Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-2pzkn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-14T03:19:39.768Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Experiment and Animal Minds: Why the Choice of the Null Hypothesis Matters

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Irina Mikhalevich
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In guarding against inferential mistakes, experimental comparative cognition errs on the side of underattributing sophisticated cognition to animals, or what I refer to as the underattribution bias. I propose eliminating this bias by altering the method of choosing the default, or null, hypothesis. Rather than choosing the most parsimonious null hypothesis, as is current practice, I argue for choosing the best-evidenced hypothesis. Doing so at once preserves the risk-controlling structure of the current statistical paradigm and introduces a sensitivity to probability-conferring empirical and theoretical information. This analysis illustrates how values like parsimony can covertly shape statistical-experimental design and inference.

Type
Psychology
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 82 , Issue 5 , December 2015 , pp. 1059 - 1069
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

I am grateful to Alisa Bokulich, Colin Allen, Simon Fitzpatrick, Richard Moore, Kent Staley, Russell Powell, and audience members at the Philosophy of Science Association 2014 meeting for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay.

References

Anderson, David R., Burnham, Kenneth P., and Thompson, William L.. 2000. “Null Hypothesis Testing: Problems Prevalence, and an Alternative.” Journal of Wildlife Management 64:912–23.10.2307/3803199CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andrews, Kristin. 2011. “Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals.” In The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, ed. Beauchamp, Tom and Frey, R. G., 469–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Andrews, Kristin, and Huss, Brian. 2014. “Anthropomorphism, Anthropectomy, and the Null Hypothesis.” Biology and Philosophy 29:711–29.10.1007/s10539-014-9442-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Babb, S., and Jonathan, Crystal. 2006. “Episodic-Like Memory in the Rat.” Current Biology 11:1317–21.Google Scholar
Crystal, Jonathon D., and Foote, Allison L.. 2009. “Metacognition in Animals.” Comparative Cognition and Behavior 4:1–16.Google ScholarPubMed
de Waal, Frans B. M. 1999. “Anthropomorphism and Anthropodenial.” Philosophical Topics 27:255–80.Google Scholar
Dienes, Zoltan. 2008. Understanding Psychology as a Science: An Introduction to Scientific and Statistical Inference. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Fisher, J. A. 1990. “The Myth of Anthropomorphism.” In Interpretation and Explanation in the Study of Animal Behavior: Interpretation, Intentionality, and Communication, ed. Bekoff, M. and Jamieson, D., 96–116. Boulder, CO: Westview.Google Scholar
Jamieson, D. 1991. “Disambiguating Anthropomorphism: An Interdisciplinary Review.” In Perspectives in Ethology, Vol. 9, ed. P. P. G. Bateson and Peter H. Klopfer, 49–85. New York: Plenum.Google Scholar
Fitzpatrick, Simon. 2009. “The Primate Mindreading Controversy: A Case Study in Simplicity and Methodology in Animal Psychology.” In The Philosophy of Animal Minds, ed. Lurz, Robert W., 258–77. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Lurz, Robert W. 2013. “Kelly on Ockham’s Razor and Truth-Finding Efficiency.” Philosophy of Science 80:298–309.Google Scholar
Foote, Allison L., and Crystal, Jonathon D.. 2007. “Metacognition in the Rat.” Current Biology 17:551–55.10.1016/j.cub.2007.01.061CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Furlong, E. E., Boose, K. J., and Boysen, S. T.. 2008. “Raking It In: The Impact of Enculturation on Chimpanzee Tool Use.” Animal Cognition 11:83–97.10.1007/s10071-007-0091-6CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Gigerenzer, Gerd. 2004. “Mindless Statistics.” Journal of Socio-Economics 33:587–606.10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.033CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 1994. “Of Nulls and Norms.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1:280–90.Google Scholar
Keeley, Brian L. 2004. “Anthropomorphism, Primatomorphism, Mammalomorphism: Understanding Cross-Species Comparisons.” Biology and Philosophy 19:521–40.10.1007/sBIPH-004-0540-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelly, Kevin. 2004. “Justification as Truth-Finding Efficiency: How Ockham’s Razor Works.” Minds and Machines 14:485–505.10.1023/B:MIND.0000045993.31233.63CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelly, Kevin 2007. “A New Solution to the Puzzle of Simplicity.” Philosophy of Science 74:561–73.10.1086/525604CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelly, Kevin 2011. “Simplicity, Truth, and Probability.” In Handbook on the Philosophy of Statistics, ed. Bandyopadhyay, Prasanta and Forster, Malcolm, 983–1024. Oxford: North Holland.10.1016/B978-0-444-51862-0.50031-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kruschke, J. K. 2010. “What to Believe: Bayesian Methods for Data Analysis.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14:293–300.10.1016/j.tics.2010.05.001CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mayo, Deborah G. 1981. “In Defense of the Neyman–Pearson Theory of Confidence Intervals.” Philosophy of Science 48:269–80.10.1086/288996CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayo, Deborah G. 1982. “On After-Trial Criticisms of Neyman-Pearson Theory of Statistics.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 158:145–58.Google Scholar
Mayo, Deborah G. 1992. “Did Pearson Reject the Neyman–Pearson Philosophy of Statistics?” Synthese 90:233–62.10.1007/BF00485352CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayo, Deborah G. 2004. “An Error-Statistical Philosophy of Evidence.” In The Nature of Scientific Evidence, ed. Taper, Mark L. and Lele, Subhash R., 79–118. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.10.7208/chicago/9780226789583.003.0004CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayo, Deborah, and Spanos, Aris. 2011. “Error Statistics.” In Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7, Philosophy of Statistics, ed. Bandyopadhyay, Prasanta S. and Forster, Malcolm R., 153–98. Philadelphia: Elsevier.Google Scholar
Meketa, Irina. 2014. “A Critique of the Principle of Simplicity in Comparative Cognition.” Biology and Philosophy 29:731–45.10.1007/s10539-014-9429-zCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Povinelli, Daniel J. 2000. Folk Physics for Apes: The Chimpanzee’s Theory of How the World Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sober, Elliot. 2005. “Comparative Psychology Meets Evolutionary Biology: Morgan’s Canon and Cladistic Parsimony.” In Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Anthropomorphism, ed. Daston, Lorraine and Mitman, Gregg, 85–99. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Mitman, Gregg 2009. “Parsimony and Models of Animal Minds.” In The Philosophy of Animal Minds, ed. Lurz, Robert W., 237–57. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar