doiSerbia

Bleaching preferences: Why deliberative procedure should include self-interested preferences

Mladenović Ivan (Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd)

Someone might vote for an option that on his or her view best promotes his or her self-interest. But, someone might vote for an option that promotes what he or she sees as a common good. The point is that there is no necessity here. Empirically oriented investigations showed that people vote both for self-centered and prosocial reasons. On the standard account of deliberative democracy public discussion is oriented towards achieving the common good. In this paper I shall argue that there is no necessity in supposing that public deliberation will lead to consensus over the common good. If consensus over the common good is neither realistic, nor desirable feature of public deliberation, then the most that practically oriented deliberative democrats might hope for is an open debate which may influence post-deliberative voting. Or so I shall argue. On this account, deliberative democracy makes more probable that outcome of the voting procedure will reflect concerns over the common good. According to this conception the appeal to selfinterest is not ex hypothesi excluded. The role of public deliberation is to bring to the fore both self-centered and prosocial concerns, and eventually to show why prosocial concerns should override private concerns. But there is no necessity here. The most important thing is to have sound procedure for weighting the reasons that speak both for and against self-interested concerns.

Keywords: self-interest, public deliberation, deliberative negotiation, voting, deliberative democracy