Abstract
This paper presents an argument against A D Smith’s Direct Realist theory of perception, which attempts to defend Direct Realism against the argument from illusion by appealing to conscious perceptual states that are structured by the perceptual constancies. Smith’s contention is that the immediate objects of perceptual awareness are characterised by these constancies, which removes any difficulty there may be in identifying them with the external, or normal, objects of awareness. It is here argued that Smith’s theory does not provide an adequate defence of Direct Realism because it does not adequately deal with the difficulties posed by the possibility of perceptual illusion. It is argued that there remain possible illusory experiences where the immediate objects of awareness, which in Smith’s account are those characterised by perceptual constancies, cannot be identified with the external objects of awareness, contrary to Direct Realism. A further argument is offered to extend this conclusion to all non-illusory cases, by adapting an argument of Smith’s own for the generalising step of the Argument from Illusion. The result is that Smith’s theory does not provide an adequate Direct Realist account of the possibility of perceptual illusion.
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Notes
See Smith (2002): chapter 3
This distinction is articulated in Smith (2006), pp. 420–421.
Smith (2002, pp. 170–171)
Although, Smith does not deny that this is a feature of the phenomenal character of these states. For Smith’s discussion see (2002: 165-87).
A claim he argues for independently in Smith (2000).
In this respect Smith is engaging the work of John Foster, who argues that Indirect Realism offers the best realist account of the facts of perception, but is unstable: for Foster, Idealism offers a better account. See Foster (2003)
Smith calls perceptual states of this kind ‘sensuously presentational’, to be distinguished from possible perceptual states that present objects by means of the Anstoss but which do not involve sensations, as in the case of pushing against a wall when your arm is anaesthetised.
The reason Smith is unlikely to pursue this option is that he thinks Indirect Realism is incoherent, so it could not be true of any being; for more, see Smith (2002), pp. 15–17. .
References
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Foster, J. (2003). The nature of perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Smith, A. D. (2006). In defence of direct realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73(2), 411–422.
Smith, A. D. (2011). Tastes, temperatures and pains. In F. Macpherson (Ed.), The senses: Classic and contemporary philosophical perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Meadows, P.J. On A. D. Smith’s constancy based defence of direct realism. Philos Stud 163, 513–525 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9828-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9828-9