Skip to main content
Log in

Mirror systems and simulation: a neo-empiricist interpretation

  • Published:
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

It is often claimed that the discovery of mirror neurons supports simulation theory (ST). There has been much controversy about this, however, as there are various competing models of the functional contribution of mirror systems, only some of which characterize mirroring as simulation in the sense required by ST. But a brief review of these models reveals that they all include simulation in some sense. In this paper, I propose that the broader conception of simulation articulated by neo-empiricist theories of concepts can subsume the more specific conceptions of simulation presented by ST and by these other models, thereby offering a framework in which each of these models may play a role. According to neo-empiricism, conceptual thought in general involves simulation in the sense that it is grounded in sensory, motor, and other embodied systems (Barsalou, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577–609, 1999, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: Biological Sciences, 364, 1281–1289, 2009; Barsalou et al., Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(2), 84–91, 2003; Prinz 2002, Mind & Language, 25(5), 612–621, 2010; Glenberg and Robertson, Journal of Memory and Language, 43, 379–401, 2000). Crucially, the term “simulation” here refers not to simulations of a target agent’s experience in the sense endorsed by simulation theory but to the activation of sensory, motor, affective, and introspective representations. This difference does not entail that neo-empiricism must be in competition with ST—indeed, I will propose that ST can be embedded as a special case within neo-empiricism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. I will use the term “mirror system” rather than “mirror neuron,” except where the context demands otherwise.

  2. I will use the term “mind reading” to refer to our perfectly ordinary ability to understand others as having mental states of various sorts, including emotions, sensations, beliefs, and desires, as well as the sorts of predictions and explanations of their behavior that such an understanding makes possible for us.

  3. But see Hill (2007).

References

  • Adolphs, R. (2003). Cognitive neuroscience of human social behaviour. National Review of Neuroscience, 4(3), 165–178.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Adolphs, R., Gosselin, F., Buchanan, T. W., Tranel, D., Schyns, P., & Damasio, A. R. (2005). A mechanism for impaired fear recognition after amygdala damage. Nature, 433, 68–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barsalou, L. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577–609.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barsalou, L. (2009). Simulation, situated conceptualization, and prediction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: Biological Sciences, 364, 1281–1289.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barsalou, L., Kyle Simmons, W., Barbey, A., & Wilson, C. (2003). Grounding conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(2), 84–91.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bastiaansen, J. A. C. J., Thioux, M., & Keysers, C. (2009). Evidence for mirror systems in emotions. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 364, 2391–2404.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buccino, G., Binkofski, F., Fink, G. R., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., Seits, R. J., Zilles, K., Rizzolatti, G., & Freund, H.-J. (2001). Action observation activates premotor and parietal areas in a somatotopic manner: An fMRI study. European Journal of Neuroscience, 13, 400–404.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers, P. (2009). How we know our minds: The relationship between metacognition and mindreading. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 121–182.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Castelli, F., Frith, C., Happé, F., & Frith, U. (2002). Autism, Asperger syndrome and brain mechanisms for the attribution of mental states to animated shapes. Brain, 125(8), 1839–1849.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chao, L. L., Haxby, J. V., & Martin, A. (1999). Attribute-based neural substrates in posterior temporal cortex for perceiving and knowing about objects. Nature Neuroscience, 2, 913–919.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Csibra, G. (2008). Action mirroring and action understanding: An alternative account. In P. Haggard, Y. Rossetti, & M. Kawato (Eds.), Sensorimotor foundation of higher cognition: Attention and performance (pp. 435–458). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Jaegher, H. (2009). Social understanding through direct perception? Yes, by interacting. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(2009), 535–542.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007). Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6(4), 485–507.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Jaegher, H., Di Paolo, E., & Gallagher, S. (2010). Can social interaction constitute social cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(10), 441–447.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dinstein, I., Hasson, U., Rubin, N., & Heeger, D. J. (2007). Brain areas selective for both observed and executed movements. Journal of Neurophysiology, 98(3), 1415–1427.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2002). The neural correlates of action understanding in non-human primates. In M. I. Stamenov & V. Gallese (Eds.), Mirror neurons and the evolution of brain and language (pp. 13–35). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frith, C., & Singer, T. (2008). The role of social cognition in decision-making. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 363, 3875–3886.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fuchs, T., & De Jaegher, H. (2009). Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8, 465–486.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, S. (2001). The practice of mind: Theory simulation or primary interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(5–7), 83–108.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, S. (2007). Simulation trouble. Social Neuroscience, 2(3/4), 353–365.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, S. (2008). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 535–543.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2008). The phenomenological mind. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2, 493–501.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gallese, V., Keysers, C., & Rozzolatti, G. (2004). A unifying view of the basis of social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(9), 396–403.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Glenberg, A. M., & Kaschak, M. P. (2003). Grounding language in action. Psychonomic Bulletin Review, 9, 558–565.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Glenberg, A., & Robertson, D. (2000). Symbol grounding and meaning: A comparison of high-dimensional and embodied theories of meaning. Journal of Memory and Language, 43, 379–401.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (1993). The psychology of folk psychology. In A. Goldman (Ed.), Readings in philosophy and cognitive science (pp. 347–380). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (2008). Mirroring, mindreading and simulation. In J. A. Pineda (Ed.), Mirror neuron system: The role of mirroring processes in social cognition (pp. 311–330). New York: Humana.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A., & Shanton, K. (2010). The case for simulation theory. In A. Leslie & T. German (Eds.), Handbook of “theory of mind”. New York: Psychology Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gopnik, A. (1993). The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 1–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gordon, R. (1995). Simulation without introspection or inference from me to you. In T. Stone & M. Davies (Eds.), Mental simulation: Evaluations and applications (pp. 53–67). Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gordon, R. (2007). Ascent routines for propositional attitudes. Synthese, 159, 151–165.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heal, J. (1986). Replication and functionalism. In J. Butterfield (Ed.), Language, mind and logic (pp. 135–150). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heiser, M., Iacoboni, M., Maeda, F., Markus, J., & Maziotta, J. (2003). The essential role of Broca’s area in imitation. European Journal of Neuroscience, 17, 1123–1128.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hickok, G. (2009). Eight problems for the mirror neuron theory of action understanding in monkeys and humans. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21(7), 1229–1243.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hill, C. (2007). Goldman’s theory of introspection (manuscript).

