The Journal of Speculative Philosophy

Sprigge in Context

T. L. S. Sprigge produced an eclectic yet highly original system of metaphysics and ethics, a synthesis of panpsychism, absolute idealism, and utilitarianism, at a time in which orthodox analytical philosophy could only view this system as an anachronism of the nineteenth century. His critics claim that his philosophy has only historical interest to a small group of specialists in the relatively dormant tradition of British Idealism, that an attempt to defend his view of consciousness is a hopeless nonstarter, and that his Spinozistic monism can have no relevance in our intellectual culture.¹ Yet others have defended Sprigge as the "most independent of thinkers within the field of metaphysics" and salute him as "a true philosopher who has significantly enriched the present state of philosophy by his courageous odd-ballism" and "for serving as a model for others who have felt themselves uncomfortably bound by the sterile narrowness of orthodox, analytic philosophy."² In this essay I shall side with the latter group and attempt to show that the criticisms from the former are mainly grounded in a prejudice that draws conclusions from a privileged posture of ignorance. I argue that Sprigge's view of consciousness remains [End Page 121] a challenge to mainstream physicalism and a viable option that addresses pressing contemporary concerns not only in metaphysics and philosophy of mind but also in environmental ethics and animal rights.

The very title Sprigge chose for his magnum opus, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism, is a challenge to those who view idealism as abandoned with the criticisms of Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and A. J. Ayer at the beginning of the twentieth century. He saw himself as providing an under-represented position in the philosophical spectrum rather than as advocating an abandoned view.³ For Sprigge idealism did not fall at any determinate point in the history of philosophy. The truth of any philosophical thesis cannot depend on what happens to be currently fashionable but, rather, must stand on the soundness of philosophical argument. To this end, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism is a bold statement of his position, most of which was worked out in Edinburgh, a city and university he called "the breath of life to a metaphysician."⁴ Sixty years before Sprigge made this remark, Alfred North Whitehead said in an address to the Royal Society of Edinburgh that the Scottish jewel was "the capital of British metaphysics haunted by the shade of Hume."⁵ There was and still is in Edinburgh a rich context of philosophical activity stimulated by centuries of greatness. Sprigge, in particular, found in Scotland a place that would tolerate resistance to the mainstream.

His system was constructed as a quest to find a satisfactory view of the universe and a moral vision that guides one in the conduct of everyday life. This takes seriously the idea that wisdom is the end sought in philosophical inquiry. As he made the point in connection with Santayana, Sprigge wrote: "The ultimate purpose of philosophical dialectics is to arrive at a synthetic vision of the world and of one's place in it, at once intellectual and aesthetic, which may inform the character of one's life and thought as a whole."⁶ He contrasted his approach with the dominant view of the latter half of the twentieth century that treated "philosophy as a self-contained intellectual game, or perhaps a form of therapy for those afflicted with a rather refined kind of intellectual disorder in their control over their native tongue."⁷ This criticism at the beginning of his inaugural lecture to the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at Edinburgh was most certainly a swipe at those who had fallen under the spell of Wittgenstein that had overtaken philosophy in England. Wittgenstein allegedly demonstrated how "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle,"⁸ but for Sprigge and the distinct minority in the resistance movement, the fly was stuck with a real philosophical problem that would not vanish with the simple control of one's tongue. [End Page 122] Wittgenstein's stranglehold on English...