

Civilizing Emotions

*Concepts in Nineteenth-Century
Asia and Europe*

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Transforming Chinese Hearts, Minds, and Bodies in the Name of Progress, Civility, and Civilization

Angelika C. Messner

TWO CONTRASTING MODES OF EMOTION

Civilized China is a man with short hair, wearing a grey cap or a black felt hat, going to meetings, singing the song of revolution and crying: 'Long live the Republic!' Barbaric China is a man in a pigtail wearing satin slippers, shutting himself up in his Ivory Tower, passing his time in reading the canons of old and kneeling before the shadows of the past.¹

When writing these lines, the Chinese scholar, writer, translator, and educator Shen Cheng (1899–1996), had already experienced the Chinese Revolution in 1911.² Describing a happy, outgoing, confident, and energetic person, on the one hand, and an introverted, secluded one, on the other, Cheng here points to oppositional behaviour and affective attitudes in early Republican China. The two contrasting modes of emotion are conceptually linked to two hierarchically differentiated levels of societal development, namely *wenming* (civility/culture, also culture) and *di* (barbarism).³ This binary in the Chinese context had existed since ancient times. Previously, many non-Chinese nomadic or half-nomadic peoples in the North, including tribal invaders such as the Mongols and Manchus, the different ethnic groups in the Southern regions, and foreigners from the Western hemisphere, were all considered barbarians. Now, in the late nineteenth century, contrasting China as sick and backward and the West as healthy, strong, and progressive, Chinese civilization itself became classified as barbaric. This radical reversal was traumatically experienced by the Chinese scholarly elite and resulted in a deep sense of inferiority. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, ongoing debates about how China could transform itself into another political system and a progressive civilization gave rise to new terms such as *guomin* (good citizen), *guojia* (nation), *fazhi guo* (constitutional state), and *guomin zhuyi* (nationalism).⁴ Whether transforming the Chinese Empire into a constitutional monarchy would be appropriate, or how patriotism (*aiguoxin*) could help to raise up citizens, was of particular concern in the journal *Xinmin Congbao* (New People).

In contrast to these contemporary terms, *wenming* had existed since ancient times. Like other 'round-trip words',⁵ *wenming* was reintroduced via Japanese (as *bunmei*) around 1900, and served now as an unquestioned universal term in the sense of progressive modernization.⁶ Previous to 1900, Chinese newspapers and magazines that disseminated various aspects of Western knowledge and were printed by Shanghai publishing houses from the 1870s to the early twentieth century, rarely made use of the term *wenming*. For instance, within the most prominent and influential Chinese-language paper, the *Shenbao* (1872–1949),⁷ *wenming* appears only twelve times, predominantly meaning 'moderate'.⁸ Similarly, and somewhat in correlation to *wenming*, both the term for knowledge and science (*kexue*) and the term for hygiene (*weisheng*) have had a long history in their 'own terms' in the Chinese context, and received new meanings and significances in the course of a few decades around the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the course of introducing Spencerian–Darwinistic categories such as 'race' and 'struggle',⁹ both the dynastic state and ritual knowledge became discursively dissociated and the inexistence of Chinese civility was written about in Chinese newspapers and journals from the 1870s onwards.¹⁰ A century of missionary writings determined the issues of foot-binding, concubines, infanticide, opium smoking, spitting in public, the queue, the satin gowns, and breast-binding of women to be signs of the barbaric state of Chinese society.¹¹ These tokens of backwardness were mostly coined as unhealthy attitudes which had to be transformed into clean and healthy behaviour. In other words, the project of politically transforming China into a modern civilization, that is, into a republic,¹² was intrinsically bound to the domains of science, medicine, and hygiene. Arguing that changes in 'state body' (*guotǐ*), most importantly, needed an appropriate 'body politic' (*zhengtǐ*), the highly influential intellectual Liang Qichao (1873–1929) proposed the cultivation of a new understanding of the relation between the individual and society.¹³ This, in turn, required the affective reordering of the hearts and minds of the Chinese population. As medicine and hygiene served as basic knowledge reservoirs for such reordering processes, this chapter particularly dwells on these knowledge and practice domains with regard to emotion and body politics.

The chapter proceeds in six parts. Following the introduction, the next section details China's steady decline as a great empire, which was accompanied by various proposals from Chinese intellectuals and scholars regarding the country's survival. The third section argues that *wenming* (civility), *kexue* (knowledge), and *weisheng* (nourishing life), which all have had a long history in China in their own context, came to be transformed into three key concepts which served as crucial instruments for transforming China into a modern nation. By way of tracing the changing meanings of these terms in Chinese history, this section analyses the processes of transforming the terms into concepts, in correlation with ongoing attempts to renew the hearts and minds of the Chinese people. Focusing on the attempts to free Chinese society from diseases, in particular from insanity, the next two sections outline the ways medicine and hygiene came to be the main domains of knowledge and practice that helped to reform people's attitudes towards the state. The last section tracks some political notions on the significance of body politics

for the nation-building process in the early twentieth century. This section also references some critical voices in contrast to all those state leaders and scholars who argued in favour of civility in terms of material and modernistic progress.¹⁴

SHIFTING POWERS AND COMPETING DISCOURSES

A view of the Chinese as backwards, ineffectual, weak, and effeminate had already emerged in 1839 during the First Opium War. As a result of this war, the Treaty of Nanjing of 1842 urged the Chinese to cede the British the island of Hong Kong, pay for the war's losses, and open five ports (Shanghai, Ningbo, Kanton, Fuzhou, and Amoy) to foreign trade. Moreover, it allowed British citizens in China to live under British laws.¹⁵ In other words, 1842 marks the violation of China's sovereignty and traumatic confrontation with a widely unknown, yet extraordinarily powerful, civilization. China's steady loss of sovereignty was additionally induced by inner disturbances, such as the Taiping Rebellion, which raged across Southern and Central China from *c.*1850 to *c.*1864, and by Muslim uprisings in the 1860s and 1870s in the Northeast and Xinjiang; both also caused the loss of immense sums of money. Only a few decades later, after the defeat in the war against Japan (1895), China again lost large sums of money as a consequence of paying large reparations.¹⁶ But what weighed even more was the fact that the little brother of China, Japan, had succeeded in fundamentally turning around power relations in Asia by adopting Western methods and military strategies (starting in 1868 with the Meiji Reforms); China was left behind. The defeat in 1895 was also the moment when the Chinese scholarly elite painfully realized that China now belonged to a lower level of civilization.

From the late 1890s onwards, China's intellectual elite had proposed the total renewing of the Chinese population for survival. They had repeatedly introduced reform plans to the emperor. Now, three years after the defeat against Japan in 1898, they succeeded in implementing reforms regarding military organization, administration, the state budget, education, and the examination system. These reforms, however, were stopped by conservative circles after only a hundred days and resulted in executions and persecution.

