The Factive Turn in EpistemologyVeli Mitova When you believe something for a good reason, your belief is in a position to be justified, rational, responsible, or to count as knowledge. But what is the nature of this thing that can make such a difference? Traditionally, epistemologists thought of epistemic normative notions, such as reasons, in terms of the believer's psychological perspective. Recently, however, many have started thinking of them as factive: good reasons for belief are either facts, veridical experiences, or known propositions. This ground breaking volume reflects major recent developments in thinking about this 'factive turn', and advances the lively debate around it in relation to core epistemological themes including perception, evidence, justification, knowledge, scepticism, rationality, and action. With clear and comprehensive chapters written by leading figures in the field, this book will be essential for students and scholars looking to engage with the state of the art in epistemology. |
Contents
Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Biscopic | 15 |
Your Evidence Is the Set of Facts That Are Manifest | 32 |
Factivity and Evidence | 50 |
Internalism Factivity and Sufficient Reason | 66 |
Reassessing the Case against Evidential Externalism | 84 |
The New Evil Demon and the Devil in the Details | 102 |
Knowledge Action and the Factive Turn | 125 |
Objectivism and Subjectivism in Epistemology | 142 |
False Beliefs and the Reasons We Dont Have | 161 |
Motivating Reason to Slow the Factive Turn | 177 |
Deflationary Pluralism about Motivating Reasons | 193 |
Some | 219 |
| 229 | |
| 246 | |
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Common terms and phrases
acting adjusting my beliefs Agnes argue argument armchair assumption claim closure principle closure-based cognitive Conee and Feldman consider count noun credence debate degree of confidence distinction doesn’t Edmund entails environment epistemic externalists epistemic norms epistemic reasons epistemological disjunctivism Evidential Externalism example explain explanandum explanatory factive reasons Factive Turn facts factual false beliefs favour Freddie Gerken Goldman illusion intention internal twin intuitive justifiably believe justified in believing kind Littlejohn massive deception mental Mitova motivating reasons non-factive non-inferentially normative reasons notion objective objectivism one-off one’s evidence ontology perceptual philosophers philosophy of action philosophy of mind plausible practical reasoning Pritchard proposition propositional attitude question radical scepticism rational evaluation rationally grounded knowledge reasons for believing reasons-claims relevant response role Schroeder sense Silins Silins’s skating someone subjectivist teleological there’s thesis things Timothy Williamson tion truth truthy Turri University of Johannesburg warranted Williamson 2000