Guido Melchior
University of Graz, Philosophy, Department Member
This paper provides a thorough analysis of two often informally stated claims. First, successful argumentation in the sense of persuasive argumentation requires agreement between the interlocutors about the rationality of arguments.... more
This paper provides a thorough analysis of two often informally stated claims. First, successful argumentation in the sense of persuasive argumentation requires agreement between the interlocutors about the rationality of arguments. Second, a general agreement about rationality of arguments cannot itself be established via argumentation, since such an attempt leads to an infinite meta-regress. Hence, agreement about the rationality of arguments is a precondition for successful argumentation. As the paper argues, these plausible claims hold under the assumption that interlocutors are subjectively rational and follow their own standards of rationality when engaging in argumentation.
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Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of the central debates is metaphysical, focusing on the features that make a disagreement deep. Proposals for what makes disagreements deep... more
Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of the central debates is metaphysical, focusing on the features that make a disagreement deep. Proposals for what makes disagreements deep include theories about hinge propositions and first epistemic principles. In this paper, I criticize this metaphysical discussion by arguing that it is methodologically flawed. Deep disagreement is a technical or semi-technical term, but the metaphysical discussion mistakenly treats it as a common-sense concept to be analyzed and captured by our pre-theoretical intuitions. Since the literature on deep disagreement is subject to this fundamental confusion and deep disagreement is not a helpful umbrella term either, I propose eliminating the notion of deep disagreement from the philosophical discourse. Instead of analyzing the nature of deep disagreement, we should develop theories about different forms of disagreement, including disagreement about hinge propositions and disagreement about epistemic principles, and, in particular, a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement.
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That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by... more
That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S doubts that a source O is reliable and believes that information i is delivered by O, then S rationally suspends judgment about the truth of i. This paper aims to accomplish two tasks. First, it provides a thorough analysis of why bootstrapping argumentation is not an instance of rational persuasion. Second, it contains a more general theory about preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation.
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In epistemology, the concept of knowledge is of distinctive interest. This fact is also reflected in the discussion of epistemic value, which focuses to a large extend on the value problem of knowledge. This discussion suggests that... more
In epistemology, the concept of knowledge is of distinctive interest. This fact is also reflected in the discussion of epistemic value, which focuses to a large extend on the value problem of knowledge. This discussion suggests that knowledge has an outstanding value among epistemic standings because its value exceeds the value of its constitutive parts. I will argue that the value of knowledge is not outstanding by presenting epistemic standings of checking, transferring knowledge, and proving in
court, whose values exceed the value of knowledge in certain contexts. Moreover, the values of these other epistemic standings do not always rely on the value of knowledge. In terms of value, knowledge is not an outstanding epistemic concept. Hence, in terms of value we cannot find support for the privileged position that knowledge enjoys in epistemology.
court, whose values exceed the value of knowledge in certain contexts. Moreover, the values of these other epistemic standings do not always rely on the value of knowledge. In terms of value, knowledge is not an outstanding epistemic concept. Hence, in terms of value we cannot find support for the privileged position that knowledge enjoys in epistemology.
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The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years. This discussion often relies on the intuition that deep disagreement is, in some sense, rationally irresolvable. In this paper, I will... more
The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years. This discussion often relies on the intuition that deep disagreement is, in some sense, rationally irresolvable. In this paper, I will provide a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Such a theory is interesting in its own right, since it conflicts with the view that rational attitudes and procedures are paradigmatic tools for resolving disagreement. Moreover, I will suggest replacing discussions about deep disagreement with an analysis of rationally irresolvable disagreement, since this notion can be more clearly defined than deep disagreement and captures the basic intuitions underlying deep disagreement. I will first motivate this project by critically assessing the current debate about deep disagreement. I then detail the notions of rationality and resolvable disagreement which are crucial for a suitable theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement before sketching various instances of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Finally, I argue for replacing theories of deep disagreement with theories of rationally irresolvable disagreement, an approach that has significant advantages over existing theories of deep disagreement which focus on hinge propositions or fundamental epistemic principles.