The leading political and reformist thinkers Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao were among those Chinese reformers who went to Japan to escape persecution after the Hundred Day Reform in 1898, and came back only after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912. In Japan, they continued to propagate their ideas on Chinese constitutionalist monarchy, on nation-building and democratic structures, on the relations between traditional patriarchy and modern nationalism, and on the ways women could actively participate in political processes. Discussing the pros and cons of learning from the Western sciences and Western methods began in the late 1860s with the translation of a wide range of Western knowledge domains. At the same time, an emerging critical perspective led to the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861–95), which suggested a significant distinction between two postures:

Western knowledge, seen as only important in a practical sense, and Chinese knowledge as an essential foundation (*tiyong*) of knowledge. After defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Chinese scholars become convinced that a single universal science was the key to the nation's continuance. Nevertheless, a discursive tension between Chinese traditional scholarship as the embodiment of the national essence (*guo cui*) and Western-derived technological knowledge as only superficial useful knowledge, was part of an emerging nationalism (*renmin zhuyi*) and/or patriotism (*aiguo zhuyi*) that played a crucial role in early twentieth-century Chinese modernizing discourses.¹⁷

Facing aggression from Western civilizations regarding indigenous health practices, as well as criticism of their minds and hearts, that urged them to turn to Protestant virtues such as 'labour',¹⁸ and the cultivation of freedom of the self via sportive training,¹⁹ Chinese scholars proposed various models of appropriating new knowledge and focusing on policy and administration.²⁰ Notably, in the New Policy decade (1901–1911), the court at Qing enacted a new criminal code based on the Japanese codex (which was, in turn, based on that of Germany), formed new regional armies, and instituted political and educational reforms, whose aim was to install and operate an efficient bureaucracy and tax regime, and to establish a new school system. From 1905 to 1911, the Qing government experimented with constitutional practices at the local level, and economic reforms were launched, with many Chinese-owned factories set up in the treaty ports between 1903 and 1908. Redefinitions of what came to be seen as civilized were visible as well in vestimentary appropriations of modernity, which required women and men, girls and schoolboys to change from satin slippers to leather shoes, from wide gowns to short trousers. Distinguishing from the Qing style of dress, men substituted long gowns and riding jackets for Western-style suits and, most importantly, cut off their queue.²¹ The cut of women's clothes shifted generally from wide to narrow, and colours from brilliant to delicate or dark.²² With the rise of straight lines and of the *qipao* (banner gown),²³ short hair (the bob) became popularized for women. In contrast to these gradual and rather noiseless vestimentary modifications, breast-binding and foot-binding developed into hotly debated issues, since they were related to an overall concern for health. These rearrangements were highly sensitive acts in politics, as well as for single individuals. The queue, for instance, was a former mark of submission to the Manchu emperor and was abolished only in 1911 with the decline of the dynasty. For members of the intellectual elite, who already had begun to cut off their queues in the late 1890s, this signified liberation, whereas, among the general population, to cut the queue was connected to the fear of losing one's soul. Appropriating modernity in terms of vestimentary issues also meant adjusting mentally to the master narrative of progress, hygiene, and civility that was adopted by political leaders, as well as scholars and students who engaged in the May Fourth Movement, 1919 to the 1920s. On 4 May 1919 over three thousand students, mainly from Beijing University, demonstrated against the peace conference at Versailles after the First World War. The demonstrators called on the Beijing government to reject the clauses in the treaty that handed over to Japan concessions that had been held by Germany in Shandong

province. Thus, this movement was an expression of the political and intellectual ferment of the New Culture Movement, during which nationalist and communist traditions emerged.

TRANSFORMING THE MEANINGS OF *WENMING*
(CIVILITY), *KEXUE* (KNOWLEDGE), AND *WEISHENG*
(NOURISHING LIFE)

Following the adoption of *wenming*, via the Japanese word *bunmei*, with the meaning of progression and modern civilization,²⁴ eminent scholars and educators in the early twentieth century, like Hu Shi (1891–1962), barely wrote an article without referring to it.²⁵ The ideal of universal civilization obtruded into the Chinese people's lives and propelled them to decrease the difference between themselves and Europeans to a minimum. This meaning was yet to be learned by the Chinese people, as prominent Chinese scholars such as Lin Yutang (1895–1976) asserted, as the Chinese did not even understand the concept of 'public citizenship'.²⁶ Therefore, great efforts had to be made in order to educate the Chinese in this regard. Yet *wenming* had already had a long history in its own context: the binary oppositions 'civilized' and 'barbaric' existed as parts of a political and cultural concept of the universe (*tianxia*), which was divided into Chinese and non-Chinese ('barbarians'). The permeability of this frontier concept was reflected by the idea that the barbarians would voluntarily come and transform themselves, that is, adopt Chinese culture/civilization.²⁷ Similar to this permeability of frontiers, the former indigenous conceptualizations of culture/civility and martiality (*wen* and *wu*) did not reflect strict opposition but were more complementary and, indeed, were part of a continuum. Ancient canonical writings variously denote *wenming* with reference to brightness, flourishing, and prosperity.²⁸ Cultivation and light, together with the quality of being 'sharp and perspicacious', were complementary to the outer appearance of being 'obedient and yielding'. With this meaning, 'education of civil administrative skills' is stressed. Yet particular opposition only arose from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries,²⁹ when the dichotomy of culture/civil (*wen*) and martiality (*wu*) came to be used as an argumentative trope in political contexts. This process was related to the gradual suspension of the aristocracy in favour of a meritocratic civil system in the late tenth century.³⁰ As the Song Empire (960–1279) was continually threatened by northern tribes (Khitans, etc.), Song officials emphasized refined modes of communication (*wen*) as helpful instruments for reigning. Successively establishing contracts of peace (appeasements) with the northern tribes, they established modes of regulated convocation for different cultures. Han Chinese saw themselves as the embodiment of *wen* culture. In opposition to them, the northern tribes were seen to embody a crude military and barbarian culture (*wu*).

