CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume XIII, Number 1, March 1983

Psychologism in Semantics

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There is an unresolved conflict in points of view that continues to fester in contemporary semantics and philosophy of mind. According to one influential outlook, an adequate theory of semantic properties and relations would provide us with a better understanding of those psychological acts and states called the propositional attitudes. A theory of such semantic concepts as that of a sentence's *meaning* something, or that of a term's *referring* to something would, according to this point of view, be capable of yielding explications of such analogous psychological concepts as that of a thought's having a certain propositional *content,* or of a belief's being *about* something. This program is sometimes called the 'Analogy Theory' of thought; since Wilfrid Sellars is the most forceful and creative proponent of this point of view, I will call it 'Sellars's Program.'[1]

1 The classic statement of this point of view may be found in Sellars's 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,' in W. Sellars, *Science, Perception, and Reality* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1963).

But there is another, equally influential outlook that runs completely counter to Sellars's Program. On Sellars's Program, the intentionality of the propositional attitudes is to be explicated by use of semantic concepts. But on this other point of view, such semantic conceptions as that of a sentence's meaning something or that of a term's referring to something, will eventually yield to explications that make essential use of propositional attitude-vocabulary. The central idea behind this point of view is that words have meanings in a language because *the speakers* of the language conventionally mean what they do when using these words. Moreover, the concept of a speaker's meaning something by his words is a psychological concept, for it can be understood in terms of a speaker's using his words with certain communicative intentions. Thus the concept of a given word or sentence's meaning something in a given language should be explicable in terms of the conventions or rules that govern the communicative intentions with which the speakers of that language use that word or that sentence. This is the point of view of H.P. Grice and his followers; I will call it 'Grice's Program.'[2]

Each of these incompatible points of view has considerable initial plausibility. But for one who is struck by the plausibility of both points of view, the resulting difficulty is profound. In the discussion to follow, I hope to succeed in moving the current impasse between the programs of Grice and Sellars off dead center. I will try to do this by arguing against Grice that semantic concepts cannot be understood in terms of the propositional attitudes. If my argument is correct, then I will have given some rational justification for preferring Sellars's view that the intentionality of the propositional attitudes should be understood in semantic terms and not vice versa.

Of course, my negative conclusion against Grice will not show that Sellars's positive view is correct. For my conclusion that semantic concepts *cannot* be understood in terms of the propositional attitudes does not imply that the propositional attitudes *can* be understood in semantic terms. Thus my argument that Grice is wrong will be consistent with the possibility that Sellars is also wrong.

Nevertheless, a successful argument against Grice's point of view would provide some much-needed support for Sellars's Program. For pessimism regarding the prospects of this program is often rooted in a

2 For Grice's psychological theory of speaker's meaning, see his paper 'Meaning,' *Philosophical Review,* **66** (1957) 377-88; see also his 'Utterer's Meaning and Intentions,' *Philosophical Review,* **78** (1969) 147-77. For Grice's program of explicating semantic concepts in terms of speaker's meaning, see his 'Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning,' in J. Searle, ed., *The Philosophy of Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1971).

conviction that the program is doomed to circularity.[3] This conviction is in turn based on the Gricean belief that the use of propositional attitude-vocabulary is required for the explication of semantic concepts. So if my argument against this Gricean belief is correct, the proponents of Sellars's Program will at least be able to proceed unfettered by worries about circularity.

My strategy will be to argue that there is at least one fundamental semantic notion that cannot be explicated within Grice's Program. This notion is that of semantic reference, or what I call *denotation.* Most of the discussion to follow will be devoted to arguing for this conclusion. But since I believe that any Gricean explication of the concepts of meaning and truth will have to rely on the concept of denotation, I take my main conclusion to show also that the concepts of meaning and truth cannot be explicated within Grice's Program either.

1. What is a theory of reference?

Since my aim is to show that no Gricean theory can capture the concept of semantic reference or denotation, it will be useful to begin by considering the form and scope that a successful theory of denotation should have.

It might be thought that the correct strategy for defining denotation would be to first find the denotation-conditions for each of the various types of singular terms. Having found these conditions, one might suggest, we could then go on to define denotation itself as that many-one relation which holds between a token α of a singular term and an object x just in case α and x satisfy the condition that is appropriate for singular terms of the same type as α.

On this conception, a general definition of denotation would be an instance of the following sort of schema:

(1) α denotes $x =_{df}$ There are a speaker s and a time t such that either

(i) α is a token of a proper name uttered by s at t and $x = (\iota y)\ \varphi$; or

3 See for instance the remarks by Chisholm in the Chisholm-Sellars Correspondence on Intentionality, H.Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell, eds., *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science,* Vol. II, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1958) 521-39.

(ii) α is a token of a definite description uttered by *s* at *t* and $x = (\iota y)\ \psi$; or

(iii) α is a token of a first person pronoun uttered by *s* at *t* and $x = (\iota y)\ \chi$; or

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and so on, for each type of singular term.[4]

Here the schemata '$(\iota y)\ \varphi$', '$(\iota y)\ \psi$', and '$(\iota y)\ \chi$' are standing in for the denotation-conditions that would be specified by the correct theories of reference for proper names, definite descriptions, first person pronouns, and so on. I am not certain that anyone has ever thought that a theory of denotation should look like (1). But some philosophers writing on reference have certainly given the impression that they believed it should. For instance, when considering proper names, Saul Kripke seems to suggest that a correct theory of the denotation-conditions for proper names would be *circular* if it made use of the concept of denotation in the statement of these conditions.[5] This suggestion makes sense only if one assumes that the correct denotation-condition for proper names should be capable of use as a clause in the general definition of denotation. So it seems that Kripke is assuming that a correct theory of denotation would look like (1).

But this assumption is far too parochial to be correct. For no matter how many types of singular terms for which one is able to find the correct denotation-conditions, it will always be possible for there to be

4 Strictly speaking, a definition of denotation that is based on an enumeration of the types of singular terms and their respective denotation-conditions would have to be recursive, and so would not look exactly like (1). I neglect this complication here, since it does not affect my basic point.

