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Composition as Identity Does Not Entail Universalism

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Abstract

Composition as Identity is the view that, in some sense, a whole is numerically identical with its parts. Compositional universalism is the view that, whenever there are some things, there is a whole composed of those things. Despite the claims of many philosophers, these views are logically independent. Here, I will show that composition as identity does not entail compositional universalism.

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Notes

  1. See Merricks (2005), and Sider (2007). They are not alone in thinking composition as identity entails compositional universalism; for example, Harte (2002, p. 114) also asserts this.

  2. For a recent discussion, see Cameron (2007).

  3. For an interesting defense of extreme monism, see Schaffer (2007).

  4. Both the name “compositional nihilism” and interest in the doctrine so-named are due to van Inwagen (1990). See chapter eight for further discussion.

  5. See van Inwagen (1990, pp. 28–29) for a brief discussion on why everything composes itself.

  6. For a defense of this view, see Cameron (2007).

  7. An anonymous referee has suggested to me that Merricks presupposes the falsity of compositional nihilism in his argument. Moreover, Merricks assumes that every plurality of things could compose something. We should be cautious about this latter assumption. Consider the view, defended by van Inwagen (1990), according to which necessarily, some xs compose a y if and only if the activity of those xs constitutes a life. I have a hard time seeing how the activity of, for example, two electrons could constitute a life. Merricks assumption is contentious, and it does the bulk of the work in the argument.

  8. See Lewis (1986). Lewis is perhaps the most prominent of property extensionalists.

References

  • Cameron, R. P. (2007). The contingency of composition. Philosophical Studies, 136(1), 99–121.

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  • Harte, V. (2002). Plato on parts and wholes: The metaphysics of structure. UK: Oxford University Press.

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  • Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Basil: Blackwell.

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  • Merricks, T. (2005). Composition and vagueness. Mind, 114, 615–637.

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  • Schaffer, J. (2007). From Nihilism to Monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85(2), 175–191.

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  • Sider, Ted. (2007). Parthood. The Philosophical Review, 116, 51–91.

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  • van Inwagen, P. (1990). Material beings. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.

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Acknowledgments

I wish to thank the anonymous referees who provided me with very useful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. I also wish to thank Jason Turner.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, 541 Hall of Languages, Syracuse, NY, 13244-1170, USA

    Kris McDaniel

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  1. Kris McDaniel
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Correspondence to Kris McDaniel.

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McDaniel, K. Composition as Identity Does Not Entail Universalism. Erkenn 73, 97–100 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9207-5

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