With this, the conceptual contrast *wen* (civil culture) and *wu* (military culture) became backed by the contrast *hua* (Chinese) and *di* (barbarians). Han Chinese and refined culture were interconnected by the particular emphasis on learning

and education. Learning to become a good person was inseparable from cultivation (*xiuyang* and *peixun*).³¹ However, the boundaries between *wen* and *wu* were not strict and absolute. They were informed by the pair *yin* and *yang*, whereby the two merge together in an endless dynamism. This meant also that *wen* and *wu* figured as a continuum along which *wu* (associated with masculinity) was correlated with class. Those with more *wen* belonged to a higher class, but having minimum *wu* was better than no masculinity at all. Military culture was actually intrinsically interwoven with cultural practices of civil officials, such as poetry, calligraphy, and painting. A really powerful man needed to have both *wen* and *wu*. When the Manchu conquered the Han in 1644, the previously explained conceptual framework was informed by the continual blurring dichotomy between Manchu and Han and *wu* and *wen*—like *yin* and *yang*. The Manchu were perceived as more martial (*wu*) and the Chinese as more cultivated and learned, and more feminine and weak (*wen*). This was a common notion in terms of colonial possession. Yet *wu* (the martial, military principle) corresponded to the dark, female (*yin*) side, whereas *wen* (culture) correlated to the bright, masculine (*yang*) side, referring to civilization. In other words, in the civilizing mission of the Qing, women (apparently both Han and Manchu) were particularly important as carriers of proper behaviour to remote outposts.³² Thus, the existing dichotomies *wen* and *wu* and *hua* and *di* were ambivalent, and blurred together at a time when *wenming*, by 1900, was adopted as *bunmei*, with the clear-cut meaning of progression, civilization, and civility. As such, *wenming*, alongside the terms *kexue* (science/knowledge) and *weisheng* (hygiene/medicine), became a step-by-step part of ‘three key concepts’ with a strong impact on early twentieth-century Chinese reordering discourses and practices.

Already in the late nineteenth century, the terms *gezhi* (literally, to achieve knowledge) and *gewu xue* (literally, learning to investigating the things) were used by Chinese students educated abroad in Western and Japanese universities to denote science in a modern sense. They regarded modern science in the light of the Japanese version of Western science, namely as *kagaku*. *Kagaku* was a translation of the English word ‘science’. Yet *kagaku* was, simultaneously, a loan translation of the Chinese word *kexue*. *Kexue* was an ancient Chinese character/term literally meaning ‘classified learning based on technical training’ and ‘branch of learning’. Via the Japanese translation processes, the term *kexue* become coloured with the Western meaning ‘natural science’. Thereby, the term *kexue* (science) somehow lost previous concepts of knowledge. Nevertheless, it was given the power to bridge old and new: *kexue* served as an overarching concept for survival in China. Unanimously perceived as natural science, as objective, and as universal, *kexue* became the factor common to all the modernizing discourses in early twentieth-century China. Nevertheless, Chinese scholars of the time who claimed science to be the key to the nation’s continuance were not generally interested in the Western idealization of science as an end in itself. Knowledge for knowledge’s sake held no attraction for them. *Weisheng* became a crucial term in the move to renew Chinese society and the whole population.³³ As such, the semantic field of *weisheng* drastically changed in the course of its reshaping during that time. Previously, *weisheng* referred to the

'way of health', which depended heavily on knowing how to restrain oneself from indulging in food, drink, or sexual excess, on knowing the right time and place for sitting, sleeping, getting up, moving, eating, and drinking,³⁴ in short, to 'nurturing life'. In ancient times, *yangsheng* (nurturing life) was not considered a part of medicine. It comprised various practices to prevent disease and increase longevity. As such, it was integral to Daoist ideas and became part of Confucian precepts on leading a life in balance with societal duties and connections. The way of guarding life and health (*weisheng zhi dao*) therefore depended heavily on knowing how to behave in consonance with the cosmic processes and activities.

KNOWLEDGE RESOURCES FOR TRANSFORMING CHINA

Medical missionaries regarded China as 'the last place in the world to study the principles of medicine—the finest place in the world to find clinical material'.³⁵ A major sign of China's backwardness and barbarism, especially in regard to harmful bodily practices, was foot-binding: the 'Lilies of Gold', the euphemism for bound feet, was a widespread social practice among all well-to-do Chinese families; since the twelfth century this custom provided the ticket to a bright future. In the late nineteenth century this practice became a contemptible habit, subsequently forbidden by law. The newly born terms *nianzu* (natural feet)³⁶ and *tian ru* (natural breasts)³⁷ became instrumental to the image of a nascent Chinese nation. Similarly, breast-binding, that is, wearing a little vest, was a common practice among Chinese women to constrain the breasts and streamline the body. Arguments against breast-binding mainly echoed debates over foot-binding. The abandonment of foot-binding was a steady process that started in the 1880s with the founding of anti-foot-binding societies. Kang Youwei was among the early founders of an anti-foot-binding society in 1885.³⁸

Moreover, physicians found various biological differences between Chinese and Westerners. Chinese brains were regarded as being somehow asymmetrical,³⁹ their experience of pain different, and their appreciation of life less than the Europeans; hence the higher number of suicides.⁴⁰

Drawing a correlation between such biological differences, observers also detected differences in emotional behaviour. Medical missionaries, as well as Chinese scholars who had been in close contact with the modern world, regarded the Chinese as being unable to feel in appropriate ways. In light of the newly emerged dichotomy between 'East and West', both a Chinese student in Berlin, Hsu Daulin, and a prominent German sinologist,⁴¹ asserted that the Chinese were regarded as neither capable of feeling as intensively as Europeans,⁴² nor of feeling in appropriate ways.⁴³

The conceptual linkage between civilization and mental health fuelled an interest in the emotional practices of the Chinese. Medical missionary writing in nineteenth-century China introduced the duality key concepts 'emotio-rationality' and 'psyche-body' for the diagnosis and therapy of people suffering from emotional and social distress. With the gradual marginalization of indigenous medicine soon

after the revolution (an official decree in 1913 declared Western medicine as the only and exclusive field of study),⁴⁴ the discursive linkage of Western medicine with modernity, progress, and civility was institutionalized. Additionally, national strength was regarded as a function of the physical strength of an individual person.⁴⁵ How were such reimagined peoples' bodies and minds linked to nation-building processes? How were claims for reimagining emotion knowledge and emotion behaviour related to medical missionary writing and medical practices in late nineteenth-century China? How were these claims related to progressive secular and Protestant concepts of individuality? How did secular concepts of sincerity reframe views of civility and civilization?

