Abstract
Manipulation arguments for incompatibilism all build upon some example or other in which an agent is covertly manipulated into acquiring a psychic structure on the basis of which she performs an action. The featured agent, it is alleged, is manipulated into satisfying conditions compatibilists would take to be sufficient for acting freely. Such an example used in the context of an argument for incompatibilism is meant to elicit the intuition that, due to the pervasiveness of the manipulation, the agent does not act freely and is not morally responsible for what she does. It is then claimed that any agent’s coming to be in the same psychic state through a deterministic process is no different in any relevant respect from the pertinent manner of manipulation. Hence, it is concluded that compatibilists’ proposed sufficient conditions for free will and moral responsibility are inadequate, and that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. One way for compatibilists to resist certain manipulation arguments is by appealing to historical requirements that, they contend, relevant manipulated agents lack. While a growing number of compatibilists advance an historical thesis, in this paper, I redouble my efforts to show, in defense of nonhistorical compatibilists like Harry Frankfurt, that there is still life left in a nonhistorical view. The historical compatibilists, I contend, have fallen shy of discrediting their nonhistorical compatibilist rivals.
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Notes
McKenna (2008a).
McKenna (2004).
Historical compatibilists include Fischer and Ravizza (1998), and Haji (1998). Mele advises compatibilists to adopt an historical view, but remains agnostic about compatibilism; see Mele (1995, 2006). Nonhistorical compatibilists include Arpaly (2006), Berofsky (2006), Double (1991), Dworkin (1988), Frankfurt (1975), Vargas (2006), Watson (1999), and Wolf (1987).
My view (2011) is that these sufficient conditions are inadequate, but that need not detain us here.
Pereboom (2001, p. xx).
The blame or praise that is at issue, as I understand it, involves some overt bit of behavior or treatment, and not merely a private attitude of blame or praise.
van Inwagen (1983, p. 3).
Mele (1995, p. 116).
I will operate with this notion of value, though it does not fully capture the relevant class of attitudes. One could desire X and think it good and yet not be motivated to X because one was committed to its value (on a related point, see Watson 2002: 144–145). Judging X valuable, even when motivated to pursue X, is more inclusive than valuing X. When speaking of a person’s values as they figure in explanations of her actions, presumably we are interested in the more restrictive notion. I will set this aside here, as it will not bear on the discussion to follow.
McKenna (2004, p. 169).
A background assumption is that the manipulation is not so excessive as to violate conditions of the agent’s identity over time. Hence, on certain psychological continuity views of personal identity, a coherence constraint on the manipulation story will require a certain level of psychological connectedness between pre- and post-manipulation. In what follows, I will simply assume that these conditions, whatever they come to, can be satisfied.
See Pereboom (2001, p. 113).
This formulation is largely the same as my earlier efforts, save for one important amendment. Here I write more cautiously of CAS satisfying some proposed compatibilist minimally sufficient conditions, rather than of it “exhausting” compatibilist conditions (McKenna 2004, p. 169; and 2008a, p. 143). Mele objected to my earlier formulation (Mele 2009b, pp. 467–469), where I wrote of CAS satisfying “the very richest” of conditions for freedom and responsibility (McKenna 2004, p. 182). That was too excessive, though I was merely alluding to the relatively robust conditions Pereboom operates with, the conjunctive one mentioned above.
This is the only argument form I will consider. But note that Mele (2008) distinguishes three different forms. The first, which he calls a straight manipulation argument, is basically the form I have set out. The second form, a manipulation argument to the best explanation, which is due to Pereboom (2001), replaces the second premise as I have set it out above with a best-explanation premise of roughly the form, ‘the best explanation that S is not free and morally responsible when manipulated in manner X into A-ing is that S is causally determined.’ The third form, an original design argument of the sort Mele himself has developed (2006), works not from a case of an already existing agent who is manipulated, but from an agent who is originally designed to perform some act, A. Mele is correct to mark these distinctions. However, it is not clear to me how much the distinction between the first and third comes to. Originally designing an agent to do something at a later time seems also to be a case of manipulation, but a case in which the agent is manipulated from a point in time prior to her coming into existence. Kearns (2011) makes a similar point.
