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Phylogenetic Analogies in the Conceptual Development of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Brent D. Mishler
Brent D. Mishler*
Affiliation:
Duke University
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Extract

David Hull’s approach to science, which culminated in his important book Science as a Process(1988), represents an unprecedented conjunction of philosophy of science with the results and concepts of a particular science. Hull takes an evolutionary approach to the conceptual development of science, importing much of his explanatory framework from comparative biology, the discipline where his empirical observations of scientists have been made. On the surface, such a cozy relationship between data, theory, and metatheory leads to worries about circular reasoning (Mishler 1989). Nevertheless, I will argue here that Hull’s approach is basically sound, and that the strength of his arguments comes precisely from his recognition of key analogies between the evolution of organisms and the conceptual evolution of scientists; however, certain disanalogies must also be taken into account.

Comparative biology can be divided into two distinct (although interrelated) halves based on differing orientations and types of questions asked.

Type
Part VI. Science as Process
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1990 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1990 , 1990 , pp. 224 - 235
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1991

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Footnotes

1

I thank V. Albert, R. Brandon, A. Gutierrez, C. Horvath, D. Hull, and S. Rice for comments on the manuscript and discussion.

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