5 Kripke seems to be suggesting this at several points in 'Naming and Necessity,' in D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., *Semantics of Natural Language* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1972). For instance, he seems to be saying (pp. 302-3) that he has not given a theory of the reference-conditions for names, because the picture he presents cannot be used to *eliminate* the notion of reference. This certainly suggests that a real theory of names *could* be so used. See also p. 285, and note especially the remark about Bishop Butler's dictum on p. 301.

other types of singular terms, obeying *other* denotation-conditions, perhaps in unknown languages that have passed out of existence, or in languages that have yet to be invented.[6] A proponent of a theory that looks like (1) is committed to the obviously false view that there *could not be* singular terms which denote objects and yet which also fail to satisfy any of the denotation-conditions for those kinds of singular terms in the actual languages with which we happen to be familiar.

We must therefore make a sharp distinction between two different sorts of tasks. On the one hand there is the task of constructing particular theories of reference for the particular kinds of singular terms found in natural languages, such as proper names, definite descriptions, and demonstrative pronouns. Most, if not all, work on reference by philosophers, logicians, and linguists has been concerned with this task. But the construction of a general theory of semantic reference is a different sort of task entirely, for such a theory must be general enough to apply, not just to the singular terms of actual languages, but to all *possible* singular terms of all *possible* languages.

If the particular denotation-conditions for the terms of particular languages cannot be directly used to define denotation itself, then the question arises: What connection is there between such conditions and the general concept of denotation? One obvious such connection is provided by the truth that a token α of a singular term denotes an object x in a language L if and only if α and x satisfy the denotation-condition in L for terms of the same type as α. Of course this truth does not take us very far, but it does suggest something important. It suggests a strategy for explicating the concept of denotation, namely: first explicate the general concept of a condition's being a denotation-condition in a language L for a type of singular term; for once this is done, the concept of denotation would fall right out, via the truth just mentioned.

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6 For instance, consider the imaginary token-reflexive term 'toof' of an imaginary language L. The following, suppose, is the correct theory of reference for 'toof' in L:

(i) If α is a token of 'toof' uttered by a speaker s at a time t, and s is speaking L in uttering α, then α denotes an object x if and only if x is the unique object that is two feet in front of s's nose at t.

Surely, it is possible for a term like 'toof' to exist. But (as far as I know) no actual language contains a term of the same type as 'toof,' and so the denotation-condition for 'toof' would not occur in a definition that has the form of (1). Of course, an infinite number of possible but non-existent types of token-reflexive singular terms can be generated in this way; just replace ' "toof" ' in (i) by the name of some other syntactic type, such as ' "threef",' and replace 'two' in (i) by the name of some other natural number, like 'three,' and so on.

The next question that arises, then, is: What makes a given condition a denotation-condition in a language for a type of singular term? A natural suggestion would be that a condition is a denotation-condition in a language if it occurs in one of a certain sort of semantic *rule* or *convention* that governs the use of the singular terms of that language. To have a label for such rules, let us call them 'denotation-rules.' If one could discover the general nature and form of the denotation-rules of any language, then one could also define the notion of a denotation-condition. Such a condition would be one that occurs (in the requisite way) in some denotation-rule of the language in question.

So if one wants to construct a general theory of reference, a good way to begin would be to find the general form of denotation-rules. It is noteworthy that we have arrived in a natural way at an outline for constructing a theory of reference that corresponds in form to the kind of project whereby the proponents of Grice's Program hope to explicate semantic notions in general. For the Gricean believes that these notions can be captured via a discovery of certain conventions or rules that govern the uses of words by speakers, and as we have just seen, it is likely that this is exactly what must be done if the notion of denotation is to be captured. This provides strong corroboration of Grice's insights.

Now according to Grice, the relevant kinds of conventions or rules must be conventions or rules that govern certain psychological states of speakers. For Grice's Program to succeed in the area of semantic reference, therefore, it must be possible to state the general form of denotation-rules in psychological terms, and this must be done in such a way that the resulting concept of this kind of rule can yield, first, an adequate concept of a denotation-condition and, finally, an adequate concept of denotation itself. I now wish to consider whether this is a real possibility or not.

2. A paradigm Gricean theory.

According to Grice, semantic rules or conventions govern what speakers may *mean* by their words. A natural view for a Gricean to take, then, would be that denotation-rules govern what speakers may mean by the singular terms that they use. A similar view would be that denotation-rules govern what speakers may *refer to* with the singular terms that they use. In fact, if we accept the plausible idea that speaker's reference is a species of speaker's meaning, then these two views come to much the same thing.[7]

On the sense of 'refer' in question, it is possible for a *speaker* to refer to something, even though the *term* he uses refers to, or denotes, a different thing, or nothing at all.[8] Thus the concepts of speaker's reference and semantic reference are not the same. Yet it surely seems likely that these two concepts are closely related. For a Gricean, this likelihood should lend credence to the idea that the psychological concept of speaker's reference could be used to define the semantic concept of denotation.[9]

Given these considerations, it would be natural for a Gricean to suggest that denotation can be explicated in terms of rules that govern speaker's reference. There are of course various forms that such rules might take, but let us begin by considering the possibility that denotation-rules have the following form:

(2) For any speaker s and object x: s is to refer to x with a token α of W only if $x = (\iota y)\ \varphi$.

Here I understand that W denotes a word or syntactic type, and that φ is a formula that contains y free.[10]

The proposal that (2) expresses the general form of denotation-rules can be used to construct a plausible theory of denotation. This theory can be roughly stated as follows: a token α denotes an object x just in case the speaker of α is following a rule of his language of the form (2) that governs the word of which α is a token, and x uniquely satisfies the denotation-condition that occurs in this rule.[11] But before we can give a

7 Kripke suggested this idea in his 'Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference,' *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, **2** (1977) 255-76. For further discussion of the relation between speaker's meaning and speaker's reference, see my paper, 'Causes and Intentions: a Reply,' *Philosophical Review*, **90** (1981).

8 See note 24 below for discussion of this point.

9 Gail Stine suggested that the notion of speaker's reference could be used to construct a Gricean theory of denotation in 'Meaning Other Than What We Say and Referring,' *Philosophical Studies*, **33** (1978) 319-37.

10 Below I will propose that φ should be understood to contain at most free variables y and α.

11 Here and below, I use the expression 'to follow a rule' in such a sense that it is possible to follow a rule without *obeying* it. This may be abnormal usage, but I need a word for the psychological relation that needs to hold between a person

more precise formulation, a certain technical difficulty needs to be overcome.