Kane (1996, p. 65).
Mele (2008, pp. 264–265).
This formulation draws upon Mele’s, especially the second premise (2008, p. 265).
McKenna (2008a, p. 143).
It is also open to her to amend her version of CAS further in some fashion that is not blatantly ad hoc, thereby allowing her to resist the second premise. But of course, if she makes this move, the incompatibilist is certainly entitled to parry with a counter-move of revising the case of manipulation so as to suit it for the compatibilist’s amended formulation of CAS.
McKenna (2008a, p. 143). This distinction is similar to Kane’s distinction between hard compatibilism and soft compatibilism (Kane 1996, pp. 67–68), which is also adopted by Watson (1999, pp. 360–365). I fear that their way of marking the distinction has mistakenly been taken to suggest that compatibilists must adopt a one-size-fits-all stance towards manipulation arguments. I should add that I do not believe either of them made that mistake. In any event, the terminology I have proposed is meant to guard against that suggestion.
Frankfurt (2002, pp. 27–28).
Locke (1975).
Fischer (2002).
Fischer and Ravizza (1998, pp. 207–214).
As many readers will no doubt recognize, the dispute between nonhistorical and historical compatibilists is yet another variation on the internalism/externalism debate that crops up in all kinds of places. Nonhistorical compatibilists like Frankfurt, as illustrated in the passages quoted above, are committed to the view that any two agents who are nonhistorical duplicates by virtue of sharing all of their “nonhistorical,” “snapshot” or “current timeslice properties” do not differ with respect to their status as free and morally responsible (as I shall explain momentarily, this has to be qualified in terms of direct freedom and direct responsibility). Historical compatibilists deny this; two agents who are nonhistorical duplicates at a time might very well differ with respect to their status as free and morally responsible depending upon differences in their respective histories—that is, depending upon differences in their “historical properties”. Hence, for the historical compatibilists, the concept of moral responsibility is historical in the same way that the property of being a sunburn or a genuine dollar bill is historical. Two burns at a time might be qualitatively indistinguishable. But because only one was caused by the sun and another not, only one is a sunburn. The same with two distinct one dollar bills; if one is counterfeit and the other produced properly, only the latter is genuine. The nonhistorical compatibilist, by contrast, is committed to the view that free will and moral responsibility are nonhistorical in the same way that the property of being a certain size, shape or weight is nonhistorical; any two duplicates sharing the same size, shape, or weight at a time are qualitatively identical in the pertinent respect regardless of any differences in how they came to be that way. See Fischer and Ravizza for a clear articulation of these notions (1998, pp. 171–173).
McKenna (2004).
McKenna (2004, p. 190).
Alternative terminology sometimes used is direct and indirect, or instead, basic and non-basic.
The main reason, although not the only reason, I do not think it is fully accurate is because it seems to me that some cases are better described as cases where a person is not even derivatively free but is derivatively morally responsible, and her derivative moral responsibility traces back to prior directly free acts for which she was directly morally responsible. Such cases might be ones such as reckless drug use leading to unwanted addiction. Cases where the derivative responsibility coincides with derivative freedom are probably best limited to cases where at the time of the behavior in question, the agent welcomes being in the state she is in, despite the fact that, while in it, it is no longer up to her how she will act or what will result from her prior directly free undertakings. Tending to this variation would require various amendments and modifications to the discussion throughout that would not affect the main line of argumentation. So for ease of discussion, I will just treat the notions of derivative freedom and derivative moral responsibility as a package deal.
In my estimation, Frankfurt can readily take on the distinction while preserving his view. It is true that some of his remarks suggest that he would not make room for indirect freedom and responsibility, in particular, his discussion of the unwilling addict, which he treats as transparently not free and not responsible (1971). This is precisely the kind of case where it would be natural to invoke the distinction for some cases of unwilling addiction and not others. It just seems incredible that Frankfurt would not agree that a person who at an earlier time freely engaged in drug use knowing the moral hazards she risked could not later be morally responsible for her addictive behavior even if, once she became an addict, she was an unwilling one. Frankfurt’s own considered position aside, it is easy enough to see how one could fashion a “Frankfurtian” view that includes the distinction between direct and derivative freedom and responsibility.