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This paper replies to the comments made in Acta Analytica by Peter Baumann, Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Wes Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster on my Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Routledge 2019),... more
This paper replies to the comments made in Acta Analytica by Peter Baumann,
Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Wes Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster on my
Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Routledge 2019), hereinafter abbreviated as KC. These papers resulted from a workshop organized by the
department of philosophy of the University of Maribor. I am very thankful to the
organizers of the workshop and to the authors for their comments.
Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Wes Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster on my
Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Routledge 2019), hereinafter abbreviated as KC. These papers resulted from a workshop organized by the
department of philosophy of the University of Maribor. I am very thankful to the
organizers of the workshop and to the authors for their comments.
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In this Précis, I provide an overview of my Monograph Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Melchior 2019), which is subject to a book symposium organized by the University of Maribor. This volume in Acta Analytica... more
In this Précis, I provide an overview of my Monograph Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Melchior 2019), which is subject to a book symposium organized by the University of Maribor. This volume in Acta Analytica contains contributions by Peter Baumann, Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Robert Weston Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster along with my replies.
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The orthodox view about sensitivity and induction has it that beliefs formed via induction are insensitive. Since inductive knowledge is highly plausible, this problem is usually regarded as a reductio argument against sensitivity... more
The orthodox view about sensitivity and induction has it that beliefs formed via induction are insensitive. Since inductive knowledge is highly plausible, this problem is usually regarded as a reductio argument against sensitivity accounts of knowledge. Some adherents of sensitivity defend sensitivity against this objection, for example by considering backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals. All these extant views about sensitivity and induction have to be revised, since the problem of sensitivity and induction is a different one. Regardless of whether we allow backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals, some instances of induction yield insensitive beliefs whereas others yield sensitive ones. These results are too heterogenous for providing a plausible sensitivity-account of inductive knowledge. Induction remains a serious problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge.
Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially... more
Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially constitute knowledge according to these accounts. In this paper, I will first argue that existing solutions to this necessity problem, which accept standard possible-worlds semantics, are unsatisfactory. In order to solve the necessity problem, I will utilize an unorthodox account of counterfactuals, as proposed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:535–572, 1997), on which we also consider impossible worlds. Nolan’s account for counterpossibles delivers the intuitively correct result for sensitivity i.e. S’s belief is sensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge of necessities and insensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge failure. However, we acquire the same plausible result for safety only if we reject his strangeness of impossibility condition and accept...
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This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa's trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound... more
This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa's trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation.
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Discrimination is a central epistemic capacity but typically, theories of discrimination only use discrimination as a vehicle for analyzing knowledge. This paper aims at developing a self-contained theory of discrimination. Internalist... more
Discrimination is a central epistemic capacity but typically, theories of discrimination only use discrimination as a vehicle for analyzing knowledge. This paper aims at developing a self-contained theory of discrimination. Internalist theories of discrimination fail since there is no compelling correlation between discriminatory capacities and experiences. Moreover, statistical reliabilist theories are also flawed. Only a modal theory of discrimination is promising. Versions of sensitivity and adherence that take particular alternatives into account provide necessary and sufficient conditions on discrimination. Safety in contrast is not sufficient for discrimination as there are cases of safety that are clearly instances of discrimination failure. The developed account of discrimination between objects will be extended to discrimination between kinds and between types.