As just stated, our Gricean theory requires, for any given term of a language, that there be a single condition, or property, that is uniquely satisfied by every object that is denoted by a token of the term.[12] In effect, then, the theory as stated requires all the tokens of any given term to have the same denotation. The trouble is that this requirement is fulfilled, and only fulfilled, by terms whose denotations are determined *independently of the context of utterance,* terms like those of mathematics and certain definite descriptions like 'the inventor of bifocals.' But the requirement is not fulfilled by *token-reflexive* terms, terms whose denotations are determined in part by features of the context of utterance.

Consider the word 'I,' for instance. A token *α* of 'I' denotes an object *x* just in case *x* is the speaker of *α*. But there is no single condition such that any token of 'I' denotes an object *x* just in case *x* uniquely satisfies that condition. Rather, there is a single *relation* that any object denoted by a token of 'I' uniquely bears to *that token,* namely, the relation of *being identical with the speaker of* the token.

We need to find another way of stating our Gricean theory so that it will be capable of dealing with both context-independent terms and token-reflexives. The following conjecture will enable me to do this. I suggest that every denotation-condition for any possible token-reflexive term can be expressed as a two-place relation that the denotation of any token of the term uniquely bears to *that token itself.* My conjecture is based simply upon an inspection of various token-reflexives. For instance, a token *α* of 'I' denotes *x* just in case *x is the unique speaker of α*; a token *α* of 'now' denotes *x* just in case *x is the unique time at which α is uttered;* a token *α* of the demonstrative 'this' denotes *x* just in case *x is the unique individual that the speaker of α demonstrates by use of α*; and so on. Since I know of no exceptions to my conjecture, I offer it as a plausible hypothesis.

Given this hypothesis, we can express a more adequate Gricean theory based on (2) as follows: a token *α* denotes an object *x* just in case

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and a rule in order for the rule to *apply* to his behavior, and I am using 'follows' to express this relation. So in my terminology, following a rule in uttering an expression is something like thinking of one's utterance as subject to the rule, and is not the same as actually obeying the rule.

12 Here I am considering only terms for which there is just *one* rule of the form (2) in the language in question. In other words, I am restricting my attention to *unambiguous* terms.

the speaker of α is following a rule of his language of the form (2) that governs the word of which α is a token, and *either* x uniquely satisfies the property mentioned in the rule, *or* x uniquely bears to α the relation mentioned in the rule. The theory can be stated in slightly clearer fashion as follows:

(G1) α denotes $x =_{df}$ There is a language L, a rule R, a word w, and a speaker s such that:

(i) α is a token of w uttered by s and R is a rule of L;

(ii) s is both speaking L and following R in uttering α; and

(iii) *either* there is a property F such that

(a) $x = (\iota y)Fy$, and

(b) R prescribes that: for any speaker s^* and object z, s^* is to refer to z with a token β of w only if $z = (\iota y)Fy$;

or there is a relation G such that

(c) $x = (\iota y)Gy\alpha$, and

(d) R prescribes that: for any speaker s^* and object z, s^* is to refer to z with a token β of w only if $z = (\iota y)\ Gy\beta$.

(G1) has the form of the sort of theory of reference envisaged earlier. It is based on the concept of a denotation-rule expressed by (2). This concept is used in clauses (b) and (d) of (iii). (G1) does justice to the distinction between context-independent and token-reflexive terms by invoking a corresponding distinction between two types of rules of the form (2). The sort of rule mentioned in clause (b) allows (G1) to deal with context-independent terms, while the sort of rule mentioned in clause (d) allows (G1) to deal with token-reflexives.

As we have seen, a theory of denotation is adequate only if it is general enough to apply to all possible terms of all possible languages. This is a strong requirement, but it is plausible to suppose that (G1) fulfils it. This is because (G1) puts so few restrictions on which conditions may be denotation-conditions. Provided merely that a given condition φ occurs in a rule of a possible language that has the form (2), φ is a denotation-condition for a possible term.[13]

But in spite of its laudable degree of generality, (G1) suffers from a serious defect. (G1) is false, I shall argue, because it implies that terms with a certain kind of meaning inevitably have a *second* meaning, even though it is clear that terms of the sort in question need not have this second meaning. As we shall see, many other Gricean theories of denotation are false for the same reason.

3. A refutation of the Gricean paradigm.

(G1) implies that a certain kind of singular term is inevitably ambiguous, because it implies that terms with a certain form of denotation-condition in a given language must also have another non-equivalent denotation-condition in that language. I have in mind terms whose denotation-conditions are complex in a certain way. A term might be such that it denotes an object just in case that object satisfies a certain condition of the form ⌜$x = (\iota y)(y = a \;\&\; Fy)$⌝, where *a* is a context-independent term. Any definite description of the form ⌜$(\iota y)(y = a \;\&\; Fy)$⌝, such as 'the individual who both is the inventor of bifocals and is French' would be an example of the kind of term I mean. To have a label, I will call such terms, 'complex terms.'

(G1) implies that any complex term must be ambiguous. To see why, let us consider an imaginary complex term W of an imaginary language L. Let us assume that in L W is unambiguous and has the same meaning as the English description 'the individual who both is the inventor of bifocals and is French.' (It does not matter whether we assume that W is syntactically simple or complex.) Given these assumptions, the following would be the correct theory of reference for W in L:[14]

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13 Here and below I assume that rules of the form (2) are all either of the form mentioned in clause (b) of (G1) or of the form mentioned in clause (d) of (G1). In other words, from here on I assume that φ is a formula containing *y* free and containing at most free variables *y* and α.

14 By saying that (3) is 'the correct theory of reference for W in L,' I intend both to rule out the possibility that (3) merely *happens* to be true, and to suggest instead that (3) is true by virtue of the meaning that W has in L. In other words, (3) contains what I've been calling the 'denotation-condition' for W in L. Hence, this same condition must occur in a denotation-rule of L, and for a proponent of (G1) this implies that the condition occurs in a rule of the form (2).

(3) If α is a token of W uttered by a speaker *s*, and *s* is speaking L in uttering α, then α denotes an object *x* if and only if x = the y such that y = the inventor of bifocals and y is French.

