Abstract
In this paper, I assess Derk Pereboom’s argument for the thesis that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise. I argue that the Frankfurt-style example Pereboom develops presupposes a prior act or omission which the agent was able to avoid. This undermines his argument. I propose a way for Pereboom to revise his example and thereby undercut this objection. Along the way, I also argue that Pereboom should supplement his account of what counts as a robust alternative—an alternative of the sort that should matter to those who argue for an ability-to-do-otherwise condition on moral responsibility.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
In his book, Pereboom cites personal correspondence between Nelkin and him (2014: 12–3).
I am especially indebted to a referee for Philosophical Studies for pressing me on my treatment of Pereboom’s reply to Widerker.
For a dissenting opinion, see Whittle (2016: 81–3). Whittle argues that at very bizarre worlds where all agents are Frankfurted and so cannot do otherwise, it remains true that there is a sense of normal whereby, in normal contexts when no agents are subject to potential interference, they are able to do otherwise. So ‘normal’ is settled by reference to pertinent standards at our world where, we assume, there are not usually secret counterfactual interveners hiding all about. I cannot pursue this further here, but I am not convinced by Whittle’s dismissal here of the prospects of a Global Frankfurt scenario for an entire population of agents. She secures her reply by identifying a sense of normal context that, it is assumed, permits free agents the ability to do otherwise. But of course, the metaphysics of the issue is meant to call into question whether anyone has this ability at all, and so whether it ought to be regarded as necessary for moral responsibility. Frankfurt scenarios were originally deployed to test our intuitions about this. And it is agreed by all parties involved that the contexts are odd ones. To diffuse them by then just insisting that we defer to the presumed default context is just to assume that in these contexts, it is clear that agents do have the ability to do otherwise.
I am indebted to a referee at Philosophical Studies for raising this concern. I would also note that, in sympathy with this referee’s concern, it does seem that this is the sort of concern Kane (1996) might raise when considering what he would call self-forming acts.
References
Fischer, J. M. (1999). Recent work on moral responsibility. Ethics, 110, 93–139.
Frankfurt, H. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy, 66, 829–839.
Frankfurt, H. (2003). Some thoughts concerning PAP. In D. Widerker & M. McKenna (Eds.), Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities (pp. 339–348). Aldershot: Ashgate Press.
Ginet, C. (1996). In defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: Why I don’t find Frankfurt’s argument convincing. Philosophical Perspectives, 10, 403–417.
Ginet, C. (2002). Review of living without free will. Journal of Ethics, 6, 305–309.
Haji, I., & McKenna, M. (2004). Dialectical delicacies in the debate about freedom and alternative possibilities. Journal of Philosophy, 101, 299–314.
Horgan, T. (2015). Injecting the phenomenology of agency into the free will debate. In D. Shoemaker (Ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility (Vol. 3, pp. 34–61). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (1996). The significance of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McKenna, M. (2003). Robustness, control, and the demand for morally significant alternatives. In D. Widerker & M. McKenna (Eds.), Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
McKenna, M. (2008). Frankfurt’s argument against alternative possibilities: Looking beyond the examples. Nous, 42, 770–793.
Mele, A. (1995). Autonomous agents. New York: Oxford University Press.
O’Connor, T. (2000). Persons and causes. New York: Oxford University Press.
Pereboom, D. (2001). Living without free will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pereboom, D. (2014). Free will, agency, and meaning in life. New York: Oxford University Press.
Whittle, A. (2016). Ceteris paribus, I could have done otherwise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(1), 73–85.
Widerker, D. (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. Philosophical Review, 104, 247–261.
Widerker, D. (2006). Libertarianism and the philosophical significance of Frankfurt scenarios. Journal of Philosophy, 103, 163–187.
Acknowledgements
For helpful comments, I would like to thank Ishtiyaque Haji, Terry Horgan, Derk Pereboom, and Carolina Sartorio. I also profited from an excellent set of comments from an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
McKenna, M. A critical assessment of Pereboom’s Frankfurt-style example. Philos Stud 175, 3117–3129 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0997-z
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0997-z