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Sensitivity is a modal epistemic principle. Modal knowledge accounts are externalist in nature and claim that the knowledge yielding connection between a true belief and the truthmaker must be spelled out in modal terms. The sensitivity... more
Sensitivity is a modal epistemic principle. Modal knowledge accounts are externalist in nature and claim that the knowledge yielding connection between a true belief and the truthmaker must be spelled out in modal terms. The sensitivity condition was introduced by Robert Nozick. He suggests that if S knows that p, then S’s belief that p tracks truth. Nozick argues that this truth-tracking relation can be captured by subjunctive conditionals. As a first approximation, he provides the following modal analysis of knowledge: S knows that p iff (1) p is true; (2) S believes that p; (3) if p were false, S wouldn’t believe that p and (4) if p were true, S would believe that p. The dominant terminology in the literature, also adopted here, is to call condition (3) the sensitivity condition and condition (4) the adherence condition. The sensitivity condition is intuitively appealing since it states that a subject does not know that p if she would believe that p even if p were false. Nozick used the sensitivity condition to accomplish two major tasks. First, he provided a solution to the Gettier problem by arguing that in Gettier cases subjects do not know since the sensitivity condition is violated. Second, he presented a controversial solution to the skeptical problem according to which we have external world knowledge but do not know that the skeptical hypothesis is false. This solution is available because sensitivity is not closed under known entailment. Quickly, criticism of the sensitivity condition emerged. First, most epistemologists regarded the price of abandoning knowledge closure as a price too high to pay. Second, it was noted that sensitivity leads to the counterintuitive consequence of precluding us from inductive knowledge since induction typically yields insensitive beliefs. The most dominant reaction to these problems was to replace sensitivity by the modal principle of safety, nowadays the most popular modal principle. However, sensitivity is not only important as a starting point of modal epistemology. Because of its intuitive attractiveness, many authors aimed at refining the original sensitivity account in order to avoid well-known problems. This has led to a second wave of sensitivity accounts. As of today, various sensitivity-based theories are on the market, including accounts that avoid closure failure, probabilistic interpretations of sensitivity and adherence, and contextualist approaches. There is thus a vivid and ongoing debate about the sensitivity principle in epistemology.
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Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially... more
Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially constitute knowledge according to these accounts. In this paper, I will first argue that existing solutions to this necessity problem, which accept standard possible-worlds semantics, are unsatisfactory. In order to solve the necessity problem, I will utilize an unorthodox account of counterfactuals, as proposed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:535-572, 1997), on which we also consider impossible worlds. Nolan's account for counterpossibles delivers the intuitively correct result for sensitivity i.e. S's belief is sensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge of necessities and insensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge failure. However, we acquire the same plausible result for safety only if we reject his strangeness of impossibility condition and accept the modal closeness of impossible worlds. In this case, the necessity problem can be analogously solved for sensitivity and safety. For some, such non-moderate accounts might come at too high a cost. In this respect, sensitivity is better off than safety when it comes to knowing necessities.
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This paper aims at resolving a puzzle about the persuasiveness of bootstrapping. On the one hand, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method of settling questions about the reliability of a source. On the other hand, our beliefs that our... more
This paper aims at resolving a puzzle about the persuasiveness
of bootstrapping. On the one hand, bootstrapping is
not a persuasive method of settling questions about the
reliability of a source. On the other hand, our beliefs that
our sense apparatus is reliable is based on other empirically
formed beliefs, that is, they are acquired via a presumably
complex bootstrapping process. I will argue that when we
doubt the reliability of a source, bootstrapping is not a persuasive
method for coming to believe that the source is reliable.
However, when being initially unaware of a source and
its reliability, as in the case of forming beliefs about our sense
apparatus, bootstrapping can be eventually persuasive.
of bootstrapping. On the one hand, bootstrapping is
not a persuasive method of settling questions about the
reliability of a source. On the other hand, our beliefs that
our sense apparatus is reliable is based on other empirically
formed beliefs, that is, they are acquired via a presumably
complex bootstrapping process. I will argue that when we
doubt the reliability of a source, bootstrapping is not a persuasive
method for coming to believe that the source is reliable.
However, when being initially unaware of a source and
its reliability, as in the case of forming beliefs about our sense
apparatus, bootstrapping can be eventually persuasive.