The distinction I am drawing upon here is not touched by Mele’s complaint about a different way of formulating the notion of basically free actions. According to the formulation that Mele considers and rejects, basicness is defined simply in terms of an act whose status as free is history-independent (2009b, p. 469). All such actions, Mele points out, are by definition history-independent, and so would yield only trivial results for one seeking to defend a nonhistorical view. Indeed. But the distinction I make turns on actions whose status as free is independent of a particular kind of history—in particular, a history that includes prior free acts by virtue of which later ones gain their status as free. It is an open question, and so not trivial, for this class of acts—the directly free ones—as to whether their status as free depends upon any further historical requirements.
Ayer (1954).
Frankfurt (1971).
A variation on this strategy is one in which it is simply granted that the freedom condition of morally responsible action is itself nonhistorical, but then some further condition, say an authenticity or autonomy condition—is required for direct moral responsibility, and it is this condition that involves some historical consideration. This is how Haji argues for the positive historical thesis that he has developed (1998). Purely as a way of simplifying matters of bookkeeping, I will assume that the freedom condition can be treated in an inclusive manner so as to also involve authenticity or autonomy as someone like Haji might think of it.
McKenna (2004).
Mele (1995, pp. 145–146).
Mele (2006, pp. 164–166).
McKenna (2004, p. 173).
Mele (2006, p. 166).
That is, I had assumed either that Beth could have done otherwise, or instead that Beth was, say, suitably responsive to reasons, or something of that sort—something that nonhistorical compatibilists would make use of to account for directly free action.
More recently, Mele has taken up cases of this sort, cases in which a globally manipulated agent has installed unsheddable values from which she acts, but in which it is nevertheless the case that this agent could have done otherwise (2009a, p. 173). In these cases, Mele is prepared to commend the (credible) historical compatibilist verdict that these agents are not morally responsible.
In the remained of this paragraph and in the next two, I draw from McKenna (2004, pp. 180–181). In doing so, I have revised slightly the case of Suzie Instant so as to fit it for the points developed in this paper.
For an excellent treatment of agents like Suzie Instant, see David Zimmerman’s paper, “Born Yesterday: Personal Autonomy for Agents without a Past” (1999). Mele comments that I, “seemingly take it to be clear that Suzie Instant is a conceptually possible agent” (2009b, p. 467). For the record, I do think such beings are conceptually possible, despite Davidson’s worries about swampman (Davidson 1987). I am not sure I would say I find it clear. For Mele’s position on this issue, see Mele (1995, pp. 172–173; and 2009a, pp. 174–179).
One potential source of concern about this example is that when Suzie Instant A-s, she does so while non-culpably believing about herself many things that are false. Given reasonable epistemic constraints on moral responsibility, this might excuse or exempt her. But as Haji and Cuypers have pointed out (2007: 349–350), all that is required to avoid this pitfall is that Suzie’s act of A-ing be one that does not implicate any objectionably false beliefs.
The case of Suzie Normal is very much like the case of Mele’s Ernie, who was created by the god Diana in zygote form and then set free to live out a normal human life (2006, pp. 188–189). According to Mele (2006, p. 193), and I agree, a compatibilist is committed to denying that when Ernie performs some act that Diana intended for him, he does not do so freely and is not morally responsible.
McKenna (2004, pp. 181–182).
McKenna (2004, p. 182).
Below (Sect. 7), I will show how one might object that there is a further negative historical condition at work here.
