is that something that (1) itself entails? And does this conjunct entail it, as I claimed it does?

Despite their use of quotation marks for a special purpose, mixed quotations do use 'that'-clauses in the ascription of speech acts. To say that Alice *said that p* is to commit oneself to Alice's having performed an assertive speech act with the content *that p*. Mixed quotations have this form, it is just that they involve a different sort of content-specification. The fact that the specification involves a relation that direct quotation also involves—the sametokening relation—is not, however, a reason to think that they are like direct quotations in not involving that commitment to the contentfulness of the specified utterance.²⁰ So the truth of (1) does require that Alice not only uttered the words 'is difficult to understand' but that she thereby expressed part of a complete propositional content.

Now, does our third conjunct entail this? It does, for the role of the samesaying relation in Davidson's original account of *indirect* quotation is to reflect the fact that indirect quotations are, unlike direct quotations, content-specifying. If *v* has the same content as something—the thing denoted by 'that' in (1*)—then it has a content, which is part of what the mixed quotation says about it.

6.3 The unparaphrasability objection

This objection is based on the idea I described as central to Davidson's account of *indirect* quotation: that in indirectly quoting someone, I make myself a samesayer with him (Davidson 1968, p. 104). On the account I have offered of *mixed* quotation, however, the truth of my mixed quotation of Nicola, for example, does not require that some utterance of mine samesay Nicola's utterance of 'Alice is a philtosopher'. So—the objection concludes—I have failed to specify *what Nicola said* by producing an utterance that samesays hers.

There are two replies to this. The first is that what Davidson maintained concerning indirect quotation cannot just be assumed to be true concerning mixed quotation. I maintain that it is not true. Indeed, the point of mixed-quoting someone, as I mentioned earlier, is often that one has little idea which of one's own utterances samesays the utterance being mixed-quoted. Someone ignorant of Cockney slang would not

²⁰ It would also be an error to infer from the fact that mixed quotations share this commitment of indirect quotations, that it manifests itself in the same way. Suppose that the word 'jwoifuseflk' means nothing as uttered either by Ian or Suzanne. Then Ian's *indirect* quotation 'Suzanne said that she could not find her jwoifuseflk' is not well-formed, due to the word's meaning nothing in his mouth. But Ian's *mixed* quotation 'Suzanne said that she could not find her "jwoifuseflk"' is well-formed but false, due to the word's meaning nothing in Suzanne's mouth.

know how to do better—how to get nearer to indirect quotation, as accounted for by Davidson—than to say ‘Sidney said that his “trouble and strife” was at the bank’ to report what Sidney said. Such a speaker undertakes no commitment as to which (if any) of his utterances same-says Sidney’s utterance of ‘trouble and strife’; so it is entirely appropriate that our logical form not have any such implication.

The second reply—consistent with the first though more concessive in letter if not in spirit—is that in an extended sense, the quoter *has* produced an utterance that same-says that of the subject. The claim is that he does this by *concatenating* part of his utterance with part of the subject’s. There is, after all, an utterance I construct, when I mixed-quote Fred, that same-says his: it is the concatenation of my utterance of ‘The President does not care about’ and Fred’s utterance of ‘people like me’. Why not count this constructed utterance as one that I have produced, in the course of mixed-quoting Fred? Then we can claim consistency with the *dictum* Davidson propounded originally concerning indirect quotation. But as I said, it is not clear why the truth of that *dictum* concerning indirect quotation should just be assumed to entail the truth of the corresponding claim concerning mixed quotation.

6.4 The Schiffer objection

Stephen Schiffer (1987) has argued that the conditions sufficient for understanding indirect quotations as Davidson conceives of them do not suffice for understanding indirect quotations as they actually are. Suppose that the following indirect quotation is true:

- (4) Sam said that flounders snore.

To know the truth stated by (4), claims Schiffer, one must know what Sam said, the content of his statement. But now consider the Davidsonian logical form:

- (4') $\exists u(\text{says}(\text{Sam}, u) \ \& \ \text{samesays}(u, \text{that})).$ Flounders snore.

To know the truth stated by (4'), Schiffer argues, it is enough to know that ‘some utterance of Sam’s has the same content as the foregoing utterance of “Flounders snore”. But this ... can be known without knowing the content of either utterance’ (p. 134).