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In diesem Artikel werden bestehende Lösungsansätze für das Problem des Außenweltskeptizismus präsentiert und diskutiert. Ich werde erstens das skeptische Problem umreißen und systematisch mögliche Lösungsstrategien skizzieren. Zweitens... more
In diesem Artikel werden bestehende Lösungsansätze für das Problem des Außenweltskeptizismus präsentiert und diskutiert. Ich werde erstens das skeptische Problem umreißen und systematisch mögliche Lösungsstrategien skizzieren. Zweitens werde ich Moores kontroversiellen Lösungsansatz darstellen. Ich werde drittens Theorien beschreiben, die das skeptische Problem lösen, indem sie das Geschlossenheitsprinzip für Wissen zurückweisen. Dabei werde ich vor allem auf Nozicks modale Sensitivitätstheorie eingehen. Viertens werde ich die alternative modale Theorie der Sicherheit und dessen Lösungsansatz für das skeptische Problem analysieren. Fünftens werde ich das mit dem skeptischen Problem verwandte Problem des einfachen Wissens diskutieren. Sechstens werde ich kontextualistische Lösungsansätze besprechen. In diesem Überblicksartikel sollen die anerkannten Vorteile und bekanntesten Probleme der jeweiligen Lösungsansätze besprochen werden, ohne dass eine Position für oder wider eine dieser Theorien vertreten wird.
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It is a commonly held view in contemporary epistemology that for having knowledge it is necessary to have an appropriately based belief, although numerous different views exist about when a belief's base is appropriate. Broadly speaking,... more
It is a commonly held view in contemporary epistemology that for having knowledge it is necessary to have an appropriately based belief, although numerous different views exist about when a belief's base is appropriate. Broadly speaking, they all share the view that one can only have knowledge if the belief's base is in some sense truth-related or tracking the truth. Baseless knowledge can then be defi ned as knowledge where the belief is acquired and sustained in a way that does not track the truth. I will argue that rejecting baseless knowledge leads to controversial consequences. The problem increases if we consider contrasting persons who know because of appropriate belief forming processes but who fail to possess further epistemic virtues such as understanding. I will not argue which belief bases constitute a suffi cient condition for knowledge. Rather I will stress the point that the common assumption that an appropriate basing relation constitutes a necessary condition for knowledge has controversial consequences.
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(*This paper was awarded the Elisabeth and Werner Leinfellner Award 2017 for outstanding contributions.) This paper provides an explanation of the skeptical puzzle. I argue that we can take two distinct points of view towards... more
(*This paper was awarded the Elisabeth and Werner Leinfellner Award 2017 for outstanding contributions.)
This paper provides an explanation of the skeptical puzzle. I argue that we can take two distinct points of view towards representations, mental representations like perceptual experiences and artificial representations like symbols. When focusing on what the representation represents we take an attached point of view. When focusing on the representational character of the representation we take a detached point view. From an attached point of view, we have the intuition that we can know that p simply by using the representation and without having prior knowledge about the reliability of the source that delivers the representation. When taking a detached point of view, we tend to think that we must have this kind of prior knowledge. These two conflicting intuitions about knowledge and representations provide the basis for our intuition of immediate perceptual knowledge on the one hand and for the skeptical intuition of underdetermination on the other hand.
This paper provides an explanation of the skeptical puzzle. I argue that we can take two distinct points of view towards representations, mental representations like perceptual experiences and artificial representations like symbols. When focusing on what the representation represents we take an attached point of view. When focusing on the representational character of the representation we take a detached point view. From an attached point of view, we have the intuition that we can know that p simply by using the representation and without having prior knowledge about the reliability of the source that delivers the representation. When taking a detached point of view, we tend to think that we must have this kind of prior knowledge. These two conflicting intuitions about knowledge and representations provide the basis for our intuition of immediate perceptual knowledge on the one hand and for the skeptical intuition of underdetermination on the other hand.
