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A Rosa multiflora by Any Other Name: Taxonomic Incommensurability and Scientific Kinds

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Abstract

The following paper attempts to explore, criticizeand develop Thomas Kuhn's mostmature – and surprisingly neglected – view ofincommensurability. More specifically, itfocuses on (1) undermining an influential picture ofscientific kinds that lies at the heartof Kuhn's understanding of taxonomic incommensurability;(2) sketching an alternativepicture of scientific kinds that takes advantage ofKuhn's partially developed theory ofdisciplinary matrices; and (3) using these two resultsto motivate revisions to Kuhn'stheory of taxonomic incompatibility, as well as, tothe purported bridge betweentaxonomic incompatibility and some of the traditionalproblems associated withincommensurability.

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McDonough, J.K. A Rosa multiflora by Any Other Name: Taxonomic Incommensurability and Scientific Kinds. Synthese 136, 337–358 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025116814353

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