In 1897, Kang Youwei's *Da tong shu* (literally: The book of the great unity) had already formulated the vision of a new society totally free from any disease, in particular also from insanity.⁴⁶ His special concern for medicine as the key domain for the development of the Chinese society correlates with discourses that had been emerging from the Western hemisphere since the late eighteenth century. With enquiries into the functions of the nervous system, madness was gradually conceptualized as mental illness. This was the background of the 'cult of curability' of insanity.⁴⁷ Thus, in congruence with the above-mentioned nineteenth-century bias that the Chinese would have no idea about medical care, the medical missionary movement in the late nineteenth century flourished in China. By 1890 there were sixty-one hospitals and forty-four dispensaries.⁴⁸

The North American medical missionary John Glasgow Kerr (1821–1901), who founded the first 'Refuge for the Insane' (1898, in Canton), was obsessed by the idea that, in China, previously nobody had cared for the insane.⁴⁹ He demanded that at least three hundred insane hospitals for one thousand inmates be built in China.⁵⁰ A few decades later, a Chinese physician trained in Western medicine argued in support of Kerr, saying that 'Chinese [traditional] physicians are ignorant about physiological (*shengli*) and psychological (*xinli*) causes of madness.'⁵¹ This dualistic conception of body and psyche was alien to indigenous Chinese medical explanations. The latter differentiated a great many forms of madness that, to a certain extent, were all explained by imbalances of the *qi* (vital energy) within the five viscera (*wu zang*): the heart, lung, spleen, liver, and the kidneys.⁵² As a technical term, *wu zang* denoted the physiological functions of generating and storing vital energy and of the intrinsically related pathological changes, giving rise to five different emotions (*qingzhi*): *xi* (happiness), *si* (thought, worry), *bei* (sadness), *kong* (fear), and *nu* (anger). Moreover, they are related to the five *shen* (spirits, life forces).⁵³ This explanatory system was based on the conceptual blending of emotion processes with ongoing processes within the inner viscera, and provided an operational thread in the social fabric in Chinese historical contexts. With this emotion knowledge in mind, people would hardly agree with the dualistic separation of brain and heart as a diagnostic frame.⁵⁴ Similarly, they would hardly agree to medically recommended segregation of their emotionally suffering family members.

However, others, especially those Chinese physicians that had been trained in Western medicine, pleaded for the adoption of Western methods in caring and

curing madness. By specifically linking civilization to expert care for mentally ill people—‘[In] every civilized country (*wenming zhi guo*) of the world, particular hospitals for mad people (*fengren yuan*) have been established in order to cure and give advice’⁵⁵—the claim for establishing such hospitals was seen as an important act of mercy (*cishan*).⁵⁶ By equating bandits and prisoners with mentally diseased people,⁵⁷ the same author, Wang Wanbai, furthermore claimed the public (*gongzhong*) should take care of lunatics (*fengzi*), since this would help China grow into a civilized country. And, indeed, Chinese schoolboys and girls were taught, from 1905 onwards, the essentialist distinction between psyche and soma, thereby redefining Chinese experiences within a Western biomedical epistemology.

The sharp distinction of ‘rationality’, on the one hand, and ‘emotion’, on the other, became essential for philosophical and aesthetic reasoning by Chinese scholars. Emotions in the Chinese canonical philosophy also tended to be seen as dangerous forces for harmony and equilibrium. Running through all Song–Ming neo-Confucian discussions, emotions were placed opposite a somehow pure state of human nature (*xing*) and the pattern for the cosmos (*li*).⁵⁸ A basic tension therefore existed between two different conceptual spheres of reality, namely the experiential one, to which the emotions and movement belonged, and the metaphysical one, to which heaven, tranquillity, and principle belonged. Although these two realms were inseparable, such as *yin* and *yang*, the experiential realm was potentially considered inferior. Such conceptual ambiguity opened up the possibility of eventually celebrating emotions as driving forces of the cosmos in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the course of this period, literary pieces highlighted emotions, passion, and friendship as essential markers of a cultivated person.⁵⁹

Yet, as shown, emotions within the domain of indigenous medical knowledge and practice were conceptually blended with the five viscera. Since this was obviously the most widely known and embodied emotion knowledge,⁶⁰ Chinese (traditional) physicians in the early twentieth century also consequently argued on the basis of this reference system and not on the views exposed in philosophical writings.

CIVILIZING AND MODERNIZING WITH SCIENCE AND HYGIENE

China’s long-standing knowledge tradition from about 1850 onwards was challenged when Protestant missionaries, and their Chinese co-workers in Shanghai, started to translate a huge number of books on the New Learning (*xin xue*), such as machine-constructing, geography, chemistry, astronomy, mathematics, medicine, botany, geology, and navigation, from English, French, Russian, German, and Japanese into Chinese. Nearly thirty arsenals, machine shops, arms manufactures, and naval stations were opened in China between the 1860s and the 1890s,⁶¹ with the Jiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai serving as the new industry’s headquarters and incorporating a department for the translation of scientific and technical texts.⁶² Starting c.1865, an emerging group of artisans, technicians, and engineers

from the arsenals were no longer relying on the traditional fields of learning.⁶³ Alongside the efforts to popularize modern science (*gezhi xue*) in the treaty ports and among the literati, private printing houses rapidly grew into huge publishing companies in the larger metropolises. Beginning in 1867, the translation department came under the guidance of John Fryer (1839–1928), a former teacher of English in Beijing and in Shanghai. Besides his thirty-four translations of natural science and technology texts,⁶⁴ almost one thousand titles of Chinese translations were published between the 1840s and 1900.⁶⁵ A major role in introducing this universalistic view was taken by scholars and students who sought asylum in Japan from the Qing state or went there to study medicine and social sciences. The number of Chinese students in Japan increased from about two hundred in 1895 to several thousand in 1908.⁶⁶ They continually faced challenges posed by concepts such as philosophy, religion, society, economics, nation, and civility, which imbued well-known classical Chinese phrases with new meanings. Through their elaborations, these terms become so-called ‘round-trip-words’.⁶⁷ The students were concerned with the re-examination of Confucian texts, promoting vernacular literature, and the creation of a new Chinese culture based on Western standards, especially science and democracy. These were the major issues of the newly formed New Culture Movement (*Xin wenhua yundong*), whose proponents echoed the belief in science and its capability in bettering man’s living conditions. Intellectual forerunners of the revolution in 1911 searched for solutions and ways out of disaster: Yan Fu (1853–1921)⁶⁸ proposed the struggle for wealth and power,⁶⁹ Zhang Binglin (1868–1936) called for the development of national consciousness,⁷⁰ and Liang Qichao (1873–1929) proposed the thorough reform of the Chinese people’s hearts and minds.

REFORMING THE STATE BY REFORMING MINDS AND HEARTS

The image of liberating stubborn people and turning them into self-determined individuals is integral to the rhetoric of reformers and revolutionaries. In the aftermath of the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861–1895),⁷¹ which contrasted Western knowledge and military technique against Chinese culture and knowledge (as being the essential foundation and prerequisite of any practical knowledge), the intellectual elite, around 1900, started arguing in favour of the idea of a universal civilization to which China now had to be connected, and with regard to which it should now be transformed. The foremost concern was the question of how to transform imperial China into a constitutional monarchy or into a republic. The attempts to establish new morals for education started as early as 1902, when the Commercial Press began to publish textbooks of new knowledge to be used in primary schools. These textbooks particularly focused on the issue of training and cultivating one’s personality in terms of governing oneself (*zizhi*), a skill that was considered foundational for freedom and necessary for the progress of civilization.⁷² Starting in 1905, when the curricula in schools were officially changed in

favour of Western-style learning, and the total number of Protestant schools increased to 2,585, with a total of 572,683 pupils,⁷³ this universal view of science won. Science (*kexue*) served as an overall key for becoming civilized, and *wenming* (civilization, civility) would help to fight for a new order of things in China. Schoolboys and schoolgirls were supposed gradually to achieve 'civilized thoughts' (*wenming sixiang*) with the help of newly introduced educational systems. A 'civic religion' was to be introduced, which was connected to efforts to establish a 'morality movement'.⁷⁴

From 1905 to 1911, the Qing government experimented with constitutional practices at the local level, and economic reforms were launched. Through the conceptual link with the claim of progress and modernity, *wenming* became a category for the creation of social and global order. At the turn of the century and through the following decades, civility/*wenming* was a governmental project with varying agents.