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Modal knowledge accounts like sensitivity or safety face a problem when it comes to knowing propositions that are necessarily true because the modal condition is always fulfilled no matter how random the belief forming method is.... more
Modal knowledge accounts like sensitivity or safety face a problem when it comes to knowing propositions that are necessarily true because the modal condition is always fulfilled no matter how random the belief forming method is. Pritchard models the anti-luck condition for knowledge in terms of the modal principle safety. Thus, his anti-luck epistemology faces the same problem when it comes to logical necessities. Any belief in a proposition that is necessarily true fulfills the anti-luck condition and, therefore, qualifies as knowledge. Miščević shares Pritchard’s take on epistemic luck and acknowledges the resulting problem. In his intriguing article “Armchair Luck: Apriority, Intellection and Epistemic Luck” Miščević suggests solving the problem by supplementing safety with a virtue theoretic condition-“agent stability”-which he also spells out in modal terms. I will argue that Miščević is on the right track when he suggests adding a virtue-theoretic component to the safety condition. However, it should not be specified modally but rather in terms of performances that manifest competences.
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In this paper, I defend the heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge against an objection that has been recently proposed by Wallbridge in Philosophia (2016b). I argue in (Melchior 2015) that sensitivity accounts of... more
In this paper, I defend the heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge against an objection that has been recently proposed by Wallbridge in Philosophia (2016b). I argue in (Melchior 2015) that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face a heterogeneity problem when it comes to higher-level knowledge about the truth of one's own beliefs. Beliefs in weaker higher-level propositions are insensitive, but beliefs in stronger higher-level propositions are sensitive. The resulting picture that we can know the stronger propositions without being in a position to know the weaker propositions is too heterogeneous to be plausible. Wallbridge objects that there is no heterogeneity problem because beliefs in the weaker higher-level propositions are also sensitive. I argue against Wallbridge that the heterogeneity problem is not solved but only displaced. Only some beliefs in the weaker higher-level propositions are sensitive. I conclude that the heterogeneity problem is one of a family of instability problems that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face and that Wallbridge's account raises a further problem of this kind.
This paper aims to provide a structural analysis of the problems related to the easy knowledge problem. The easy knowledge problem is well known. If we accept that we can have basic knowledge via a source without having any prior... more
This paper aims to provide a structural analysis of the problems related to the easy knowledge problem. The easy knowledge problem is well known. If we accept that we can have basic knowledge via a source without having any prior knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source, then we can acquire knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source too easily via information delivered by this source. However, rejecting any kind of basic knowledge leads into an infinite regress and, plausibly, to skepticism. I will argue that the third alternative, accepting basic knowledge but rejecting easy knowledge entails closure failure. This is obviously the case for deductive bootstrapping, but, notably, the problem also arises for inductive bootstrapping. Hence, the set of problems related to the easy knowledge problem has the structure of a trilemma. We are forced to accept easy knowledge, closure failure, or skepticism.
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Offering a solution to the skeptical puzzle is a central aim of Nozick’s sensitivity account of knowledge. It is well-known that this account faces serious problems. However, because of its simplicity and its explanatory power, the... more
Offering a solution to the skeptical puzzle is a central aim of Nozick’s sensitivity account of knowledge. It is well-known that this account faces serious problems. However, because of its simplicity and its explanatory power, the sensitivity principle has remained attractive and has been subject to numerous modifications, leading to a ‘second wave’ of sensitivity accounts. I will object to these accounts, arguing that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face two problems. First, they deliver a far too heterogeneous picture of higher-level beliefs about the truth or falsity of one’s own beliefs. Second, this problem carries over to bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning. Some beliefs formed via bootstrapping or Moorean reasoning are insensitive, but some closely related beliefs in even stronger propositions are sensitive. These heterogeneous results regarding sensitivity do not fit with our intuitions about bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning. Thus, neither Nozick’s sensitivity account of knowledge nor any of its modified versions can provide the basis for an argument that bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning are flawed or for an explanation why they seem to be flawed.
