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A Comparative Study of the Law of Palliative Care and End-of-Life Treatment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Danuta Mendelson  and
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost
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Extract

Since the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided the Quinlan case a quarter of a century ago, three American Supreme Court decisions and a host of state appellate decisions have addressed end-of-life issues. These decisions, as well as legislation addressing the same issues, have prompted a torrent of law journal articles analyzing every aspect of end-of-life law. In recent years, moreover, a number of law review articles, many published in this journal, have also specifically addressed legal issues raised by palliative care. Much less is known in the United States, however, as to how other countries address these issues. Reflection on the experience and analysis of other nations may give Americans a better understanding of their own experience, as well as suggest improvements to their present way of dealing with the difficult problems in this area.

This article offers a conceptual and comparative analysis of major legal issues relating to end-of-life treatment and to the treatment of pain in a number of countries. In particular, it focuses on the law of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Poland, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Japan.

Type
Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , Spring 2003 , pp. 130 - 143
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2003

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