Abstract
This article reports a test of the predictive accuracy of solution concepts in cooperative non-sidepayment n-person games with empty core. Six solutions were tested. Three of these were value solutions (i.e., λ-transfer value, λ-transfer nucleolus, and λ-transfer disruption value) and three were equilibrium solutions (deterrence set, stable set, and imputation set). The test was based on a laboratory experiment utilizing 5-person, 2-choice normal form games with empty core; other related data sets were also analyzed. Goodness-of-fit results based on discrepancy scores show that the three value solutions are about equally accurate in predicting outcomes, and that all three are substantially more accurate than the other solutions tested.
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Michener, H.A., Salzer, M.S. Comparative accuracy of value solutions in non-sidepayment games with empty core. Theor Decis 26, 205–233 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134106
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134106