It is well known that, after the failed reform in 1898, Liang Qichao, scholar, journalist, philosopher, historian, and reformist, escaped to Japan and became an advocate of the constitutional monarchy. Together with his teacher, Kang Youwei, he was among the reformers who, in 1898, succeeded in implementing their proposal for several institutional and ideological changes within the Qing government. Yet the 'Hundred Days' Reform' was stopped after one hundred days for being too radical. Six prominent reformers were executed. Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei were able to escape into exile, where they remained for the next fourteen years. They would only return to China after the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912.

Liang Qichao had access to Japanese translations of the work of the Swiss jurist and politician Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808–1881). Bluntschli taught at the universities of Zurich, Munich, and Heidelberg,⁷⁵ and was one of the founders of the Institute of International Law at Gent. His writings became the foundation for the concept of the state in Asia between 1880 and 1910,⁷⁶ in particular also for Liang's concept of the integral unity (organic unity) of the state and its population. In his view, no state would be possible without people's conscious activism. Just at the time of the New Policy Movement in 1902, when reforms in taxation and the bureaucratic regime were launched, Liang Qichao expressed the most acute necessity for developing a strong Chinese nation: the creation of new citizens, that is, new Chinese people (*xinmin*). This organic view of the state is the background for Liang's idea of the art of *shesheng* (nurturing life, hygiene) that is to be followed by everybody as the *sine qua non* of all political and social restructuring processes:

A state is formed by the assembly of its people. The relationship of a nation to its people resembles that of the body to its four limbs, five viscera, muscles, veins, and corpuscles. There has never been a case where the four limbs have been cut off, the five viscera wasted away, the muscles and veins injured, and the corpuscles dried up, while the body still lived. In the same way, there has never been a nation which could still exist if its people were foolish, timid, disorganized, and confused. Therefore, if we wish the body to live for a long time, the methods of hygiene (*shesheng*) must be understood. If we wish the nation to be secure, rich, and respectable, the methods for

creating a new people must be discussed. The Renovation (*xinmin*) of the People is the First and Most Urgent Matter for China Today.⁷⁷

With a special concern for affective attitudes, Liang points at the transforming processes from foolishness, timidity, confusion, and disorganization to their opposites, such as sincerity, courage, and effectiveness. This emphasis on sincerity was related to the claim for authenticity which later, specifically during the May Fourth Movement in 1919, became a key word for fighting traditional family and marriage structures. The major message was that marriage should be grounded in love and not in family politics.⁷⁸

Moreover, as a prerequisite for a successful transformation of the peoples' hearts, they must understand the art of *she sheng* (nourishing life). The term *she sheng* was well known in the Chinese context in terms of 'life regimen' (for instance, preserving life through cultivating a sincere heart and diminishing anger).⁷⁹ Yet, previously, this term lacked the particular colour of political significance it now gained in early twentieth-century thinking. With *she sheng*, Liang clearly referred to the domain of *weisheng* (the way of life, guarding life) that now, in Liang's discourse, was reshaped into the meaning of 'public and racial hygiene'. Foundational for this transformation was the idea of the survival of the fittest when applied to human society.⁸⁰ The idea that the only way for China's survival was to instil nationalism (*gongmin*), in the sense that the Chinese nation (*gongmin*) could gradually change towards a strong and wealthy nation (*guomin*), was conceptually bound to the view of the body as a machine as much as to an emphasis on purity and cleanliness. However, there were also critical views, even among those who voiced high respect for Western thought and culture, as they could not consider totally abolishing Chinese culture. As stated by Kang Youwei:

Do those who advocate the total abolition of Confucianism not realize how closely it is connected to all of Chinese civilization? If we abolished Confucians, we would lose all the achievements of our civilization, as well as all our national identity. Have the Chinese people, who are striving for that identity, lost their minds?⁸¹

Other scholars who had studied in the West, such as Zhu Guangqian (1897–1986),⁸² argued strongly against emotionally rational (*lizhi-qinggan*) bifurcation, saying that both knowing and feeling are by no means separable processes.⁸³

In the context of the overall concern for creating good Chinese citizens, scholars voiced critical views regarding attempts to simply transfer Western views of civilization. The *Yishu huibian* (Collection of translations), which was compiled by Chinese students in Tokyo in 1902, included several articles by Gong Fazi. The collection declared two different kinds of civilization, namely a 'material civilization' and a 'spiritual civilization'.⁸⁴ Gong insists on the necessity of both: the material civilization as the basis (such as clothing, food, housing, and handicraft as features of the material civilization) and spiritual civilization as the vital core and the esprit (*shengqi*) of the whole nation. Without explicitly naming the Chinese culture as the spiritual basis, he nevertheless pleads for the harmonious combination of the two.⁸⁵

In contrast to Gong Fazi, Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), the first provisional president of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1912, used the concept of psychological

construction (*xinli jianshe*). In this regard, it is of interest that Sun Yatsen had been educated in Christian schools in Hawai'i and Hong Kong,⁸⁶ and, in 1884, at the age of 18, was baptized. Hence, his claim that revolution first and foremost required renewed hearts and minds, helped to transform the concept of psychological construction into a powerful metaphor in the campaigns against superstition.⁸⁷ Similarly, Li Dazhao (1889–1927), one of the most radical Marxist thinkers, reminded his colleagues and friends in 1915 that, 'as the spirit of the modern citizen embraces courage and intrepidity, we can adopt it to strengthen our will to struggle'.⁸⁸

With this claim, Li points to the prevailing mood of despair among all those who, since the 1860s, consciously witnessed the steady decline of China as a former major civilizing force. His work also points to the image of the Chinese as a population who were lacking in the ability to feel in appropriate ways, deficient in personal hygiene, full of disease, and devoid of any public consciousness about the preservation of health. This image had been embraced in early twentieth century by members of the Chinese scholarly elite, who critiqued their own people, claiming they lacked a scientific spirit and civility. With this critique, the scholarly elite were referring to a particular feature of an indigenous perspective on knowledge and knowledge acquisition, namely the inseparability of knowledge from its context. Concomitantly, they accused the Chinese people of not having the appropriate knowledge about medicine and hygiene (*weisheng*). The Chinese elite at this time refused to acknowledge indigenous Chinese modes of preserving health in the late nineteenth century. This view was imbedded within a deep feeling of inferiority with regard to Western civilizations that,⁸⁹ in turn, caused Chinese scholars, physicians, and politicians alike to claim a foundational rearrangement of Chinese hearts and minds. These were the moments when hearts and emotions were considered as fundamental objects, to be changed and reformed.

