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There is No Simpliciter Simpliciter

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Abstract

This paper identifies problems with indexicalism and abverbialism about temporary intrinsic properties, and solves them by disentangling two senses in which a particular may possess a property simpliciter. The first sense is the one identified by adverbialists in which a particular possesses at all times the property as a matter of foundational metaphysical fact regardless of whether it is manifest. The second involves building on adverbialism to produce a semantics for property-manifestation according to which different members of a family of second-order properties of the foundational property are relevant to property manifestation at different times.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia

    Kristie Miller & David Braddon-Mitchell

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  1. Kristie Miller
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  2. David Braddon-Mitchell
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Correspondence to Kristie Miller.

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Miller, K., Braddon-Mitchell, D. There is No Simpliciter Simpliciter . Philos Stud 136, 249–278 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9074-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9074-3

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