Guilty Robots, Happy Dogs: The Question of Alien MindsWhen we interact with animals, we intuitively read thoughts and feelings into their expressions and actions. It is easy--often irresistible--to suppose that they have minds like ours. And as technology grows more sophisticated, we might soon find ourselves interpreting the behavior even of robots in human terms. But is our natural tendency to humanize other beings philosophically or scientifically justifiable? Can we ever know what non-human minds are really like? How different are human minds from the minds of animals or robots? In Guilty Robots and Happy Dogs, David McFarland offers an accessible exploration of these and many other intriguing questions, questions that illuminate our understanding the human mind and its limits in knowing and imagining other minds. In exploring these issues, McFarland looks not only at philosophy, but also examines new evidence from the science of animal behavior, plus the latest developments in robotics and artificial intelligence, to show how many different--and often quite surprising--conclusions we can draw about the nature of minds "alien" to our own. Can robots ever feel guilty? Can dogs feel happy? Answering these questions is not simply an abstract exercise but has real implications for such increasingly relevant topics as animal welfare, artificial intelligence, and cybernetics. Engagingly and accessibly written, and thought-provoking from start to finish, Guilty Robots and Happy Dogs touches on the very nature of mind and its evolution. It is essential reading for anyone curious about animal behavior, robotics, artificial intelligence, or the nature of the human mind. |
Other editions - View all
Guilty Robots, Happy Dogs: The Question of Alien Minds: The Question of ... David McFarland No preview available - 2008 |
Common terms and phrases
action activity agent alien Andy Clark animal behaviour Animal Cognition animal or robot animal’s animals and robots artiWcial intelligence ascribe attribute automaton aVairs aware behave behaviourist belief beneWts bird Border brain Cabanac Cambridge canary capable cat’s causal Chapter chimpanzee cognition connectionism consciousness Daniel Dennett Dennett diVerent diYcult eliminative materialism energy environment Ethology eVect example experience explanation explicit representation feelings folk psychology foraging function functionalist human identiWable imply intentional stance intentional system involved inXuence kind kitchen learning machine McFarland mean mental abilities natural selection pain particular person philosophical stance Philosophy of Mind physical pigeon possible predator problem procedural psychology pucks qualia question rational rats realist stance reason refuelling result reXex role scientists scientiWc security robot self-suYcient sense situation slugs species speciWc stigmergy supervenient suYcient symbol theory of mind things trade-oV unwell words Wrst Wtness Xock zombie