NOTES

1. Zheng Cheng [Sheng Cheng], *Son of China*, intr. Paul Valéry, trans. Marvin McCord Lowes (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1930), 206.
2. After the revolution he moved to France, where he published several of his writings in French.
3. Throughout this text the Pinyin romantization system is used.
4. See *Yishu huibian* [A monthly magazine of translated political works], 1/9 (1902), 118.
5. See Victor Mair, *Anthologizing and Anthropologizing: The Place of Non-Elite and Non-Standard Culture in the Chinese Literary Tradition* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), 3.
6. *Shenzhou huabao* [The national herald], on 1 March 1908, published, for instance, a programmatic picture entitled 'The First to Awaken from the Great Dream. In Commemoration of the First Anniversary of the Shenzhou Ribao'. Here, *wenming* appears as the sun that had the power to enlighten the whole world, particularly China. *Wenming* also was used as the name of a newly established press company in Shanghai. See Leo Ou-fan Lee, 'The Cultural Construction of Modernity in Urban Shanghai: Some Preliminary Explorations', in Wen-hsin Yeh (ed.), *Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 31–61.

7. Reaching circulation figures of eight to ten thousand, the *Shenbao* contained information about international commercial activities, on statecraft topics, and on important national and international political affairs. See Andrea Janku, 'Translating Genre: How the "Leading Article" Became the *Shelun*', in Michael Lackner and Natascha Vittinghoff (eds.), *Mapping Meanings: The Field of New Learning in Late Qing China* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 329–53. See also Natascha Vittinghoff, 'Social Actors in the Field of New Learning in Nineteenth Century China', in Lackner and Vittinghoff, *Mapping Meanings*, 90.
8. *Shenbao* (1880), issues 1, 5, 19; (1897), issues 9, 2, 22; (1900), issues 2, 3, 4; (1902), issues 2, 4, 12.
9. Herbert Spencer's *The Principles of Sociology* was available in the Chinese language in 1903. For details on Spencer see Chapter 1, Scandinavian languages, and Chapter 2, British English.
10. See Janku, 'Translating Genre'; Vittinghoff, 'Social Actors', 75–118; Rudolf G. Wagner, 'China "Asleep" and "Awakening": A Study in Conceptualizing Asymmetry and Coping with It', *Transcultural Studies* [online journal], 1/2011, <<http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/ojs/index.php/transcultural/article/view/7315/2920>> accessed 7 October 2013.
11. See, for instance, Jean Jacques Matignon, *Superstition, crime et misere en Chine* (Lyon: A. Storck & Cie, 1899); Daniel Harrison Kulp, *Country Life in South China; The Sociology of Familism, vol. 1: Phenix Village, Kwantung, China* (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1925), 249–58.
12. See John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Tani E. Barlow, *Formations of Colonial Modernities in East Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). The most recent study on the political transformations from the dynastic state towards a modern nation is from Peter Zarrow, *After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1889–1924* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). See also Peter Zarrow, 'Introduction: Citizenship in China and the West', in Joshua A. Fogel and Peter G. Zarrow (eds.), *Imagining the People: Chinese Intellectuals and the Concept of Citizenship, 1890–1920* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 3–38; Yeh, *Becoming Chinese*; Lee, 'The Cultural Construction of Modernity in Urban Shanghai'.
13. See Joachim Kurtz, 'Translating the Vocation of Man: Liang Qichao (1873–1929), J. G. Fichte, and the Body Politic in Early Republican China', in Martin J. Burke and Melvin Richter (eds.), *Why Concepts Matter: Translating Social and Political Thought* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012), 156.
14. See Vincent Goossaert, 'Republican Church Engineering: The National Religious Associations in 1912 China', in Mayfair Mei-Hui Yang (ed.), *Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 209–32; see Rebecca Nedostup, 'Ritual Competition and the Modernizing Nation-State', in Yang, *Chinese Religiosities*, 87–112.
15. When they committed a crime in China, they could only be brought to trial in British courts.
16. See Chapter 12, Japanese.
17. See Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
18. See Rudolf G. Wagner, 'Notes on the History of the Chinese Term for "Labor"', in Lackner and Vittinghoff, *Mapping Meanings*, 129–42.

19. See Denise Gimpel, 'Freeing the Mind through the Body: Women's Thoughts on Physical Education in Late Qing and Early Republican China', *Nan Nü Men, Women and Gender in China*, 8/2 (2006), 316–58.
20. There was no conceptual and institutional separation between criminal and civil lawsuits. In 1907, the newly established Ministry of Civil Affairs called for a civil code to be established. See Xiaoqun Xu, *Trial of Modernity: Judicial Reform in Early Twentieth-Century China, 1901–1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 39–45; see also the work by Frank Dikötter, *Sex, Culture and Modernity in China: Medical Science and the Construction of Sexual Identities in the Early Republican Period* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1995); Michael Lackner, Iwo Amelung, and Joachim Kurtz (eds.), *New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China* (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Lackner and Vittinghoff, *Mapping Meanings*.
21. The queue and the tonsure of the forehead was originally the hairstyle enforced by the Manchu, who took power in 1644. Many anti-Manchu-oriented Chinese refused to adjust to the new hairstyle. Many thousands were killed by the Manchu in the course of massacres. The queue was regarded as symbol of humiliation. In the late nineteenth century (the late Qing), anti-Manchu resentments played a major role among revolutionaries and reformist scholars. Therefore, these Chinese scholars had already cut off their queue in the late 1890s. See Lyon Sharman, *Sun Yat-Sen, His Life and Its Meaning* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934), 40. Cutting off the queue was, for revolutionary minded scholars, an important sign of emancipation. Simultaneously, the Qing court defended the queue until the end, in early 1912. See the most comprehensive work by Antonia Finnane, *Changing Clothes in China: Fashion, History, Nation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 77–80.
22. See Finnane (2007), 92.
23. The term derives from *qi* (banner)—Manchus were the 'banner' people—and *pao* (gown).
24. See Lydia H. Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity. China 1900–1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 308–9.
25. I am grateful to Viatcheslav Vetrow for his many great suggestions in this regard.
26. See Lin Yutang, *My Country and My People* (London: William Heinemann, 1936), 170.
27. See Sabine Dabringhaus, 'Grenzen', in Brunhild Staiger et al. (eds.), *Das große China-Lexikon. Geschichte, Geographie, Gesellschaft, Politik, Wirtschaft, Bildung, Wissenschaft, Kultur* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003), 268.
28. *Wenming* is a compound consisting of the two lexemes, *wen* and *ming*. The oracle book *Zhouyi* (*Yijing*, Book of changes, fourth to second century BC) is among the earliest texts where *wen* appears in connection with *ming*. A passage in the chapter Qian says: 'There appears a dragon in the fields: all under the Heaven enjoys the blessings of civilization.' For a translation, see Richard John Lynn, *The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 133. Another chapter in the *Zhouyi*, named Mingyi (Suppression of the light) says: 'Insight all cultivation and light, (*wen* and *ming*), and outside all yielding and obedience, so should one be when beset with great adversity, as was King Wen.' See Lynn *The Classic of Changes*, 357.
29. See Joanna Waley-Cohen, 'Militarization of Culture in Eighteenth-Century China', in Nicola di Cosmo (ed.), *Military Culture in Imperial China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 278–95.