Now it could be thought that whatever merit this objection has against Davidson’s account of indirect quotation—and again, it is no part of my aim here to decide how much that is—it has *more* merit against my account of mixed quotation. Consider my utterance of the following:

(5) Sam said that flounders ‘snore’

On my account, two samesaying relations are here asserted to obtain: between my utterance of ‘Flounders’ and some utterance of Sam’s, and between Sam’s utterance of ‘snore’ and itself. So my account of mixed quotation requires even *less* of the sort of knowledge Schiffer is concerned with than Davidson’s account of indirect quotation requires. On that account, knowing the truth of (4) requires knowing of some utterance *other than Sam’s*, that it samesays Sam’s; but knowing the truth of (5), on my account, does not require knowing, of *any* utterance other than Sam’s utterance of ‘snores’, that it samesays that utterance.

The question is: do we have here a problem for my account, or again, just what we should expect given the function of mixed quotation in our quotational repertoire? The latter. I claim that one can understand

Nicola said that Alice is a ‘philtosopher’

even if one has *no idea* how to paraphrase the quoter’s utterances—or Nicola’s, or anyone’s for that matter—involving the word ‘philtosopher’. Again, the point of mixed-quoting someone is often to allow for a partial paraphrase while leaving alone some part that resists interpretation. If that is right, then it will often be the case that *the mixed-quoter herself* is unjustified in attempting some paraphrase of the dubious part. Yet if she can mixed-quote none the less, why should we require anything more of someone trying to understand the mixed quotation she produces? Whatever bite the Schiffer objection has to Davidson’s account of indirect quotation, it does not have here. Failure of understanding (of the quotation-marked part of the ‘that’-clause) is one of the typical reasons *for* using mixed quotation; it cannot be held against it that it allows for such failure.

7. Understanding mixed quotation

On the account I have described, understanding a mixed quotation requires knowing that it has the truth condition given by the logical form (1*) etc. *and* knowing how the demonstrations go. Knowing the latter is *not* something one knows merely in virtue of understanding direct and indirect quotations, which, on the Davidsonian account, do not even involve deferred demonstration. Here I differ from Cappelen and Lepore who claim, ‘it would seem that all that is needed to

understand mixed quotation is a prior understanding of pure, direct, and indirect quotation' (1997a, p. 431).²¹

Let me elaborate. It is merely a convention that the demonstration involved in mixed quotation is deferred demonstration of an utterance by the subject of the mixed quotation. It *could* have been our convention that in mixed quotation we only enclose in quotation marks words spoken by the Great Leader, say, and that, correspondingly, the demonstration is deferred demonstration of an utterance by the Great Leader. If that were our convention then my mixed quotation 'Derek said that John is reluctant to "seek truth from facts"' would be true just in case Derek produced two utterances, the first of which samesaid *my* utterance of 'John is reluctant to' and the second of which samesaid *the Great Leader's* utterance of 'seek truth from facts' (while of course sametokening mine). The difference here would not be a difference in logical form but a difference in the conventions determining the *demonstrata*. In order to understand a mixed quotation one must know which conventions govern the demonstrations involved in it.²²

It is that point about what is involved in *understanding* mixed quotation that it has been my main concern to make. The logical form that I described illustrates how that point might be accommodated on the Davidsonian approach to mixed quotations. That the accommodation is so easily achieved on that approach should count in its favour.²³

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²¹ By 'pure' quotation they mean, for example, the quotation in "The word "charisma" has eight letters'. They take this to be a different sort of quotation from that involved in 'He said, "I wish you were here"'. Whether these are indeed different kinds of quotation is not a question I shall consider here.

²² Now is the time to answer the two questions I raised in note 11. I chose not to make the third conjunct 'samesays(*v*, *v*)' because I wanted a logical form that would cover variant practices such as the one just described. I chose to have the third 'that' demonstrate the quoter's utterance, rather than deferred-demonstrate the utterance by the subject, because if either direct or deferred demonstration would do the job, it is probably direct demonstration that does it. (Why would one deferred-demonstrate something when one could say what one wanted to say by directly demonstrating the very item one would use to effect the deferred demonstration?)

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