  • Hobson, R. P. (2002). The cradle of thought. London: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hutto, D. (2004). The limits of spectatorial folk psychology. Mind and Language, 19(5), 548–573.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Iacoboni, M., Molnar-Szakacs, I., Gallese, V., Buccino, G., Mazziotta, J. C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). Grasping the intentions of others with one’s own mirror neuron system. PLoS Biology, 3, 529–535.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jacob, P. (2008). What do mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition? Mind and Language, 23(2), 190–223.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jacob, P. (2009). The tuning-fork model of human social cognition: A critique. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(1), 229–243.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keysers, C., Wicker, B., Gazzola, V., Anton, J. L., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2004). A touching sight: SII/PV activation during the observation and experience of touch. Neuron, 42, 335–346.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kilner, J., Friston, K., & Frith, C. (2007). Predictive coding: An account of the mirror neuron system. Cognitive Processing, 8, 159–166.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leslie, A. (2000). Theory of mind as a mechanism of selective attention. In M. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The new cognitive neurosciences (pp. 1235–1247). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mukamel, R., Ekstrom, A. D., Kaplan, J., Iacoboni, M., & Fried, I. (2010). Single-neuron responses in humans during execution and observation of actions. Current Biology, 20, 750–756.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Newman-Norlund, R., van Shie, H., van Zuijlen, A., & Beckering, H. (2007). The mirror system is more active during complementary compared with imitative action. Nature Neuroscience, 10(7), 817–818.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oberman, L., Winkielman, P., & Ramachandran, V. S. (2007). Face to face: Blocking facial mimicry can selectively impair recognition of impair emotional expressions. Social Neuroscience, 2(3–4), 167–178.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pecher, D., Zeelenberg, R., & Barsalou, L. W. (2003). Verifying properties from different modalities for concepts produces switching costs. Psychological Science, 14, 119–124.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pobric, G., & Hamilton, A. (2006). Action understanding requires the left inferior frontal cortex. Current Biology, 16, 524–529.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prinz, J. (2002). Furnishing the mind: Concepts and their perceptual basis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prinz, J. (2010). Can concept empiricism forestall eliminativism? Mind & Language, 25(5), 612–621.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pulvermüller, F., & Hauk, O. (2005). Functional links between motor and language systems. European Journal of Neuroscience, 21, 793–797.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reddy, V. (2008). How infants know minds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rizzolatti, G., & Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annual Reviews of Neuroscience, 27, 169–192.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Simmons, W. K., Pecher, D., Hamann, S. B., Zeelenberg, R., & Barsalou, L. W. (2003). fMRI evidence for modality-specific processing of conceptual knowledge on six modalities. Meeting of the Society for Cognitive Neuroscience, New York, March 2003.

  • Singer, T., Seymour, B., O’Doherty, J., Kaube, H., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. (2004). Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain. Science, 303, 1157–1162.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vermeulen, N., Corneille, O., & Niedenthal, P. M. (2008). Sensory load incurs conceptual processing costs. Cognition, 109, 287–294.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wicker, B., Keysers, C., Plailly, J., Royet, J., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (2003). Both of us disgusted in my insula: The common neural basis of seeing and feeling disgust. Neuron, 40, 4–655.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wolpert, D. M. (1997). Computational approaches to motor control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 1, 209–216.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wolpert, D. M., Doya, K., & Kawato, M. (2003). A unifying computational framework for motor control and social interaction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London B, 358, 593–602.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to two anonymous reviewers, both of whose suggestions helped a great deal in improving this paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to John Michael.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Michael, J. Mirror systems and simulation: a neo-empiricist interpretation. Phenom Cogn Sci 11, 565–582 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9253-3

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9253-3

Keywords

Navigation