30. See Kam Louie and Louise Edwards, 'Chinese Masculinity: Theorizing "Wen" and "Wu"', *East Asian History*, 8 (1994), 135–48.
31. See Kathleen Ryor, 'Wen and Wu in Elite Cultural Practices during the Late Ming', in di Cosmo, *Military Culture in Imperial China*, 217–42.
32. Ryor, 'Wen and Wu in Elite Cultural Practices during the Late Ming'; Waley-Cohen, 'Militarization of Culture in Eighteenth-Century China', 293.
33. See Hsiang-Lin Lei, 'When Chinese Medicine Encountered the State: 1910–1949', PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1999.
34. See Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 22–47.
35. This assessment stems from two medical missionaries and authors: William Hamilton Jeffery and James L. Maxwell, *The Diseases of China, Including Formosa and Korea* (London: Bale, Sons and Danielsson, 1910), 3; see also John Dudgeon, *The Diseases of China; Their Causes, Conditions, and Prevalence, Contrasted with Those of Europe* (Glasgow: Dunn & Wright, 1877).
36. See Dorothy Ko, *Cinderella's Sisters: A Revisionist History of Footbinding* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). See especially page 5 on this assessment with regard to the foot-binding history.
37. See *Beiyang huabao* [Newspaper], 30 July 1927. Illustration in Finnane (2007), 168.
38. Li Youning and Zhang Yufa (eds.), *Jindai Zhongguo nü quan yundong shiliao 1842–1911* [Documents on the feminist movement in modern China] (Taipei: Chuanji wenxue she, 1975).
39. See, for instance, Gerhard von Bonin, 'On a Curious Asymmetry in the Chinese Brain', *Chinese Medical Journal*, 38/7 (July 1924), 561–3.
40. See Jeffery and Maxwell, *The Diseases of China*, 8–9.
41. See Angelika C. Messner, *Medizinische Diskurse zu Irresein in China (1600–1930)* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2000), 76.
42. See Arthur Henderson Smith, *Chinese Characteristics* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1894). This book introduced the idea of Chinese national characteristics. Until the 1920s it remained the best sold book among American missionaries who went to China. Smith's writings on the Chinese emotion attitudes were framed by the 'distance between expression and inner feeling'. See Haiyan Lee, *Revolution of the Heart: A Genealogy of Love in China, 1900–1950* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 240–9. On the 'inability' of the Chinese to feel real love, see Dau-lin Hsü, 'Die chinesische Liebe', *SINICA Zeitschrift für Chinakunde und Chinaforschung*, 4/6 (1929), 247.
43. Hsü Dau-lin (1906–1973), a Chinese law student at the University of Berlin, published, during his years in Berlin (1929 to early 1930s), articles on Chinese history in the Frankfurt-based sinological journal *SINICA*. See Anthony W. Sariti 'Necrology: Hsü Dau-lin, 1906–1973', in *Songshi yanjiu tongxin* [Sung studies newsletter], 9 (June 1974), 42–6. Also the prominent early twentieth-century sinologist, Richard Wilhelm, stated that Chinese people did not feel as intensively as Europeans did. See Richard Wilhelm, 'Die Weltanschaulichen Grundlagen der Liebe in Europa und China', *SINICA Zeitschrift für Chinakunde und Chinaforschung*, 4/6 (1929), 251–8.
44. This decision partly resulted from the painful experience of the epidemics in Manchuria during the years 1910/11, during which more than 60,000 people fell victim. The eighty Chinese doctors failed, whereas Japanese doctors, who were called in afterwards, and who applied the methods of public health (quarantine) were successful. Consequently, the previously disputed dissection of corpses was explicitly allowed in

- China. Only ten years later, in 1922, the minister of the interior declared Chinese medicine to be an equally legal field of study. See John Z. Bowers, *Western Medicine in a Chinese Palace: Peking Union Medical College, 1917–1951* (Philadelphia: Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1972), 20; Ralph C. Croizier, *Traditional Medicine in Modern China: Science, Nationalism and the Tensions of Cultural Change* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 47.
45. On the issue of ‘weak and small people’ in comparison to European populations, see Robert J. Culp “‘Weak and Small Peoples’ in a ‘Europeanizing World’: World History Textbooks and Chinese Intellectuals’ Perspectives on Global Modernity’, in Tze-ki Hon and Robert J. Culp (eds.), *The Politics of Historical Production in Late Qing and Republican China* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007), 211–46; see Dikötter, *Sex, Culture and Modernity in China*, 17.
 46. Cf. Wolfgang Bauer, ‘Einleitung’ [Introduction], in Yu-wei K’ang, *Ta T’ung Shu: Das Buch von der Großen Gemeinschaft*, trans. Wolfgang Kube, ed. Wolfgang Bauer (Düsseldorf and Cologne: Diederichs, 1974), 16–17.
 47. Andrew T. Scull, ‘The Social History of Psychiatry in the Victorian Era’, in Andrew T. Scull (ed.), *Madhouses, Mad-Doctors, and Madman: The Social History of Psychiatry in the Victorian Era* (London: Athlone Press, 1981), 10.
 48. See Sara Waitstill Tucker, ‘The Canton Hospital and Medicine in Nineteenth Century China 1835–1900’, PhD thesis, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1983, 232.
 49. See J. G. Kerr, ‘The Refuge for the Insane, Canton’, *China Medical Missionary Journal*, 12/4 (1898), 177–8.
 50. Kerr, ‘The Refuge for the Insane’, 178. This claim was never realized.
 51. Wang Wanbai, ‘Fengrenyuan zhi zhongyao yu biyi’ [On the importance and benefit of lunatic asylums], *Zhonghua yixue zazhi* [Chinese medical journal], 3/5 (1919), 128.
 52. In this text I use the terms ‘*wu zang*’, ‘*five zang*’, ‘*yin-viscera*’, and ‘*five organs*’ interchangeably. For a detailed study of the five *zang* in an early seventeenth-century medical textbook, see Elisabeth Hsu, ‘Zangxiang in the Canon of the Categories and Tendencies towards Body Centered Chinese Medicine’, *Ziran kexue shi yanjiu* [Studies of the history of natural science], 19/2 (2000), 165–87.
 53. I avoid translating these five terms since this would require a lengthy discussion of their semantics in late imperial texts. However, on their semantics in the *Huangdi neijing* (200 BC, which is one of the most important medical canons until today), see Paul U. Unschuld and Hermann Tesselow, *Huang Di Nei Jing Su Wen: An Annotated Translation of Huang Di’s Inner Classic-Basic Questions*, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 409.
 54. Chinese physicians at that time variously questioned this separation. Most prominent in this regard were the writings by Zhang Xichun (1860–1933). See Angelika C. Messner, ‘On “Translating” Western Psychiatry into the Chinese Context in Republican China’, in Lackner and Vittinghoff, *Mapping Meanings*, 650–3.
 55. Wang Wanbai, ‘Fengrenyuan zhi zhongyao yu biyi’.
 56. Wang Wanbai, ‘Fengrenyuan zhi zhongyao yu biyi’.
 57. Wang Wanbai, ‘Fengrenyuan zhi zhongyao yu biyi’.
 58. On this emotion knowledge see Chapter 13, Korean.
 59. These epistemological shifts and their implications for educational and political issues have been interpreted by historians as evidence for individualism and subjectivity as integral adjectives for an emerging new self in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See Richard G. Wang, ‘The Cult of *Qing*: Romanticism in the Late Ming Period and in the Novel *Jiao Hong Ji*’, *Ming Studies*, 33 (August 1994), 12–55.

