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Forms, Types, and Tokens in Aristotle's Metaphysics
- Journal of the History of Philosophy
- Johns Hopkins University Press
- Volume 17, Number 4, October 1979
- pp. 371-381
- 10.1353/hph.2008.0080
- Article
- Additional Information
- Purchase/rental options available:
Forms, Types, and Tokens in Aristotle's Metaphysics D. K. MODRAK ARE ARISTOTELIANFORMSuniversals or particulars? This question has received much attention in recent discussions. ~Besides being interesting in its own right, the answer is crucial to the interpretation of the central books of the Metaphysics, given the interrelatedness of Aristotle's notions of form, substance, essence, and definition. If, for example, the correct answer is that forms are universals, Aristotle may be in difficulty , for he denies that universals are substances, and he identifies substance with form. 2Thus, Aristotle seems to hold that (1) no universal is a substance and that (2) some universals (i.e., forms) are substances. If such a contradiction is at the heart of his theory of substance, it would seem to be in trouble. If we seek to avoid this difficulty by making forms individuals as Edwin Hartman does in a recent paper, ~ we also end up with conflicting doctrines: a thing's substance or form is identical with its essence, the formula of which is its definition.' If forms are particulars, then the objects of definition would be particulars, but Aristotle insists that definition is of the universal.~ What is needed, then, is an interpretation of forms that allows them to be the objects of knowledge and definition (i.e., universals) and at the same time avoids the contradiction mentioned above. My proposal is to distinguish between substance types and other universals, which I shall call universalsp, and to identify forms with substance types. The contradiction we generated above from the thesis that forms are universals is resolved because 1 asserts that no universalp is a substance, and 2 asserts that forms are substance types. The object of this paper is to show that this is Aristotle's position and that consequently his theory of forms is much more coherent and philosophically satisfying than is frequently realized. Finally, I hope to show James H. Lesher summarizesthe contemporary dispute nicely in "Aristotle on Form, Substance, and Universals: A Dilemma," Phronesis16 (1971):169-78. 2Aristotle asserts that universalscannot be substancesat 1003a7,1038b7-12,1038b35,1060b21,1087a2, alOft, 1087a10ft.,and thal what is common cannot be a substance at 1040b23.He identifiessubstance with form at 1028a28,1032bl-2, 1033b17,1035b14ff.,1037a27ff.,1047a27, 1041b6,and 1050b2.If a solution is not found, we may have to concur with Geach's assertion that "'there is hardly a statement about form in the Metaphysicsthat is not (at least verbally)contradicted by some other statement" (G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach, ThreePhilosophers(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961),p. 75. "Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and Essence," PhilosophicalReview 85 (1976):545-66. ' The relation of essence, or definition, to substance is discussed at 1029b20;1030b5;1031al, 10,18; 1031b32;and 1039a20.The relation of form to definition and essence is discussed at 1035a21,1029bl-3, 1036a29, 1043bl,and 1044a10.(See n. 2 above on the identification of form with substance.) ' 1036a28-20, 1040al-7, 1059b25.Cf. 1018b33.See also 1060b20-23 and 1087a10,which say that the objects of knowledge are universals. [371] 372 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY why Aristotle's objections to Platonic forms as substances cannot be turned against his own conception of forms. I. If, like Aristotle, we divide the world into substances and attributes, we are likely to associate the former with individuals and the latter with universals. However, we should be wary of attributing this position to Aristotle. In the Categories , he treats these as separate distinctions and divides both the substance category and the attribute category, namely the category that includes any item that is present in a subject, into individuals and universals. He distinguishes between primary substances, which are concrete individuals (e.g., this man), and secondary substances, which are the genera and species of these individuals (e.g., man); between individual attributes (e.g., this white) and universal attributes (e.g., white). 6 This conception of primary and secondary substances is not found in the Metaphysics , but Aristotle continues to hold that the species-now construed as the form--of the composite individual is a substance, as well as the individual3 The form, since it is exemplified by all the members of...