Abstract
The proverb “chalepa ta kala” (“fine things are difficult”) is invoked in three dialogues in the Platonic corpus: Hippias Major, Cratylus and Republic. In this paper, I argue that the context in which the proverb arises reveals Socrates’ considerable pedagogical dexterity as he uses the proverb to rebuke his interlocutor in one dialogue but to encourage his interlocutors in another. In the third, he gauges his interlocutors’ mention of the proverb to be indicative of their preparedness for a more difficult philosophical trial. What emerges in the study of these three Platonic dialogues is that Socrates believes that how he and others describe learning makes a tangible difference in philosophical investigation.
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Notes
I have elswhere explored Xenophon’s contrast of Glaucon and Charmides in the context of the contemporary use of the “Socratic method” in law schools and K-12 education (see Mintz 2006, p. 489).
Socrates’ encouragement of Charmides to enter the political life of the city did not necessarily bode well for Athens as Charmides would eventually become closely associated with the 30 Tyrants, being one of the Ten appointed to govern the Piraeus (see Nails 2002, p. 92; Nails argues against the commonly held view that Charmides was actually a member of the Thirty). The issue of the moral character of Socrates’ associates is a central problem in the Socratic dialogues. Was he responsible for the character of people considered by many to be traitors to Athens such as Alcibiades, Critias and Charmides? Or was the problem that those men did not spend enough time associating with Socrates? Plato’s dialogue about temperance, Charmides, features, similar to Xenophon, a bright, young and relatively modest Charmides. But Plato ends with the young man compelling Socrates to associate with him; Charmides is executing, notably, the order of his older cousin Critias when he compels Socrates to associate with him. Charmides says, “We shall have to use force… seeing that this fellow here [Critias] has given me my orders” (Plato 1997b, 176c). Plato leaves readers with the impression that Critias—rather than Socrates—is the most significant influence on Charmides. This reading of the close of Charmides is suggested by Eva Brann (2004, pp. 66–87).
The fact that Xenophon represents Socrates’ pedagogical flexibility in a similar way does not necessarily mean that we ought to attribute that educational gift to the historical Socrates. I think that it is likely that it was a feature of the historical Socrates, though it is rather possible that such depictions of Socrates became part of the genre of Socratic dialogues. Either way, I will not speculate further on the issue. And hereafter in the article, I will set Xenophon aside and focus only on Platonic dialogues.
It is essential to note this extended sense both because Socrates is obviously doing something different than other educators in his time and ours and, further, because Socrates famously denies that he is a teacher explicitly in Plato’s Apology of Socrates: “if you have heard from anyone that I attempt to educate human beings and make money from it, that is not true” and “I have never been anyone’s teacher” (Plato 1998; 19d and 33a). Though many scholars take Socrates’ denial in the Apology of Socrates as Plato merely distinguishing Socrates from the sophists—after all, how could Plato believe anything other than that Socrates was the educator in Athens par excellence?—I read the Apology of Socrates as a meditation on the question, “what is a teacher?” A Platonic answer to that question is no simple matter.
I have used the Kahn’s suggested correction of Woodruff’s translation here (Kahn 1985, p. 263).
To mention just two brief examples: The first line of the dialogue is Socrates’ greeting of Hippias: “Here comes Hippias, fine [ho kalos] and wise!” (281a). A later exchange uses several cognates of kalon,
Socrates: So if the fine [to kalon] is a cause of the good, the good should come to be from the fine [tou kalou]…
Hippias: Certainly. You’re talking finely [kalôs gar legeis], Socrates.
S: Then see if I say this finely as well [oukoun kai tode kalôs legô]… (297b; I have made a minor change to Woodruff’s translation to highlight the adverbial sense of kalôs).
The strategy of couching one’s criticism in the name of some non-present other is, pedagogically, a noteworthy move by Socrates. Rather than confront Hippias directly, as he often does with other interlocutors, Socrates distances himself from the criticism of Hippias’ views that he raises. Perhaps the assuredness that Hippias maintains through much of the conversation is best explained by Socrates’ feigning to be teaming with Hippias against the unnamed other in a joint enterprise of inquiring into the fine. Hippias does not appear to be annoyed, frustrated or embarrassed until relatively late in the dialogue. This device demonstrates a profound educational insight that there is a considerable difference between asking someone, “how would you respond to someone who says that X undermines your argument?” and telling someone, “X undermines your argument.”
It is noteworthy, however, that in Hippias Major, Socrates is not wholly estimable nor is Hippias simply clueless. Woodruff’s analysis of the dialogue defends Hippias against the charge of stupidity and notes that “Socrates comes off badly in the dialogue. He is ironical and insulting. He punishes Hippias for no apparent crimes, and takes advantage of whatever it is that makes Hippias stand up to such treatment” (Plato and Woodruff 1982, p. 119).
See Guthrie on the prominence of the issue of etymology (1971, p. 204 ff.).
I have altered Reeve’s translation to use the more common translation of “learn” for mathein (and its cognate mathâma) in place of “know.”
Zenobius writes that “people are told of the ‘difficulty’ proverb when they lack strength.” My translation of alloi de to chalepon akouousin epi tou adunatou (Leutsch and Schneidewin 1958, p. 172).
The second instance inverts the word order of the proverb. It reads ta kala tô onti chalepa. Adam argues that one should not read tô onti as part of the proverb. Adam suggests reading it as “it is true that fine things are difficult.” I am of the view that it could also be translated as “fine things really are difficult” (Adam 1963, p. 34).
Mitchell Miller (2007) has recently offered a helpful discussion of “the longer and fuller road” that specifically addresses Socrates’ education of Glaucon and Adeimantus and Plato’s education of the reader. Miller helpfully situates the mathematical curriculum as central to “the longer and fuller road” and notes that Glaucon and Adeimantus lack the preparatory education that would be necessary for Socrates to present them with more than a partial and incomplete description of the Good.
Socrates specifically refers to young men who have philosophic natures; i.e., “ease in learning, a good memory, courage, and high-mindedness” (494b).
This story may be a thinly veiled reference to Socrates’ relationship with Alcibiades, especially because of the references to the young man’s beauty matching his intellectual gifts (though it could apply to other bright young men who Socrates engaged in conversation). The brief account in Republic is similar in its most important details to another account of Socrates’ relationship with Alcibiades in the Platonic corpus, Alcibiades (two other Platonic dialogues also offers an extended conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades, Second Alcibiades and Symposium) (Plato 1997a, e, g). It is fitting, therefore, that in Symposium Plato has Alcibiades say in the last line of his speech, “Remember our torments; be on your guard: don’t wait, like the fool in the proverb, to learn your lesson from your own misfortune” (Plato 1997g, 222b). Alcibiades had the misfortune (and fortune) of having Socrates show him his foolishness.
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Mintz, A.I. “Chalepa Ta Kala,” “Fine Things are Difficult”: Socrates’ Insights into the Psychology of Teaching and Learning. Stud Philos Educ 29, 287–299 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-010-9178-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-010-9178-7