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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
This paper will examine Rawls’ Theory of Justice as the most coherent twentieth century restatement of the liberal egalitarian paradigm. It will examine Rawls’ assertion that his theory is in the tradition of the state of nature/contractarian formulation of that paradigm, with particular reference to the parallels between Locke's formulation and his own. The paper will note that in both formulations:
a) The principles of justice formulated are sub specie aeternitatis but it will be argued that in fact they are, in their more developed form under “more favourable” historical conditions, the principles acknowledged by liberal man.
b) The principles developed by men in “reasonably favourable conditions” (R., 5.82,542) are principles both of equality and inequality. However, it will be argued that the inequality principle takes precedence over the equality principle and, in fact, in its theoretical and practical manifestations, makes void the fair value of the equality principle itself.
1 All references to Rawls will be from A Theory of justice and listed as follows: (R., S, ___, p. ___). All references to Locke will be from the Two Treatises of Government and will be listed as follows: (L., I or II, S.___).
2 Macpherson, C.B., “Rawls's Models of Man and Society”, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 3 (1973), 341.Google Scholar
3 See for example Pateman, C., Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge, 1970)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and specifically for Canada, Loon, R.J. Van and Whittington, M.S., The Canadian Political System (2d ed., Toronto, 1976), 76 ff.,Google Scholar and Clement, W., The Canadian Corporate Elite: an Analysis of Economic Power (Toronto, 1975).Google Scholar
4 Parekh, B.C., review of A Theory of justice in Political Studies, XX (December 1972), 479.Google Scholar
5 Rawls points out that “It should be kept in mind here that capital is not only factories and machines and so on, but also the knowledge and culture, as well as the techniques and skills, that make possible just institutions and the fair value of liberty.” (R., 5.44, 288).
6 McDonald, V., “A Guide to the Interpretation of Locke the Political Theorist”, Canadian journal of Political Science, VI, 4 (December 1973), 602-23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
7 This assertion may strike the reader as somewhat bizarre given observations such as the following by Rawls: “I shall not examine whether there are sound arguments overriding the principle of fair equality of opportunity in favor of a hierarchical class structure.” (R., 5. 46, 301). And again: “in a competitive economy (with or without private ownership), with an open class system excessive inequalities will not be the rule. Given the distribution of natural assets and the laws of motivation, great disparities will not long persist.” (R., 5. 26, 158). However, I would address the reader to my section, “The Two Principles of justice: Egalitarian or Inegalitarian” (pp. 77-8) where I note that the just savings principle with its concern for the lot of all future generations of least advantaged “requires the indefinite if not definite continuing presence of a system of incentives that will encourage the more talented and productive to remain in high positions of authority, political, social and economic, to produce the 'capital’ needed to raise the level of the least advantaged.” The final formulation of the difference principle therefore “posits a situation in which this and all future societies will in fact be hierarchically structured, class stratified societies.”.
8 Miliband, R., The State in Capitalist Society (London, 1973), pp. 24–26;Google Scholar W. Clement, op. cit., p. 97; Marchak, M.P., Ideological Perspectives on Canada (Toronto, 1975), p. 16–17.Google Scholar
9 Vlastos, G., “Justice and Equality”, in Brandt, R.B., ed.,Social justice (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962).Google Scholar
10 For an understanding of the limits that might need to be imposed on hierarchy and inequality, see Pateman, op. cit.
11 Macpherson, op. cit., 347.
12 Pateman, op. cit.
13 An anonymous critic of this paper has posed the question: How does the lack of full participation in political and industrial questions restrict the sense of one's own worth? To answer the question adequately would require an article in itself. See for example my article in a forthcoming issue of the Queen's Quarterly, “Participation in the Canadian Context: Fact or Fiction?“ Briefly, the answer can be found in Rawls’ own assessment of self-respect and its relation to social union. We have already noted that Rawls sees in self-respect the primary good without which the fulfilment of any rational life plan is impossible. To execute any rational life plan involves commitment both to the Aristotelian Principle and to social interdependency. Unless we take up a life plan that engages our most acute capacities our life will lack zest. Without acknowledgement of the value of our life plan in the eyes of others our sense of self-worth is undermined. Given the paramount importance that Rawls places upon the value of equal citizenship as the basis of self-respect and status it would seem natural to suppose that he would also see in zestful activity within this paramount social union one of the most essential means to the realisation of one's sense of self-respect. We have noted Rawls’ belated acknowledgement of the importance of such participation for development of one's self-esteem in his concluding remarks in Section 37. However, he reveals his ambivalence about the importance of political participation when he observes that “(the principle of participation) does not define an ideal of citizenship; nor does it lay down a duty requiring all to take an active part in political affairs.” (R., S. 36, 227). He notes that “In a well-ordered .state only a small fraction of persons may devote much of their time to politics …. But this fraction, whatever its size, will most likely be drawn more or less equally from all sectors of society.” (R., S. 36, 228) (my italics). This is an extraordinary observation given the extensive information available on the correlation between political activity and socio-economic status. Van loon and Whittington, for instance, have shown that the 40% of Canadians on or below the poverty line do not participate politically?they are objects of the society rather than full members of it. Pateman's analysis of the authoritarian environment in which the least advantaged lives and works explains in large part why this is so. In fairness to those who question the value of such full participation evidence can be advanced in criticism of the value of such an end for most people. Certainly there is much empirical evidence in support of the view that people do not want to participate. My position is that this apathy could well be a product of our socialisation. I am suggesting that participation is a human value both for the individual and society and that people should at least be given the opportunity to avail themselves of this value.