Now if (G1) is correct, then denotation-rules are of the form (2). But if denotation-rules are of the form (2), then (3) would be true *because* L contains a rule of this form, a rule that contains the denotation-condition for W mentioned in (3). This rule is:

(4) For any speaker *s* and object *x*: *s* is to refer to *x* with a token α of W only if x = the y such that y = the inventor of bifocals and y is French.

An object cannot satisfy the consequent of (4) without being the inventor of bifocals. Thus we may say that the rule (4) *logically implies* the rule:

(5) For any speaker *s* and object *x*: *s* is to refer to *x* with a token α of W only if x = the y such that y is an inventor of bifocals.[15]

Now I think it is clear that, since (4) logically implies (5), any language of which (4) is a rule must also be a language of which (5) is a rule.[16] But if both (4) and (5) are rules of L, then according to (G1), W

15 Roughly, one rule or imperative logically implies another just in case a person could not endorse the former without committing himself to endorsing the latter. A clear account can only be achieved by constructing a logic of imperatives. For an example of such a logic that is adequate for my purposes here, see Hector-Neri Castañeda's *Thinking and Doing* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1975), Chapter Four.

16 The principle I am invoking here is

(P) If R is a rule of L, and R logically implies R′, then R′ is a rule of L.

Since several of my arguments here and below against various Gricean theories of denotation depend on (P), a Gricean might hope to avoid these arguments by denying (P). However, unless (P) is true, a Gricean theory of denotation cannot hope to give an adequate account of syntactically complex terms. Let L be a language that contains terms of the form ⌜$\alpha + \beta$⌝. Since L will contain an infinite number of such terms, there cannot be a finite list of *basic* denotation-rules, each covering an instance of ⌜$\alpha + \beta$⌝. So there must be a single basic rule in L for all terms of this form (e.g., 'refer to *x* with a term of the form ⌜$\alpha + \beta$⌝ only if *x* is the sum of the denotations of α and β'). But then, the denotation-condition for an instance of ⌜$\alpha + \beta$⌝, say '2 + 1', can only be obtained from a denotation-rule that is *derived* from the basic rule (e.g., 'refer to *x* with "2 + 1" only if *x* is the sum of the denotations of "2" and "1" '). So to be adequate, a Gricean theory will have to treat derived rules as rules of language, and this requires the truth of (P).

must be *ambiguous* in L, contrary to what we assumed. Let us suppose (what is in fact true) that Ben Franklin, an American, is the inventor of bifocals. Given our initial assumption that in L, W unambiguously means 'the individual who both is the inventor of bifocals and is French,' all tokens of W that are uttered in L would have no denotations, since no one both invented bifocals and is French. (G1) has this same result for tokens of W uttered by speakers of L who are following the rule (4). But also according to (G1), when speakers of L are following the rule (5), their tokens of W would denote an object x just in case x is the inventor of bifocals. So according to (G1) these tokens of W would all denote Ben Franklin. But this would be impossible if W unambiguously meant 'the individual who both is the inventor of bifocals and is French.' So according to (G1), W must be ambiguous in L. In effect, (G1) requires that if W means 'the individual who both is the inventor of bifocals and is French' then W must *also* mean 'the inventor of bifocals.'

We began by assuming both that (G1) is true and that in some possible language L, the word W unambiguously conforms to (3). From these assumptions we deduced the consequence that W does *not* unambiguously conform to (3), contrary to hypothesis. So if (G1) were a correct theory of denotation, it would be *logically impossible* for there to be a language in which W unambiguously conformed to (3). And in general, if (G1) were correct, there could not be languages that contain unambiguous complex terms (W being just an arbitrary example of such a term). But this consequence is clearly false. For it is obviously possible for a term to mean the same as a description of the form $\ulcorner(\iota y)\ (y = a \ \& \ Fy)\urcorner$, *and to have no other meaning.* Thus (G1) is false.

The argument just given against (G1) can be easily generalized to refute any of an infinite number of other Gricean theories of denotation that are based on forms of rules analogous to (2).[17] Thus consider any theory of denotation that is based on a rule of the following form:

(6) For any speaker s and object x: s is to bear M to x and a token α of W only if $x = (\iota y)\varphi$,

where M expresses a three-place relation. By an argument exactly analogous to the one against (G1), we can show that any such theory of denotation is false because it implies that complex terms are inevitably ambiguous.

17 Here and below, when I speak of a theory of denotation's being 'based on' a given form of rule, I mean that the theory is just like (G1), only with expressions for the form of rule in question replacing clauses (iii)-(b) and (iii)-(d) of (G1).

The same general sort of consideration can be used to refute several other types of theories of denotation, including each theory that is based on one of the following forms of rule:[18]

(7) s is permitted to refer to x with a token α of W only if $x = (\imath y)\varphi$;

(8) s is permitted to refer to x with a token α of W, if $x = (\imath y)\varphi$;

(9) s is to utter a token α of W only if s refers with α to $(\imath y)\varphi$;

(10) s is permitted to utter a token α of W only if s refers with α to $(\imath y)\varphi$;

(11) s is permitted to utter a token α of W, if s refers with α to $(\imath y)\varphi$;

(12) s is to utter a token α of W only if s intends to refer with α to $(\imath y)\varphi$;

(13) s is to utter a token α of W, if s intends to refer with α to $(\imath y)\varphi$;

(14) s is permitted to utter a token α of W only if s intends to refer with α to $(\imath y)\varphi$;

(15) s is permitted to utter a token α of W, if s intends to refer with α to $(\imath y)\varphi$.

By arguments analogous to the argument against (G1), we can show that the theories of denotation based on the above concepts of denotation-rules are all false, because each such theory either (a) implies that complex terms are inevitably ambiguous, or (b) implies that any term which means the same as a description of the form ⌜$(\imath y)$ $(y = a)$⌝ is inevitably ambiguous, whether the term is complex or not.[19] And like

18 Here and below, forms of rules will be expressed without explicit universal quantifiers to bind the variables 's' and 'x'. This is just for the sake of brevity; these quantifiers should be assumed to be implicit wherever they are necessary to bind 's' and 'x'.

19 The theories based on those rules in the list whose major connective is 'only if' imply like (G1) that complex terms are inevitably ambiguous. The theories based on the other rules in the list whose major connective is 'if' imply that any term which means the same as a description of the form ⌜$(\imath y)$ $(y = a)$⌝ is inevitably ambiguous. As an example of the latter sort of theory, consider the theory based on (8). Let W be a term of L that means the same as a description ⌜$(\imath y)$ $(y = a)$⌝. If (8)

the argument against (G1), each of these arguments against a theory of denotation that is based on one of the forms (7) - (15) can be generalized to refute an infinite number of other theories that are based on other analogous forms of rule.