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In his highly valuable book, Duncan Pritchard presents a particular account of perceptual knowledge, epistemological disjunctivism (ED). Pritchard argues that this view seems plainly false at first sight, but if it were right, it would... more
In his highly valuable book, Duncan Pritchard presents a particular account of perceptual knowledge, epistemological disjunctivism (ED). Pritchard argues that this view seems plainly false at first sight, but if it were right, it would represent the “holy grail of epistemology” (1), a view that allows us “to have our cake and eat it too” (3). This prospect motivates Pritchard to develop and defend an account that prima facie might seem simply false. It is disputable whether ED really seems plainly false at first sight or whether this intuition is based on a particular philosophical tradition. However, in this paper, I will not discuss whether ED is actually true. Rather, I will investigate whether, if true, it has the advantages over rival accounts that Pritchard claims. I will argue that there is no dialectical advantage for ED over alternative liberal accounts concerning skepticism. Thus, ED is not the Holy Grail for the skeptical problem. Either the Holy Grail is simply an account of basic knowledge, in which case any account allowing basic knowledge is an instance of it or it is a conservative anti-skeptical strategy or the search has to go on.
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Vogel argues that sensitivity accounts of knowledge are implausible because they entail that we cannot have any higher-level knowledge that our beliefs are true, not false. Becker and Salerno object that Vogel is mistaken because he does... more
Vogel argues that sensitivity accounts of knowledge are implausible because they entail that we cannot have any higher-level knowledge that our beliefs are true, not false. Becker and Salerno object that Vogel is mistaken because he does not formalize higher-level beliefs adequately. They claim that if formalized correctly, higher-level beliefs are sensitive, and can therefore constitute knowledge. However, these accounts do not utilize the belief-forming method that sensitivity accounts require. If we take bootstrapping as the belief-forming method, as the discussed cases suggest, then we face a generality problem. Our higher-level beliefs as formalized by Becker and Salerno turn out to be sensitive according to a wide reading of bootstrapping, but insensitive according to a narrow reading. This particular generality problem does not arise for the alternative accounts of process reliabilism and basis-relative safety. Hence, sensitivity accounts not only deliver opposite results given different formalizations of higher-level beliefs, but also for the same formalization, depending on how we interpret bootstrapping. Therefore, sensitivity accounts do not fail because they make higher-level knowledge impossible, as Vogel argues, and they do not succeed in allowing higher-level knowledge, as Becker and Salerno suggest. Rather, their problem is that they deliver far too heterogeneous results.
Keith DeRose’s solution to the skeptical problem is based on his indirect sensitivity account. Sensitivity is not a necessary condition for any kind of knowledge, as direct sensitivity accounts claim, but the insensitivity of our beliefs... more
Keith DeRose’s solution to the skeptical problem is based on his indirect sensitivity account. Sensitivity is not a necessary condition for any kind of knowledge, as direct sensitivity accounts claim, but the insensitivity of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false explains why we tend to judge that we do not know them. The orthodox objection line against any kind of sensitivity account of knowledge is to present instances of insensitive beliefs that we still judge to constitute knowledge. This objection line offers counter-examples against the claim of direct sensitivity accounts that sensitivity is necessary for any kind of knowledge. These examples raise an easy problem for indirect sensitivity accounts that claim that there is only a tendency to judge that insensitive beliefs do not constitute knowledge, which still applies to our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false. However, a careful analysis reveals that some of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false are sensitive; nevertheless, we still judge that we do not know them. Therefore, the fact that some of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false are insensitive cannot explain why we tend to judge that we do not know them. Hence, indirect sensitivity accounts cannot fulfill their purpose of explaining our intuitions about skepticism. This is the hard problem for indirect sensitivity accounts.
Abstract I will compare Lehrer’s anti-skeptical strategy from a coherentist point of view with the anti-skeptical strategy of the Mooreans. I will argue that there are strong similarities between them: Neither can present a persuasive... more
Abstract I will compare Lehrer’s anti-skeptical strategy from a coherentist point of view with the anti-skeptical strategy of the Mooreans. I will argue that there are strong similarities between them: Neither can present a persuasive argument to the skeptic and both face the problem of easy knowledge in one way or another. However, both can offer a complete and self-explanatory explanation of knowledge although Mooreanism can offer the more natural one. Hence, one has good reasons to prefer Mooreanism to Lehrer’s anti-skeptical approach, if one does not prefer coherentism to foundationalism for other reasons.
