Abstract
W. V. O. Quine’s assault on the analytic/synthetic distinction is one of the most celebrated events in the history of twentieth century philosophy. This paper shines a light on Quine’s own understanding of the history of this distinction. More specifically, this paper argues, contrary to what seems to be the received view, that Quine explicitly recognized a kindred subversive spirit in David Hume.
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Notes
For a discussion of Quine and Logical Positivism, see Isaacson 2004.
Presumably, a formally false proposition would also be cognitively significant for Ayer.
For more on the relationship between Hume, the Logical Positivists and Quine, see Isaacson 2004, especially 218-219.
White of course was another famous philosopher who joined (or predated?) Quine’s attack on analyticity (see White 1950).
For more on this, see Meeker 2007.
References
Ayer, A. J. (1952). Language, truth and logic. New York: Dover.
Hume, D. (1990). A treatise of human nature. L. A. Selby-Bigge 2nd ed., rev., P. H. Nidditch (Eds.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Hume, D. (1999). An enquiry concerning human understanding. Beauchamp, T. L. (Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Hume, D. (2000). A treatise of human nature. Norton, D. F., & Norton, M. J. (Eds.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Isaacson, D. (2004). Quine and logical positivism. In R. F. Gibson Jr. (Ed.), Cambridge companion to Quine (pp. 214–269). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Meeker, K. (2007). Hume on certainty, knowledge, and probability: Anticipating the disintegration of the analytic/synthetic divide? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 88, 226–242.
Pakaluk, M. (1989). Quine’s 1946 lecture on Hume. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 27, 445–459.
Quine, W. V. O. (1951). Two dogmas of empiricism. The Philosophical Review, 60, 20–43.
Quine, W. V. O. (2008). Lectures on David Hume’s philosophy: 1946. Edited by James G. Buickerood. In: Quine, W. V. Confessions of a confirmed extensionalist and other essays. Follesdal, D., & Quine, D. B. (Eds.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
White, M. (1950). The analytic and the synthetic: An untenable dualism. In S. Hook (Ed.), John Dewey: Philosopher of science and freedom. New York: The Dial Press.
White, M. (2000). The ideas of the enlightenment and their legacy: The psychologism of Hume and Quine compared. In M. D. Gedney (Ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 7: Modern Philosophy (pp. 151–159). Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center.