Abstract
Aristotle’s account of friendship has largely withstood the test of time. Yet there are overlooked elements of his account that, when challenged by apparent threats of current and emerging communication technologies, reveal his account to be remarkably prescient. I evaluate the danger that technological advances in communication pose to the future of friendship by examining and defending Aristotle’s claim that perfect or character-friends must live together. I concede that technologically-mediated communication can aid existing character-friendships, but I argue that character-friendships cannot be created and sustained entirely through technological meditation. I examine text-based technologies, such as Facebook and email, and engage a non-text based technology that poses the greatest threat to my thesis—Skype. I then address philosophical literature on friendship and technology that has emerged in the last decade in Ethics and Information Technology to elucidate and defend my account by contrast. I engage Cocking and Matthews (2000), who argue that friendship cannot be created and sustained entirely through text-based contact, Briggle (2008), who argues that friendship can be created and sustained entirely through text-based contact, and Munn (2012), who argues that friendship cannot be created and entirely sustained through text-based contact but can be created and sustained entirely in immersive virtual worlds. My account discusses a certain kind of friendship, character-friendship, and a certain kind of technology, Skype, that these accounts do not. Examination of these essays helps to demonstrate that character friendship cannot be sustained entirely by technologically-aided communication and that character-friends must live together.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I refer to Aristotle’s highest form of friendship as character-friendship, following Cooper’s usage (1977, pp. 627–29). While ‘perfect’ is accurate, the connotation of the word has caused readers of Aristotle to miss something important in Aristotle’s account of friendship, as I make clear later in this essay. I do not defend Aristotle’s account of character-friendship, and I assume for the sake of argument that character-friendship is possible—even if rare.
References to Aristotle’s works are noted parenthetically, EE for Eudemian Ethics, NE for Nicomachean Ethics, and MM for Magna Moralia. I recognize that MM’s authorship is in question.
Aristotle is unclear about how literally to take the phrase ‘living together,’ though he clearly requires close geographical proximity. I stipulate that ‘living together’ means physically living in close geographical proximity, such that each friend can visit each other frequently. Aristotle also claims that character friends must live together in NE 1157b7, 1158a8-9, 1165b30, 1170b10-14, and 1171b32-1172a15.
If A and B are both virtuous, this does not necessarily make them character-friends; being virtuous is a necessary but insufficient condition for one being a character friend with another. A character-friend results if A and B are both virtuous and they mould each other over time through shared activity. Two tokens of virtue-type do not a character-friendship make. Rather, two tokens of virtue must love each other jointly and somewhat exclusively.
Most of the communicative advantages that Skype has over text-based technologies are the same that C&M believe that physical interaction provides over text-based technologies. Skype yields non-voluntary cues (visual and auditory), comparatively unedited responses, and encourages more direct attention between communicators.
I take ‘technology’ to include any communicative technology, books included.
Either B is identical to B’s avatar or he is not. If identical, then B himself must engage in a filtering process when trying to approximate his identity accurately in his avatar. Thus when A (or A’s avatar) engages B’s avatar then communication is multi-filtered. If B is not identical to his avatar, then when B engages with A then A cannot directly perceive B (at most, A can directly perceive B’s avatar, which is not identical to B in this situation).
For examination of the extent that text-based technologies can support or strengthen existing friendships from an Aristotelian perspective, see Vallor (2010) and Vallor (forthcoming).
References
Aristotle. (1925). Eudemian ethics. In W. D. Ross (Ed.), The works of Aristotle (J. Solomon, Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Aristotle. (1925). Magna moralia. In W. D. Ross (Ed.), The works of Aristotle (G. Stock, Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Aristotle. (1962). Nicomachean ethics (M. Ostwald, Trans.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Briggle, A. (2008). Real friends: How the internet can foster friendship. Ethics and Information Technology, 10, 71–79.
Cocking, D., & Kennett, J. (1998). Friendship and the self. Ethics, 108, 502–527.
Cocking, D., & Matthews, S. (2000). Unreal friends. Ethics and Information Technology, 2, 223–231.
Cooper, J. (1977). Aristotle on the forms of friendship. The Review of Metaphysics, 30, 619–648.
Fortenbaugh, W. W. (1975). Aristotle’s analysis of friendship: Function and analogy, resemblance, and focal meaning. Phronesis, 20(1), 51–62.
Munn, N. J. (2012). The reality of friendship within immersive virtual worlds. Ethics and Informational Technology, 14(1), 1–10.
Thomas, L. (1987). Friendship. Synthese, 72, 217–236.
Vallor, S. (2010). Social networking technology and the virtues. Ethics and Information Technology, 12(2), 157–170.
Vallor, S. (forthcoming). Flourishing on facebook: Virtue friendship & new social media. Ethics and Information Technology. doi:10.1007/s10676-010-9262-2. Published online Jan. 2011.
Acknowledgments
I thank the anonymous referees of this essay for their helpful suggestions.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
McFall, M.T. Real character-friends: Aristotelian friendship, living together, and technology. Ethics Inf Technol 14, 221–230 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-012-9297-7
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-012-9297-7