4. Theories based on biconditional rules.

The Gricean theories of denotation we have considered so far have all been based on rules that are *conditional* in form. But there are other plausible candidates for the concept of a denotation-rule that are instead *biconditional* in form. Consider, for instance, the form of rule:

(16) s is permitted to utter a token α of W if and only if s refers with α to $(\imath y)\varphi$.

Let us call the theory of denotation that is based on (16) but is otherwise just like (G1), '(G2).' (G2) is certainly no less plausible in appearance than the theories already described. And because it is based on a biconditional instead of a conditional form of rule, (G2) cannot be refuted by the considerations adduced so far. In particular, it does not follow from (G2) that every complex term which means the same as a description of the form $\ulcorner(\imath y)\ (y = a\ \&\ Fy)\urcorner$ must also mean $\ulcorner(\imath y)\ (y = a)\urcorner$, or vice versa.

Nevertheless, (G2) does have a defect that is similar to the ones we've already found in other Gricean theories. For (G2) falsely implies

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is an adequate concept of a denotation-rule, then L must contain the rule

(i) s is permitted to refer to x with a token α of W, if $x = (\imath y)\ (y = a)$.

But, for any property F, the rule (i) logically implies the rule

(ii) s is permitted to refer to x with a token α of W, if $x = (\imath y)\ (y = a\ \&\ Fy)$.

So according to the theory in question, W must also mean the same as $\ulcorner(\imath y)\ (y = a\ \&\ Fy)\urcorner$ since (ii) must be a rule of L if (i) is.

The arguments against the theories based on (7), (9) and (10) are exactly analogous to the argument against (G1), and the argument against the theory based on (11) is exactly analogous to the one just given against the theory based on (8). The arguments against the theories based on (12)-(15) are similar to those already described, but they require use of an additional principle about intending to the effect that $\ulcorner$s intends to refer to $(\imath y)\ (y = a\ \&\ Fy)\urcorner$ implies $\ulcorner$s intends to refer to $(\imath y)\ (y = a)\urcorner$. The plausibility of this latter principle rests on that of the principle: $\ulcorner$s intends to do both A and B$\urcorner$ implies $\ulcorner$s intends to do A$\urcorner$.

that terms with a certain kind of meaning are either inevitably ambiguous or cannot exist at all. I will call terms of the kind in question 'demonstrative descriptions.' By a demonstrative description, I mean any term whose denotation-condition requires that an object is denoted by a token of the term if and only if the object both (a) is referred to with the token by its speaker, and (b) uniquely satisfies a given further condition.

But are there terms of this sort? One widely held view of demonstratives strongly suggests that such terms exist in English. On this view, demonstrative singular terms all have in common the feature that their tokens' denotations are determined either wholly or in part by what their speakers demonstrate, or refer to, by use of the tokens.[20] For instance, the 'pure' demonstratives 'this' and 'that' have their denotations determined solely by what their speakers are referring to, and so conform to the following principle:

(17) If α is a token of 'this' ('that') uttered by *s*, and *s* is speaking English in uttering α, then α denotes an object *x* if and only if *x* = the individual *y* such that *s* refers to *y* with α.

Other demonstratives have their denotations determined in part by what their speakers are referring to and in part by additional conditions. For instance, English demonstratives of the form ⌜that F⌝ ('that man', 'that book over there') conform to the following principle:

(18) If α is a token of ⌜that F⌝ uttered by *s*, and *s* is speaking English in uttering α, then α denotes an object *x* if and only if *x* = the individual *y* such that *y* satisfies F and *s* refers to *y* with α.

One species of demonstrative of this last sort is especially important for my purposes. I have in mind terms of the form ⌜that unique F⌝. According to (18), a token α of ⌜that unique F⌝ denotes an object *x* if and only if *x* both is referred to with α by its speaker and uniquely satisfies F. This makes such terms examples of demonstrative descriptions.

The existence in English of terms of the form ⌜that unique F⌝ shows, I think, that there are examples of demonstrative descriptions in actual languages. Other examples can also be produced.[21] But my argument

20 See, for instance, Tyler Burge, 'Demonstrative Constructions, Reference, and Truth,' *Journal of Philosophy*, **71** (1974) 205-23; also, Michael Devitt, *Designation* (New York: Columbia University Press 1981) 42-56.

21 In my paper 'The Ambiguity of Definite Descriptions,' *Theoria*, **45** (1979) 78-89, I argue that every definite description ⌜the φ⌝ is ambiguous as between its stan-

against (G2) will not assume that there are any actual examples of such terms. It will only assume that it is *possible* for there to be languages that contain demonstrative descriptions. That this is possible should be beyond dispute.

To see the difficulty that demonstrative descriptions pose for (G2), let us consider an imaginary example of such a term, 'Dsocrates' say, of an imaginary language L. Suppose that the correct theory of reference for 'Dsocrates' in L is:

(19) If α is a token of 'Dsocrates' uttered by *s*, and *s* is speaking L in uttering α, then α denotes an object *x* if and only if x = the *y* such that y = Socrates and *s* refers to *y* with α.

Now (G2) is correct only if (16) is an adequate concept of a denotation-rule. But if (16) is adequate, then the following must be a rule of L:

(20) *s* is permitted to utter a token α of 'Dsocrates' if and only if *s* refers with α to the *y* such that y = Socrates and *s* refers to *y* with α.[22]

(20) is an oddly redundant rule. Its redundancy is due to the fact that its righthand part is logically equivalent to the simpler expression ⌜*s* refers with α to the *y* such that y = Socrates⌝. Because of this fact, (20) is logically equivalent to the rule:

(21) *s* is permitted to utter a token α of 'Dsocrates' if and only if *s* refers with α to the *y* such that y = Socrates.

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dard Russellian interpretation and an interpretation on which it means ⌜that φ⌝. From this it follows that every English description of the form ⌜the unique φ⌝ is, on one of its meanings, a demonstrative description. David Kaplan discusses demonstrative definite descriptions in his paper 'Dthat,' in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds., *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1979) 383-400). Kaplan leaves aside the question of whether there are any such terms in actual languages, but he clearly believes that they are *possible*.

