Abstract
Scientists use visualisations of different kinds in a variety of ways in their scientific work. In the following article, we will take a closer look at the use of photographic pictures as scientific evidence. In accordance with Patrick Maynard’s thesis, photography will be regarded as a family of technologies serving different purposes in divergent contexts. One of these is its ability to detect certain phenomena. Nonetheless, with regard to the philosophical thesis of theory-ladenness of observation, we encounter certain reservations concerning the status of photography and that of photographic pictures in the process of measurement in science. Accordingly, the aim of this paper is twofold: We will discuss suggested solutions both for the technological and for the psychological part of the problem of theory-ladenness appearing in the context of the use of photography in scientific observations. The essential proposal will be to follow Christian Suhm in his advice to make a distinction between theory-relativity and theory-ladenness.
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Notes
This is not to say that there is not a great variety of other possible ways of using cameras in science.
On the problem of establishing the evidential status of X-ray photographs from a historical point of view see Golan (2002).
A compendium of more recent contributions to this discussion is presented by Walden (2008).
An influential voice in this context is Kendall L. Walton. His thesis of the transparency of photographs forms a good starting point for critical discussions. Walton’s assumption is that photographs literally allow us to see the depicted object itself: “Photographs are transparent. We see the world through them” (Walton 2008, 22, his italics).
Roger Scruton’s work offers us an insightful example about the difficulties that such an attempt to describe an “ideal” way of the photographic process can cause (see Scruton 2008).
Even though photographs can be used in such a way, Abell admits that not all photographs necessarily play such an evidential role (see Abell 2010, 81). Some may be the result of fraudulent intentions.
William J. Mitchell, for instance, points this out: “A photograph is fossilized light, and its aura of superior evidential efficacy has frequently been ascribed to the special bond between fugitive reality and permanent image that is formed at the instant of exposure. It is a direct physical imprint, like a fingerprint left at the scene of crime or lipstick traces on your collar. The correspondence with reality is thus causally established” (Mitchell 1994, 24).
Oliver R. Scholz offers a critical discussion of different suggestions of how to spell out the idea of resemblance in picture theory (see Scholz 2009, ch. 2).
What exactly is expressed by this function may vary with regard to the context of application. In some cases it might be filled out by a lawlike statement, in others it might be of a more local decision of the scientist, e.g. what false colours attached to a given photograph may stand for in the particular context. It is important that such local decisions are adequately communicated—e.g. by including a caption—and are hold constant in the context of application to allow for correct interpretations.
For a real world mapping function we have to consider the distance from Earth, intermediate matter etc.
Take another example for illustration: Park distant control systems and radar traps belong to the same family of technologies. The former, however, measures the distance between your car and objects in its surroundings, while the latter measures speed.
An ongoing and lively debate in aesthetics, for example, consists in balancing the causal component of picture production against the role of the photographer’s intention (see e.g. Walton 2008; Scruton 2008). Another aspect that is critically discussed is related to the digitalisation of the photographic process. It is argued that this allows for a lot more, much easier and hardly recognisable manipulations of photographs. Barbara Savedoff, for instance, draws our attention to the negative consequences of the rapid expansion of digital technology in this context. From her point of view, this development will lead to a significant loss of credit concerning the evidential status of photographs: “Digital manipulation is relatively fast and easy for anyone with the appropriate software […] As a result, not only are we finding ourselves surrounded more and more by images that have been altered in some way, but it is also becoming impossible to tell which images are straight and which have been altered. […] In a world where digital manipulation—digital collage—has become the norm, we may simply come to assume that a photograph has been altered if it is at all challenging to read it as straight” (Savedoff 2008, 136f.).
Thomas S. Kuhn makes an even stronger point when he claims that all scientists are related to a paradigm by virtue of being a member of a certain scientific community. For Kuhn, perceiving means perceiving with the aid of such a paradigm. It tells the scientist what exists in the world. Thus, the epistemic burden of a certain tradition leads to ontological commitments in the end and, as a consequence, scientists belonging to different paradigms will live in different worlds (see Kuhn 1996, 111, 135).
The same point is made by Alan F. Chalmers: “Two normal observers viewing the same object from the same place under the same physical circumstances do not necessarily have identical visual experiences, even though the images on their respective retinas may be virtually identical” (Chalmers 1999, 5).
This presupposes a theory of meaning as use like the one put forward by Wittgenstein.
Maynard also offers a convincing example where the photographic picture is not taken as a kind of depiction, namely a description of the tasks of the Herschel space observatory. “Its cameras’ function is not to depict opaque bodies, but to derive information about the formation of stars and galaxies […]” (Maynard 2010, 30, my italics). And: “Herschel’s output is not pictures, but rather data (part of which is accessed pictorially, within technical constraints)” (ibid., 31).
U stands for ultraviolet, b for blue and v for visual, referring to the defined wavelength of light (see Unsöld and Baschek 2005, 183).
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Maria Reicher-Marek, Alexander Wagner and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. This work was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) in the context of the project “Visualisierungen in den Wissenschaften – eine wissenschaftstheoretische Untersuchung”. For linguistic revision I thank Janet Carter-Sigglow.
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Mößner, N. Photographic Evidence and the Problem of Theory-Ladenness. J Gen Philos Sci 44, 111–125 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-013-9219-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-013-9219-3