This special issue collects the results of the workshop “The Philosophy of Keith Lehrer” which was held in October 2010 at the University of Graz, Austria, where Keith Lehrer is Honorary Professor and Honorary Doctor of Philosophy. Over... more
This special issue collects the results of the workshop “The Philosophy of Keith Lehrer” which was held in October 2010 at the University of Graz, Austria, where Keith Lehrer is Honorary Professor and Honorary Doctor of Philosophy. Over the last decades Lehrer has been a frequent visitor in Graz. As a much admired teacher and scholar, has decisively influenced generations of students and inspired many of them to choose an academic career. The guest-editors, who organized the workshop, want to thank all the participants for making the workshop a success. Special thanks go to Keith Lehrer for commenting on each talk at the workshop as well as each contribution to this volume. We are grateful to Stuart Cohen for publishing this issue in his prestigious journal. This volume honors Lehrer and his invaluable contributions to philosophy. It contains five chapters, each illustrating the impressively wide range of his philosophy. The chapters are divided into discussions and applications of Lehrer´s work in theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The fifth and final chapter contains his replies to all of the contributions.
It is a widely held view that persons have privileged knowledge about their own minds, although numerous different views on what this privilege exactly consists of exist. One possible way of interpreting it is to claim that persons can... more
It is a widely held view that persons have privileged knowledge about their own minds, although numerous different views on what this privilege exactly consists of exist. One possible way of interpreting it is to claim that persons can refer to their own mental states in a privileged way. I will argue that this view has to be extended. Our common-sense view about reference to mental states implies that besides privileges of first-person reference to one's own mental states, there also exist privileges of third-person reference to the mental states of others: Other persons can refer to all of the mental states of a person in a way that the person cannot. In a next step, I will explain that persons can take two perspectives towards their own mental states: a first-person perspective and a third-person perspective. I will conclude that the possibilities of first person reference from a third-person perspective are limited.
Closure is the principle that a person, who knows a proposition p and knows that p entails q, also knows q. Closure is usually regarded as expressing the commonplace assumption that persons can increase their knowledge through inference... more
Closure is the principle that a person, who knows a proposition p and knows that p entails q, also knows q. Closure is usually regarded as expressing the commonplace assumption that persons can increase their knowledge through inference from propositions they already know. In this paper, I will not discuss whether closure as a general principle is true. The aim of this paper is to explore the various relations between closure and knowledge through inference. I will show that closure can hold for two propositions p and q for numerous different reasons. The standard reason that S knows q through inference from p, if S knows p and knows that p entails q, is only one of them. Therefore, the relations between closure and inferential knowledge are more complex than one might suspect.
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Knowing and Checking accomplishes three major tasks: (1) It breaks new ground by developing the first thorough epistemic theory of checking. (2) It provides a novel explanation of enduring epistemological problems, such as the skeptical... more
Knowing and Checking accomplishes three major tasks:
(1) It breaks new ground by developing the first thorough epistemic theory of checking.
(2) It provides a novel explanation of enduring epistemological problems, such as the skeptical problem, via a theory of checking instead of, as is the usual strategy, by a theory of knowledge.
(3) It settles a lively debate in epistemology by arguing that sensitivity is necessary for checking but not for knowing, thereby finding a new home for the much discussed modal sensitivity principle.
(1) It breaks new ground by developing the first thorough epistemic theory of checking.
(2) It provides a novel explanation of enduring epistemological problems, such as the skeptical problem, via a theory of checking instead of, as is the usual strategy, by a theory of knowledge.
(3) It settles a lively debate in epistemology by arguing that sensitivity is necessary for checking but not for knowing, thereby finding a new home for the much discussed modal sensitivity principle.