22 Strictly speaking, (20) is not the right form to be an instance of the form (16). In note 13 above, I stipulated that in the expression of such forms, 'φ' is to range over formulae that contain at most free variables '*y*' and 'α'; in (20), however, the formula following 'the *y* such that' also contains a free occurrence of the variable '*s*'. This formal defect is easily remedied by replacing this occurrence of '*s*' by 'the speaker of α', to obtain a rule equivalent to (20) that satisfies my restriction. Here and in similar contexts below I use '*s*' in place of 'the speaker of α' merely for the sake of brevity.

Since (20) and (21) are logically equivalent rules, (20) is a rule of a given language if and only if (21) is also a rule of that language. Thus we have the result that both (20) and (21) are rules of our imaginary language L.

It is not entirely clear whether or not we should say that in addition to being logically equivalent, (20) and (21) are *the same rule*. But in the present context it makes little difference what we say about this matter, since (G2) can be shown false whichever alternative we endorse.

On the one hand, suppose that (20) and (21) are different rules. Then the argument against (G2) proceeds in much the same manner as the earlier argument against (G1). According to (G2), when a speaker s of L is following (20) in uttering a token α of 'Dsocrates,' α denotes an object x just in case x = the y such that y = Socrates and s is referring to y with α. So these tokens would fit our initial assumption that tokens of 'Dsocrates' in L unambiguously conform to (19). But also according to (G2), when a speaker s of L is following (21) in uttering a token α of 'Dsocrates,' a denotes x just in case x = Socrates; so in such cases, tokens of 'Dsocrates' may denote Socrates even though their speakers are *not* referring to Socrates with the tokens. Because it allows such cases, (G2) implies that in L 'Dsocrates' need not unambiguously conform to (19) after all. And in general, (G2) implies – on our present assumption – that there could not be languages that contain unambiguous demonstrative descriptions, a consequence that is clearly false.

On the other hand, suppose that (20) and (21) are the same rule. Imagine that a given speaker s^* of L utters a token b of 'Dsocrates', and that in uttering b, s^* is following the single rule (20)-(21). According to (G2), b denotes an object x just in case x uniquely satisfies a condition contained in the rule being followed by s^*. But the difficulty is that there are *two* nonequivalent conditions, each of which is 'contained' in what is prescribed by the single rule (20)-(21). Thus from (G2) it follows both that

(22) For any x, b denotes x if and only if x = the y such that y = Socrates and s^* refers to y with b,

and that

(23) For any x, b denotes x if and only if x = the y such that y = Socrates.

Now suppose that although Socrates exists, s^* does not refer to Socrates with b. From this supposition we quickly derive a contradiction. For by (23) it follows that b denotes Socrates, and by (22) it follows that b does *not* denote Socrates.

Now evidently, if L were a possible language, it would be possible for a speaker of L to follow the rule in L for 'Dsocrates' without referring to Socrates, even though Socrates exists.[23] But we've just seen that if (G2) is true, then the latter is *not* possible. Hence, (G2) implies that L is not a possible language. In other words, (G2) implies the falsehood that there could not be a language containing demonstrative descriptions. At least, (G2) implies this, given the assumption that (20) and (21) are the same rule.

Either (20) and (21) are the same rule or they are not. If they are not the same rule, then (G2) implies that there could not be a language containing unambiguous demonstrative descriptions. If they are the same rule, then (G2) implies that there could not be a language containing demonstrative descriptions, period. In either case, (G2) is false.[24]

As before, we can generalize the argument against (G2) to refute an infinite number of other theories that are based on analogous forms of rule. Thus consider any theory of denotation that is based on a rule of the form:

(24) s is permitted to utter a token α of W if and only if s bears M to α and $(\iota y)\varphi$.

where M expresses a three-place relation. To generate a refutation of

23 Here it is again important to note that the speaker is following the rule only in the sense that the rule applies to his utterance, not in the sense that the speaker is obeying the rule. See note 11 above.

24 My argument against (G2) depends upon the fact that (G2) allows a token to denote an object that its speaker is not referring to. ([G1] and the other theories so far discussed also have this feature.) A defender of Grice might want to reject this possibility, and might endorse a variant of (G2) that has an additional clause requiring that a token α denotes an object x only if α's speaker refers to x with α. This theory would certainly avoid my objection based on demonstrative descriptions. But it does so only by requiring that *every* term must be a demonstrative description; and surely, any theory that requires this is false.

For instance, definite descriptions like 'the inventor of bifocals' denote whichever objects uniquely satisfy their matrices, regardless of what their speakers are referring to. Even if Donnellan is right that this is true only of descriptions that are 'used attributively,' it is still nevertheless clear that there *are* such attributively used terms: see Keith Donnellan, 'Reference and Definite Descriptions,' *Philosophical Review*, **75** (1966) 281-304. Kripke has persuasively argued that proper names also may denote objects that their speakers are not referring to: see his 'Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference,' op. cit. But even if these views about the descriptions and names of actual languages are wrong, it is surely at least *possible* for there to be languages whose terms behave in the way these views describe. And this mere possibility is enough to refute the idea that a term can only denote an object that its speaker is referring to.

any such theory, we need only to assume the possibility of a language L containing a term W for which the correct theory of reference is:

(25) If α is a token of W uttered by *s*, and *s* is speaking L in uttering α, then α denotes *x* if and only if x = the *y* such that $y = a$ and *s* bears M to α and *y*.

Then, by an argument exactly analogous to the one we gave against (G2), we can show that the theory in question is false, because it falsely implies that terms conforming to the relevant instance of (25) are either inevitably ambiguous or cannot exist at all. An argument of this sort will always be successful, because whatever natural (non-semantic) relation M we pick, it will always be possible for there to be unambiguous terms that obey a principle involving M of the form (25). This will always be possible, since to suppose otherwise would be to unduly restrict the notion of a denotation-condition.[25]

Arguments similar to the one against (G2) can also be constructed to refute the theories of denotation that are based on the following forms of rule:[26]

(26) *s* is to utter a token α of W if and only if *s* refers with α to $(\iota y)\varphi$;

(27) *s* is permitted to utter a token α of W if and only if *s* intends to refer with α to $(\iota y)\varphi$.

