Abstract
Arguments for scepticism about perceptual knowledge are often said to have intuitively plausible premises. In this discussion I question this view in relation to an argument from ignorance and argue that the supposed persuasiveness of the argument depends on debatable background assumptions about knowledge or justification. A reasonable response to scepticism has to show there is a plausible epistemological perspective that can make sense of our having perceptual knowledge. I present such a perspective. In order give a more satisfying response to scepticism, we need also to consider the standing of background beliefs. This is required since the recognitional abilities that enable us to have perceptual knowledge are informed by, or presuppose, a picture or conception of the world the correctness of which we have not ascertained. The question is how, in the face of this, to make sense of responsible belief-formation. In addressing this problem I make a suggestion about the standing of certain crucial beliefs linking appearances with membership of kinds.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Austin, J. L. (1946/1979). Other minds. The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 20, 148–187; 1946 (Reprinted in Austin’s Philosophical papers (3rd ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979 to which page references refer).
Bonjour L. (1980) Externalist theories of empirical knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: 53–73
Breuckner A. (1994) The structure of the skeptical argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 827–835
Cohen S. (2002) Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65: 309–329
DeRose K. (1995) Solving the skeptical problem. The Philosophical Review 104: 1–52
Dretske F. (1970) Epistemic operators. The Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007–1023
Goldman A. I. (1986) Epistemology and cognition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Greco, J. (2007). The nature of ability and the purpose of knowledge. In Philosophical issues, 17: The metaphysics of epistemology (pp. 57–69).
Greco J. (2008) Skepticism about the external world. In: Greco J (eds) The Oxford handbook of skepticism. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 108–128
Hookway C. (1990) Scepticism. Routledge, London
Hume, D. (1965). In L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), A treatise of human nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
McDowell, J. (1994/1998). Knowledge by hearsay. In B. K. Matilal & A. Chakrabarti (Eds.), Knowing from words: Western and Indian philosophical analyses of understanding and testimony (pp. 195–224). Dordrecht: Kluwer (Reprinted in J. McDowell (1998), pp. 414–443. Page references are to the reprint.).
Millar A. (1991) Reasons and experience. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Millar A. (2000) The scope of perceptual knowledge. Philosophy 75: 73–88
Millar A. (2007a) What the disjunctivist is right about. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74: 176–198
Millar, A. (2007b). The state of knowing. In Philosophical issues, 17: The metaphysics of epistemology (pp. 179–196).
Millar, A. (2008a). Disjunctivism and skepticism. In J. Greco (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism (pp. 581–604). New York: Oxford University Press.
Millar A. (2008b) Perceptual-recognitional abilities and perceptual knowledge. In: Haddock A., Macpherson F. E. (eds) Disjunctivism: Perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 330–347
Millar A. (2009) What is it that cognitive abilities are abilities to do?. Acta Analytica 24: 223–236
Millar A. (2010) Knowing from being told. In: Haddock A., Millar A., Pritchard D. (eds) Social epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 175–193
Millar A. (2011a) Knowledge and reasons for belief. In: Reisner A., Steglich-Peterson A. (eds) Reasons for belief. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 223–243
Millar, A. (2011b). How visual perception yields reasons for belief. In Philosophical issues, 21: The epistemology of perception (pp. 332–351).
Millikan R. (2000) On clear and confused ideas: An essay about substance concepts. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Moore, G. E. (1925). A defence of common sense. In J. H. Muirhead (Ed.), Contemporary British philosophy. Second Series (Reprinted in Moore’s Philosophical papers (pp. 32–59). London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959).
Pollock J. (1987) Contemporary theories of knowledge. Hutchinson, London
Pritchard D., Millar A., Haddock A. (2010) The nature and value of knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Pryor J. (2000) The skeptic and the dogmatist. Noûs 34: 517–549
Quine W. V. (1969) Ontological relativity and other essays. Columbia University Press, New York
Sosa E. (2007) A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Sosa E. (2009) Reflective knowledge: Apt belief and reflective knowledge. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Wittgenstein L. (1969) On certainty. Blackwell, Oxford
Wright C. (2002) (Anti-)sceptics: Simple and subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65: 330–348
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Millar, A. Scepticism, perceptual knowledge, and doxastic responsibility. Synthese 189, 353–372 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0005-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0005-7