Abstract
In this paper, I defend the central arguments of my book Conversation and Responsibility in response to two critics, Dana Nelkin and Holly Smith.
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Notes
George Sher was also a critic at our session. His equally impressive contribution is not included here, since it was committed elsewhere (forthcoming). Readers are encouraged to read it as well. At points, my replies to Nelkin and Smith will converge on points that can also be employed in response to Sher.
Sher (forthcoming) presses me on this point.
In conversation, my colleague Terry Horgan usefully calls this soft-core conceptual geography as in contrast with hard-core conceptual analysis.
So too for working in the other direction, the one that Wallace and various other Strawsonians (e.g., Watson 1987; Bennett 1980) seem to prefer. Attempting to treat holding morally responsible as more basic and account for it, I say, eventually requires attention to the conditions for being responsible (2012, pp. 50–53).
I am grateful to Mark Timmons for helping me to think though my reply to Nelkin here.
References
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Acknowledgments
For help with this paper, I would like to thank Mark Balaguer, Terry Horgan, Derk Pereboom, Paul Russell, Carolina Sartorio, David Shoemaker, Hannah Tierney, Mark Timmons, Chad van Schoelandt, and Brandon Warmke.
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McKenna, M. Defending conversation and responsibility: reply to Dana Nelkin and Holly Smith. Philos Stud 171, 73–84 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0248-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0248-x