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25 Surely, any natural three-place relation M is expressible by a (possible) predicate M* that in turn could occur as part of a (possible) definite description of the form ⌜(ιy) (y = a & b bears M* to *y* and c)⌝, where a, b, and c are context-independent terms. But then the relation M would be part of the denotation-condition for this possible definite description. And it is very implausible to suppose that M could be part of the denotation-condition for such a definite description, and yet could *not* be part of the denotation-condition for a token-reflexive term that conforms to a principle of the form expressed by (25).

26 The argument against the theory based on (26) is exactly analogous to the argument against (G2). The argument against the theory based on (27) depends on the additional principle that ⌜*s* intends to refer with α to the *y* such that $y = a$ and *s* refers to *y* with α⌝ is equivalent to ⌜*s* intends to refer with α to the *y* such that $y = a$⌝. The plausibility of the latter principle rests in turn on the plausibility of the principle that ⌜*s* intends to both do A and do A⌝ is equivalent to ⌜*s* intends to do A⌝. This is because ⌜*s* intends to refer with α to the *y* such that $y = a$ and *s* refers to *y* with α⌝ just says in effect that *s* intends to both refer to a with α and refer to a with α.

And again, each of these arguments can be generalized to refute an infinite number of other theories that are based on analogous forms of rule.

5. A final theory.

There is a form of rule which yields a theory of denotation that is immune to the kinds of objections we've raised against (G1) and (G2). This form is:

(28) *s* is permitted to refer to *x* with a token α of W if and only if $x = (\iota y)\varphi$.

Let us call the theory that is based on (28) but is otherwise just like (G1) and (G2), '(G3).'

Since (28) is not conditional in form, complex terms pose no problem for (G3). Also, (G3) does not imply that demonstrative descriptions are either inevitably ambiguous or cannot exist at all. Nevertheless, demonstrative descriptions do pose a serious difficulty for (G3). To see why, let us again suppose that (19) is the correct theory of reference in L for 'Dsocrates.' According to (G3), (19) would be true because L contains a certain rule of the form (28), namely:

(29) *s* is permitted to refer to *x* with a token α of 'Dsocrates' if and only if *x* = the *y* such that *y* = Socrates and *s* refers to *y* with α.

Once again, we are faced with an oddly redundant rule. But this time, we cannot use this redundancy to show that L contains a further rule for 'Dsocrates.' For this to be shown, (29) would have to logically imply

(30) *s* is permitted to refer to *x* with a token α of 'Dsocrates' if and only if *x* = the *y* such that *y* = Socrates.

But (29) does not imply (30). Suppose that Socrates exists, and that *s* utters a token α of 'Dsocrates.' In these circumstances, one who endorses (30) is committed to

(31) *s* is permitted to refer to Socrates with α.

So if (29) logically implies (30), one who endorses (29) is also committed to (31) in these same circumstances. But an endorser of (29) is not committed to (31). He is committed only to

(32) *s* is permitted to refer to Socrates with α, if *s* refers to Socrates with α.

Hence, (29) does not logically imply (30).

Another difference between (29) and (30) is that, where *s* utters a token α of 'Dsocrates,' (29) implies

(33) *s* is permitted to refer to Socrates with α only if *s* refers to Socrates with α,

while (30) does not. (30) does not imply (33), for if it did, then together with the assumptions that Socrates exists and that *s* does *not* refer to Socrates with *a*, (30) would imply

(34) *s* is not permitted to refer to Socrates with α.

But these assumptions plus (30) do not imply (34); rather, they imply (31), the negation of (34). The fact that (30) does not imply (33) shows that (30) also does not imply (29).

These logical differences between (29) and (30) serve to bring out the peculiarity of (29). For these logical differences are due to the fact that (29), unlike (30), makes the performance of a certain sort of action (in this case, referring to an object with a token of 'Dsocrates') a condition of permission to perform an action of that very sort. Let us call rules of the form ⌜*s* is permitted to do A only if *s* does A⌝ 'self-conditioning' rules. One distinctive feature of (29) is that it logically implies various self-conditioning rules of the form ⌜*s* is permitted to refer to *x* with a token of 'Dsocrates' only if *s* refers to *x* with a token of 'Dsocrates'⌝.

Self-conditioning rules are peculiar because they are pointless. If we told a person *s* that he is permitted to do an action A only if he does A, neither his endorsement of this rule nor our issuance of it would make a difference to his behavior. This is simply because *s* cannot disobey this rule.[27] On the one hand, if *s* does A he has fulfilled the condition laid down for permission to do A, and he has thus obeyed the rule. On the

27 Here it is worthwhile contrasting self-conditioning rules with *tautological* rules (such as ⌜*s* is permitted to do A only if either *p* or not-*p*⌝). These are easy to confuse, since tautological rules are also impossible to disobey. But self-conditioning rules are not tautological, since tautological rules are logically implied by every rule and self-conditioning rules are not. For instance, we've seen that the self-conditioning rule (33) is not implied by (30). See note 15.

other hand, if *s* does not do A, then the rule forbids him to do A, and he has thus obeyed the rule by not doing A.

When we adopt systems of behavior-governing rules, we do so with the purpose of regulating behavior. Since self-conditioning rules can play no role in the regulation of behavior, it would be very unlikely for any group of social beings to adopt a system containing or implying such pointless rules.[28] In particular, it is quite implausible to suppose that any *actual languages* contain or imply self-conditioning rules. Thus it is implausible to suppose that any actual languages contain rules of the same form as (29), that is, rules of the form:

(35) *s* is permitted to refer to *x* with a token α of W if and only if $x =$ the *y* such that $y =$ a and *s* refers to *y* with α.

The difficulty for (G3) is that there are demonstrative descriptions found in actual languages, such as those English terms that have the form ⌜that unique F⌝. According to (G3), tokens of such terms can denote objects only when their speakers are following rules of the form (28). But in order for these rules to contain denotation-conditions for demonstrative descriptions, they must also be of the form (35), and again, no actual language including English contains rules of this form. Hence (G3) is false.