In my earlier formulation (2004, pp. 181–182), I did not make this line of argument explicit, but I can see from Mele’s discussion that I should have:
McKenna apparently is thinking that there is good reason to make symmetrical moral responsibility judgments about instant agents like Suzie Instant and radically manipulated agents like Beth. However, because he offers no argument for this thought, I cannot be blamed for my ignorance about why he finds it plausible. (Mele 2009b, p. 466)
I hope that what I have offered here helps. Note that in their critical discussion of my 2004, Haji and Cuypers (2007, p. 349) explicitly formulate and then discuss the line of argument I have set out here.
McKenna (2004, pp. 182–184).
Arpaly (2003, p. 128).
McKenna (2004, pp. 183–184).
McKenna (2004, pp. 182–183).
Frankfurt (2002, pp. 27–28).
McKenna (2011).
For example, see Mele (2009a, p. 170).
Mele (2006, p. 172).
Thus, it is easy to see that Fischer and Ravizza (1998) are as committed to Suzie Instant’s A-ing unfreely as they are to Beth’s A-ing unfreely.
One central criticism Mele leveled against my earlier discussion of his view (McKenna 2004) is precisely that he is on record as granting that some instant agents can be regarded as free and morally responsible for their actions while agents like Beth are not (Mele 2009b). Mele asks why he is under pressure to treat the cases of Beth and Suzie Instant symmetrically. It is a fair question, and I mean to take it up, but only indirectly. The problem with speaking directly to the difference between us at this juncture is that we apparently are talking about very different kinds of cases. As I have already made clear above (Sect. 4), I do not mean for the Beth case to be understood so that her action when she A-s is one that is only derivatively free, if it is free at all; I mean for it to be understood as one in which what is in question is whether her action is directly free. It appears that Mele does not think about his case of Beth in the same way—insofar as he is not thinking of his case of Ann as one involving what I would call direct freedom. And as for the matter of the instant agents that Mele is prepared to regard as free and responsible (e.g., 1995: 172–173), these are agents whose abilities far exceed the abilities of normal human persons like ourselves. All of their values are sheddable. I have, by contrast, sought to test a nonhistorical compatibilist thesis by considering a case of an instant agent who, when she is brought into existence, can be regarded as a current-timeslice replica of an actual human person. This is a constraint that I believe is warranted by virtue of the dialectical assumption that early on (Sect. 1) I claimed for compatibilism. So, under the highly plausible assumption that actual adult human persons cannot simply shed each of their values at will, instant agents with only sheddable values will not do.
Haji and Cuypers (2007) offer a different explanation of why the cases of Beth and Suzie Instant should be treated asymmetrically. They do so by way of defending a positive historical thesis, but one that only applies to agents who have a history. I will set aside their treatment here, as I have responded to them elsewhere (McKenna 2012).
Fischer and Ravizza (1998, pp. 220–223).
McKenna (2008a).
McKenna (2008a, p. 144).
In fact, one can find a nice illustration of this point in Pereboom’s formulation of his manipulation argument. In response to Fischer and Ravizza’s historical conditions, which they contend render them immune to certain manipulation worries (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, pp. 235–236), Pereboom just proposes that their historical requirements be added to his manipulation case (Pereboom 2001, p. 122).
This point is most clearly on display with Mele’s forceful original design argument for incompatibilism (2006, pp. 188–189). This argument features the goddess Diana, who creates Ernie with the intention that he performs some particular “free” act at a certain point in his adult life, which Ernie subsequently does. Construed as a kind of manipulation argument (manipulating Ernie from a point in time prior to his coming into being), this example allows for a case in which Ernie’s entire life history prior to his “free” act need not differ in any way from any other agent at a deterministic world. Aside from his manner of creation, Ernie really does live out the kind of ordinary, every-day life any other person might. Here the intuitive unease of claiming that Ernie does act freely and is morally responsible is ratcheted way down as in comparison with how jarring a case like the case of Beth is. It is little wonder that Mele rightly remarks that compatibilists should take (what I would term) a hard-line reply to this argument (2006, p. 193).
I am indebted to Terry Horgan for this suggestion.
Frankfurt (2002, p. 28).
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McKenna, M. Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism. J Ethics 16, 145–174 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-012-9125-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-012-9125-7