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Rationality and Total Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Andrew McLaughlin
Andrew McLaughlin*
Affiliation:
Lehman College, City University of New York
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Abstract

The meaning and justification of the requirement of total evidence are examined. It is argued that there are several significantly different interpretations of the requirement, but each interpretation makes the requirement highly suspect. For any of the usual interpretations of the requirement, it would be quite unreasonable to conduct inquiry in such a way as to fulfill it. It is then suggested that the rational inquirer should seek the optimal amount of evidence, rather than all the evidence. This raises the problems surrounding the idea of scientific or epistemic utility.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , June 1970 , pp. 271 - 278
Copyright
Copyright © 1970 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

This is a slightly revised version of a paper read at the Cleveland meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, May 1969. I am indebted to Stephen Spielman for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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