Abstract
In this paper I consider whether there is a measure of coherence that could be rightly claimed to generalize the notion of logical equivalence. I show that Fitelson’s (2003) proposal to that effect encounters some serious difficulties. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that no mutual-support measure could ever be suitable for the formalization of coherence as generalized logical equivalence. Instead, it appears that the only plausible candidate for such a measure is one of relative overlap. The measure I propose in this paper is quite similar to Olsson’s (2002) proposal but differs from it by not being susceptible to the type of counterexample that Bovens and Hartmann (2003) have devised against it.
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Meijs, W. Coherence as Generalized Logical Equivalence. Erkenntnis 64, 231–252 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-5060-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-5060-3