Abstract
It is often claimed that the discovery of mirror neurons supports simulation theory (ST). There has been much controversy about this, however, as there are various competing models of the functional contribution of mirror systems, only some of which characterize mirroring as simulation in the sense required by ST. But a brief review of these models reveals that they all include simulation in some sense. In this paper, I propose that the broader conception of simulation articulated by neo-empiricist theories of concepts can subsume the more specific conceptions of simulation presented by ST and by these other models, thereby offering a framework in which each of these models may play a role. According to neo-empiricism, conceptual thought in general involves simulation in the sense that it is grounded in sensory, motor, and other embodied systems (Barsalou, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577–609, 1999, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: Biological Sciences, 364, 1281–1289, 2009; Barsalou et al., Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(2), 84–91, 2003; Prinz 2002, Mind & Language, 25(5), 612–621, 2010; Glenberg and Robertson, Journal of Memory and Language, 43, 379–401, 2000). Crucially, the term “simulation” here refers not to simulations of a target agent’s experience in the sense endorsed by simulation theory but to the activation of sensory, motor, affective, and introspective representations. This difference does not entail that neo-empiricism must be in competition with ST—indeed, I will propose that ST can be embedded as a special case within neo-empiricism.
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Notes
I will use the term “mirror system” rather than “mirror neuron,” except where the context demands otherwise.
I will use the term “mind reading” to refer to our perfectly ordinary ability to understand others as having mental states of various sorts, including emotions, sensations, beliefs, and desires, as well as the sorts of predictions and explanations of their behavior that such an understanding makes possible for us.
But see Hill (2007).
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Many thanks to two anonymous reviewers, both of whose suggestions helped a great deal in improving this paper.
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Michael, J. Mirror systems and simulation: a neo-empiricist interpretation. Phenom Cogn Sci 11, 565–582 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9253-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9253-3