Abstract
This paper defends three theses: (i) that presentism is either trivial or untenable; (ii) that the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time is not about the status of presentism; and (iii) that there is no temporal analogue of the modal thesis of actualism.
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meyer, U. The Presentist’s Dilemma. Philos Stud 122, 213–225 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-1784-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-1784-9