Admittedly, this argument against (G3) is not as conclusive as the argument given earlier against (G2). For the argument against (G2) assumed only that it is *possible* for there to be languages containing demonstrative descriptions, while the argument against (G3) depends on my view that there actually are such languages. But even if this view were wrong, (G3) would still be an implausible theory. Suppose that terms of the form ⌜that unique F⌝ are not demonstrative descriptions after all. Surely we could nevertheless easily change English and *begin* using these terms as demonstrative descriptions if we wanted to. And surely, we could do this without having to become committed to pointless self-conditioning rules of the kind implied by rules of the form (35). But if (G3) were correct, we could not do this. Hence again, (G3) is false.

This second argument against (G3) is important, because unlike the first, it can be generalized to apply to any theory of denotation that is based on a rule of the form:

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28 In a way, tautological rules are pointless too, but we *can't help* adopting them, since they are logically implied by every system of rules. But since self-conditioning rules are not tautological (see note 27), we *can* avoid adopting them, and since they are pointless, we *would* avoid adopting them.

(36) s is permitted to bear M to x and a token α of W if and only if $x = (\iota y)\varphi$,

where M expresses a three-place relation. I suggest that any theory of this kind will be implausible, since in order to account for the possibility of a language with terms whose denotation-conditions are of the form ⌜x = the y such that $y = a$ and s bears M to y and α⌝, the theory must require that the language contain self-conditioning rules. But just as in the case of demonstrative descriptions, it will always seem clear that we could introduce terms of the kind in question into our language without having to also adopt such pointless rules.

The same arguments that we gave against (G3) also apply to the theory that is based on the form of rule:

(37) s is to refer to x with a token α of W if and only if $x = (\iota y)\varphi$.

And again, one of these arguments can be generalized to refute any theory that is based on an analogous form of rule.

6. Conclusion.

I have given arguments against three representative Gricean theories of denotation, and I have described how similar arguments can be given against other analogous theories. In all, I have described arguments that refute fifteen different attempts to define denotation in terms of speaker's reference. Moreover, each of these arguments can be generalized to refute an infinite number of analogous theories of denotation. Even so, I have not shown conclusively that *no* Gricean theory of denotation will prove successful. But I have provided considerations that refute every plausible such theory that I have been able to think of, and I believe it is unlikely that any Gricean theory of denotation will be found that is not refuted by the same, or at least similar, considerations. Certainly, I think that I have said enough to raise serious doubts about the possibility of explicating denotation in terms of a type of rule that is defined over psychological states or relations.

Our discussion of the difficulties raised for Gricean theories by demonstrative descriptions strongly suggests that denotation-rules cannot regulate any kind of mental or physical state that is itself a potential part of the denotation-condition of a possible singular term. But it seems that *any* kind of mental or physical state is a potential part of the denotation-condition of a possible term.[29] So our discussion strongly suggests that *denotation-rules do not regulate speakers' behavior,* whether the 'behavior' is psychological or not.

But if denotation-rules do not regulate speakers' behavior, then what is their function? In my view, the singular terms of all languages, actual or possible, are governed by rules of the following form:

(38) If α is a token of W, then for any x, α is to denote x if and only if $x = (\iota y)\varphi$.

Of course, the concept of a rule having the form and content of (38) cannot be of any use in defining denotation itself, since any such definition using this concept would be viciously circular. So if I am right, it is impossible to define denotation in terms of the kind of semantic rule that governs speakers' uses of singular terms.

The distinction between the Gricean rules we've discussed and rules of the form (38) is a special case of a more general distinction that Searle has drawn between what he calls *regulative* and *constitutive* rules: 'regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior. ... But constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behavior.'[30] For example, in chess there are rules that regulate players' behavior, such as the rules telling players which moves they may make with their pieces. There are also such regulative rules in languages, such as the *syntactic* rules that tell speakers which combinations of sounds they are permitted to utter. But there are also rules in chess that do *not* regulate players' behavior, rules that tell players which moves are to *count as,* for instance, checking one's opponent or winning the game. The arguments I have given in this paper support the idea that the *semantic* rules of languages are of this latter sort, and unlike syntactic rules, are constitutive rather than regulative in nature. If this is true then Grice's Program, which assumes that semantic rules regulate speakers' psychological states, is mistaken in principle.

I have tried to present evidence that denotation, or semantic reference, cannot be captured in psychological terms. The Gricean believes that the aboutness or intentionality of singular referring expressions is to be understood in terms of the aboutness or intentionality of the propositional attitudes. But my evidence suggests that the Sellarsian may be right in his belief that the Gricean has it backwards. Moreover, I

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29 See note 25 above.

30 John Searle, *Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1969) 33

think that the concept of denotation is so closely connected with the other main semantic concepts of *meaning* and *truth,* that if denotation cannot be understood in psychological terms, then meaning and truth cannot either. On the Gricean theories of meaning and truth that have so far been adumbrated, these concepts are to be understood in terms of the types of (psychologically defined) conventions that govern the use of the complete sentences of a language. But it surely seems that among the more important of the conventions that determine the meanings and truth-conditions of the sentences of a language are those conventions that determine the denotations of the singular terms which are meaningful parts of such sentences.[31] So a Gricean theory of meaning or truth will have to rely on the concept of a denotation-rule or convention. But as I have argued, this concept cannot be captured by a Gricean theory in psychological terms. Therefore, no Gricean theory will succeed in capturing the concepts of meaning and truth in psychological terms either.

This fact suggests that the Sellarsian may also be right in his belief that the concept of a propositional attitude's having a content may be explicable in terms of the concept of a sentence's having a meaning, rather than the other way around. It also suggests that, like our system of moral concepts, our system of semantic concepts may be autonomous. Perhaps, that is, no semantic concept is completely understandable in non-semantic terms.[32]

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31 Brian Loar sketches a Gricean theory of meaning that makes this assumption in his paper 'Two Theories of Meaning,' in G. Evans and J. McDowell, eds., *Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1976); see pp. 153-5.

32 I was originally stimulated to think about these matters by Hector-Neri Castañeda, when he was serving as director of my Ph. D. dissertation ('The Reference of Proper Names,' Indiana University, 1976). The ideas in section 1 originally appeared in the Introduction of my dissertation. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association (March, 1981). Brian F. Chellas served as commentator on that occasion, and I am grateful to him for his lucid and valuable remarks. For helpful comments and suggestions, I am also indebted to Hector Castañeda, Carl Ginet, Richard Grandy, Lawrence Lombard, Lawrence Powers, Neil Wilson, and a referee for the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*.