Mind, Value, and RealityThis volume collects some of John McDowell's influential papers, written at various times over the last two decades. One group of essays deals mainly with issues in the interpretation of the ethical writings of Aristotle and Plato. A second group of papers contains more direct treatments of questions in moral philosophy that arise naturally out of reflection on the Greek tradition. Some of the essays in the second group exploit Wittgensteinian ideas about reason in action, and they open into the third group of papers, which contains readings of central elements in Wittgenstein's difficult later work. A fourth group deals with issues in the philosophy of mind and with questions about personal identity and the special character of first-personal thought and speech. |
Contents
Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives? | 77 |
Might There Be External Reasons? | 95 |
Wittgenstein on Following a Rule | 221 |
Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgensteins Later Philosophy | 263 |
Functionalism and Anomalous Monism | 325 |
The Content of Perceptual Experience | 341 |
Reductionism and the First Person | 359 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 385 |
CREDITS | 393 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
according action agent anti-realist appeal argument Aristotle Aristotle's behaviour Blackburn Cartesian causal claim cognitive Colin McGinn colour conceived conception consciousness consider constitute correct David Wiggins desire distinction Essay ethical eudaimonia explanation expression external reasons fact genuine grasp human Humean idea idiolectic independently instance intelligible interpretation involves judgement kind Kripke Kripke's Loar Loar's Mackie Mackie's matter meaning metaphysical mind moral Moral Realism motivational nature Nicomachean Ethics non-cognitivism non-cognitivist notion objective one's particular passage perception phenomenology philosophy philosophy of mind picture platonism position possible practical reason premise Private Language Private Language Argument prohairesis projectivism projectivist propositional attitudes quasi-memory question rationality realism reality reasons for acting Reductionism reflection relevant requires rule Rule-Following sceptical seems sense sensitivity Simon Blackburn simply someone sort specific structure sub-personal suggestion suppose thesis things thought tion truth understanding virtue virtuous person Williams's Wittgenstein Wright's reading