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Inferentialism and our knowledge of others’ minds

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Abstract

Our knowledge of each others’ mental features is sometimes epistemically basic or non-inferential. The alternative to this claim is Inferentialism, the view that such knowledge is always epistemically inferential. Here, I argue that Inferentialism is not plausible. My argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. Given the nature of the task involved in recognizing what mental features others have on particular occasions, and our capacity to perform that task, we should not expect always to find good inferential explanations of our knowledge. This conclusion is an epistemological one. The motivation for it is independent of metaphysical concerns about functionalism or about the best way to model the cognitive architecture which produces our knowledge of others’ minds. Given this it is compatible both with the truth of functionalism and theory–theory construed as a cognitive model.

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Notes

  1. For a helpful discussion of the potential role of testimony in securing our knowledge of others’ mental features see Gomes (2014).

  2. Compare e.g. Fodor (1987), chapt. 1 and Lewis’ ‘platitudes’ in his (1972).

  3. There are other grounds for arguing that we may sometimes have perceptual knowledge of others’ mental features where this implication is not intended or indeed where it is explicitly denied. For recent discussion see e.g. Bohl and Gangopadhyay (2013), Lavelle (2012), Herschbach (2008), Spaulding (2010). Also, there may be non-perceptual yet non-inferential views available.

  4. This is not to say that epistemological considerations cannot have some influence on our views of the best cognitive model. If, for example, Inferentialism were ruled out on epistemological grounds, this would undermine at least one potential motivation for wanting to model the cognitive processes in a way that would mirror the Inferentialist’s epistemological model.

  5. For theory-of-mind theory, see e.g. Gopnik and Wellman (1992).

  6. Cf. Haldane (1988) for a discussion of the problem of individuating behaviours, as well as Sect. 5 below.

  7. Cf. e.g. Jackson and Pettit (1993).

  8. For different forms of this objection see e.g. Davidson (1970) and Hornsby (1986a, b).

  9. My thanks to Tom Stoneham for coining this phrase.

  10. See e.g. Bedau (1997).

  11. Cf. Haldane (1988), where this problem is applied specifically to the question of what behavioural evidence is supposed to form the ToP’s data.

  12. See Sect. 5 for further discussion.

  13. For more see e.g. Bengio (2009).

  14. Cf. O’Shea (2012). He argues that a Sellarsian ‘theory’ theory takes as behavioural inputs Rylean behaviours, which are behaviours classified in ways which while rich fall short of individuating particular sets of hidden mental features.

  15. Cf. e.g. Jackson (2000). A similar thought, though this time applied to causation itself rather than causal explanation, can be found in Yablo (1992). See also Enç (1995).

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Acknowledgments

My thanks to Tim Crane, Keith Allen, Barry Lee, Jon Webber, Alessandra Tanesini, Tom Stoneham, Mark Sainsbury, Rasmus Thybo Jensen and Paul Noordhof for many helpful discussions and comments on these and related topics. Also to those who helped but whose names do not appear above, including audiences at Glasgow, Durham, Southampton, Manchester, York, Bochum, Copenhagen and Cardiff. Particular thanks to Cardiff for their support over the past year.

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    William E. S. McNeill

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McNeill, W.E.S. Inferentialism and our knowledge of others’ minds. Philos Stud 172, 1435–1454 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0358-0

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