Abstract
Coherence plays an important role in psychology. In this article, I suggest that coherence takes two main forms in humans’ cognitive system. The first belong to ‘system 1’. It relies on the degree of coherence between different representations to regulate them, without coherence being represented. By contrast other mechanisms, belonging to system 2, allow humans to represent the degree of coherence between different representations and to draw inferences from it. It is suggested that the mechanisms of explicit coherence evaluation have social functions. They are used as means of epistemic vigilance—to evaluate what other people tell us. They can also be turned inwards to examine the coherence of our own beliefs. Their function is then to minimize the chances that we are perceived as being incoherent. Evidence from different domains of psychology is briefly reviewed in support of these hypotheses.
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Notes
Gawronski and Stack (2004) have suggested that “‘inconsistency’ between two propositions can only arise when the propositions are defined by their truth values” (p. 536). Given that it takes metarepresentations to represent the truth values of propositions, we take their view to be akin to the one exposed here (see also Stanovich 2004, on higher order preferences).
Here I will use ‘coherence evaluation’ only to refer to the system 2, metarepresentational mechanisms involving representation of coherence relationships between representations.
Incoherent elements can be used not only to evaluate the speaker’s statement, but also to argue for its rejection. When we have a priori reasons to distrust the speaker and we look for incoherent elements not so much to evaluate what she says but to justify the rejection of what she says, coherence evaluation has turned into reasoning. Reasoning is understood here as the search and evaluation of arguments (Mercier and Sperber 2009, 2011). It is reasoning that can evaluate, for instance, if a conclusion is logically necessary rather than merely coherent.
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Acknowledgments
I thank Jean-Baptiste André, Fabrice Clément and Dan Sperber for very helpful discussions on that topic and comments on this article.
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Mercier, H. The social functions of explicit coherence evaluation. Mind Soc 11, 81–92 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-011-0095-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-011-0095-4