60. This is evidenced by a huge bulk of literary work from late imperial China. See Angelika C. Messner, 'Aspects of Emotion in Late Imperial China: Editor's Introduction to the Thematic Section', *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques*, 66/4 (2013), 893–913.
61. See Benjamin Elman, *On their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550–1900* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 389.
62. See Meng Yue, 'Hybrid Science versus Modernity: The Practice of the Jiangnan Arsenal, 1864–1897', *East Asian Science, Technology and Medicine*, 16 (1999), 13–52.
63. They comprised the topics of acoustics, astronomy, chemistry, physical geography, political geography, geology, political economy, etc. See Elman, *On their Own Terms*, 134–41 and 232–3; Dikötter, *Sex, Culture and Modernity in China*, 5–10.
64. See Jonathan Spence, *To Change China: Western Advisers in China, 1620–1960* (New York: Penguin Books, 1980), 140–54; Rune Svarverud, 'The Formation of a Chinese Lexicon of International Law 1847–1903', in Lackner and Vittinghoff, *Mapping Meanings*, 507–36.
65. See Xiong Yuezhi, *Xixue dongjianshu wan Qing shehui* [The dissemination of Western knowledge and the late Qing society] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1994). He gives the number of 434 Western titles. See also Vittinghoff, 'Social Actors', 89.
66. See Yung Ying-yue, 'The Chinese Educational Mission in the 1870s: Comparison with the Chinese Students in Japan in the 1900s', *Journal of the Institute for Asian Studies*, 29 (2002), 341–64, especially 353.
67. See Mair, *Anthologizing and Anthropologizing*, 3.
68. In 1901, he completed his translation of *An Inquiry into Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nation* by Adam Smith into Chinese. See Yan Fu (tr.), *Yuan Fu* [On the origins of wealth] (1901/02; Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1981).
69. See Benjamin Schwarz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964).
70. See Young-tsu Wong, *Search for Modern Nationalism: Zhang Binglin and Revolutionary China, 1869–1936* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989).
71. This movement arose in the wake of the Chinese defeat in the Opium Wars.
72. See Yvonne Schulz Zinda, 'Propagating New "Virtues": "Patriotism" in Late Qing Textbooks for the Moral Education of Primary Students', in Lackner and Vittinghoff, *Mapping Meanings*, 685–710, especially 689–700.
73. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire: 1894–1911*, repr. edn., vol. 3 (Taipei: Book World Co., 1960), 413.
74. See Nedostup, 'Ritual Competition and the Modernizing Nation-State', 87.
75. See Yong Lei, *Auf der Suche nach dem modernen Staat. Die Einflüsse der allgemeinen Staatslehre Johann Caspar Bluntschli auf das Staatsdenken Liang Qichaos* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 95–116.
76. See Cheng Kuangmin, *Liang Qichao qimeng de dongxue beijing* [The Japanese learning background to Liang Qichao's enlightenment thought] (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 2003).
77. The source of this passage is the fortnightly journal *Xinmin congbao* [Renewing the people], 1/2 (1902), which Liang Qichao published from 1902 to 1905 in his Japanese exile in Yokuhama. The article is to be found in the essay collection *Xinminshuo* (repr.; Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1996), 1–2.
78. See Lee, *Revolution of the Heart*, 105–11.
79. See Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*.
80. As mentioned, Herbert Spencer's *The Principles of Sociology* had been available in the Chinese language since 1903.

81. Kang Youwei, *Kang Youwei zhengzhi lunji: shang, xia* [Collected political essays by Kang Youwei], ed. Tang Zhijun, vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 738. See also Jana S. Rošker, *Searching for the Way: Theory of Knowledge in Pre-modern and Modern China* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2008), 120.
82. Zhu Guangqian, went—after earning his BA in Hong Kong—to study in Edinburgh, London, and Strasbourg, where he earned his doctorate. In the 1930s he returned to Beijing. His works are crucial for the development of literary aesthetics in China in the twentieth century.
83. Zhu Guangqian, ‘Tan qing yu li: gei yige zhong xuesheng de shi'er feng xin zhi jiu’ [On emotion and reason: The ninth of twelve letters to a middle school student], *Yiban* [The ordinary], 3 (1928), reprinted in *Gei qingniande shi'erfeng xin* (Anhui: Anhui chubanshe, 1996), 38–45, here 42.
84. See Gong Fazi, ‘Wuzhi wenming biyao’ [The need for material civilization], *Yishu huibian*, 2/11 (1903), 107–8.
85. See the inspiring study by Ann Anagnost, *National Past-Times: Narrative, Representation, and Power in Modern China (Body, Commodity, Text)* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 75–86.
86. Goossaert, ‘Republican Church Engineering’, 213.
87. See Nedostup, ‘Ritual Competition and the Modernizing Nation-State’, 91.
88. See Li Dazhao, *Li Dazhao wenji* [Collected writings by Li Dazhao], 2 vols (1915; Beijing: Renminchubanshe, 1984), vol. 1, 148–9.
89. On the different feelings of humiliation and shame in Iran of that time see Chapter 7, Persian.