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Against Modalism

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Jesus College, Cambridge, England

    Joseph Melia

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  1. Joseph Melia
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I would like to thank Dr. Butterfield for many invaluable comments and suggestions, and Prof. Forbes for his remarks on an earlier draft. Thanks also to Tony Halbert and Adrian Moore for a number of useful suggestions.

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Melia, J. Against Modalism. Philosophical Studies 68, 35–56 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354468

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354468

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