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Too much substance, not enough cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Vincent C. Müller  and
Stephanie Kelter
Vincent C. Müller
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Science, University of Hamburg, D-22527 Hamburg, Germanyvmueller@informatik.uni-hamburg.dekelter@informatik.uni-hamburg.de www.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/grk/_eng.html
Stephanie Kelter
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Science, University of Hamburg, D-22527 Hamburg, Germanyvmueller@informatik.uni-hamburg.dekelter@informatik.uni-hamburg.de www.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/grk/_eng.html
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Abstract

Millikan's account of substance concepts is based on a notion of “substance” expanded from realist notions of individuals and natural kinds. Her metaphysical notion, based on “inductive potential,” is shown to be too puristic and needs to incorporate cognizing subjects. This could preserve the realist/nondescriptionist insight that the extension of substances is determined by the world.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , February 1998 , pp. 80
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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