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Abduction − the context of discovery + underdetermination = inference to the best explanation

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Abstract

The relationship between Peircean abduction and the modern notion of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a matter of dispute. Some philosophers, such as Harman (Philos Rev 74(1):88–95, 1965) and Lipton (Inference to the best explanation, Routledge, London, 1991, p. 58; 2004, p. 56), claim that abduction and IBE are virtually the same. Others, however, hold that they are quite different (Hintikka in Trans Charles S. Peirce Soc 34(3):503, 1998; Minnameier in Erkenntnis 60(1):75–105, 2004) and there is no link between them (Campos in Synthese 180(3):419–442, 2009). In this paper, I argue that neither of these views is correct. I show that abduction and IBE have important similarities as well as differences. Moreover, by bringing a historical perspective to the study of the relationship between abduction and IBE—a perspective that is lacking in the literature—I show that their differences can be well understood in terms of two historic developments in the history of philosophy of science: first, Reichenbach’s distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification—and the consequent jettisoning of the context of discovery from philosophy of science—and second, underdetermination of theory by data.

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Notes

  1. References to Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce 1931–1935, 1958) are of the form (volume number. paragraph number, date).

  2. For an even longer list of philosophical works in which abduction and IBE are taken to be virtually identical, see (McAuliffe 2015).

  3. Some advocates of the Generative Interpretation of abduction are Davis (1972, Chapter II), Hintikka (1998), Burton (2000), and Minnameier (2004).

  4. I borrow the terms ‘the Generative Interpretation’ and ‘the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation’ from McKaughan (2008).

  5. Some advocates of the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation of abduction are Laudan (1980), Achinstein (1993), and McKaughan (2008).

  6. References to Peirce’s The New Elements of Mathematics (1976) are of the form (NEM volume number: page number, date).

  7. References to the eighth volumes of Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition (2010) are of the form (W8: page number, date).

  8. See, for instance, Kuhn (1977), Quine and Ullian (1978, Chapter vi), Hempel (1979), and Laudan (1984).

  9. For instance, Newton-Smith (1981, pp. 226–32), McMullin (1996), Lipton (2004, Chapter 9), and Schindler (2018).

  10. This is not an accurate description of Semmelweis’s research. Through a close historical examination of his research, Tulodziecki (2013) convincingly argues that Semmelweis was not as perfect a reasoner as he is depicted by many philosophers of science—including Lipton—to be. For instance, at different stages of his research, he was simply ignoring available alternative explanations.

  11. Hintikka (1998) distinguishes between abduction and IBE on the ground that the latter is more akin to deduction. Minnameier (2004), however, claims that abduction is different from IBE, because the latter is similar to Peirce’s concept of induction. Campos (2009), too, extensively discusses the fact that abduction has nothing to do with confirming (or disconfirming) evidence for a hypothesis—i.e., has nothing to do with induction—while IBE is similar to induction.

  12. The book was later translated into English as The Theory of Probability (1949).

  13. Having a high view of Peirce’s theory of induction and probability and, at the same time, ignoring (if not disdaining) his theory of abduction could be seen among other philosophers too. Braithwaite (1934), for instance, claims that Peirce’s theory of probability and induction is one of the most important parts of his logic but there is nothing substantial in his theory of abduction in general, and insight in particular.

  14. Howard (2006, p. 4) convincingly argues that the DJ distinction also targets the left wing of the Vienna Circle, especially Neurath (1913).

  15. I am in debt of Don Howard who brought my attention to this work.

  16. The close association of the DJ distinction and the logical empiricist movement neither means that the DJ distinction did not survive the demise of logical empiricism nor that it was not accepted by philosophers unsympathetic to this movement. In fact, a precursor of the DJ distinction was introduced in the German edition of Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002, p. 7, originally published in 1934), four years before its appearance in Reichenbach’s works.

  17. In his works, Peirce mentions Poincaré’s name and views several times (5.495-7, 1906; 6.370, 1902).

  18. To the best of my knowledge, there is no evidence suggesting that Peirce was familiar with Pierre Duhem or his The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1954, French: 1906) which is considered by many as the locus classicus of underdetermination.

  19. References to The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings (Peirce 1998) are of the form (EP volume number: page number, date).

  20. Peirce wrote a review on the English translation of Lobatchewsky’s Geometrical Researches on the Theory of Parallels (1891) in which he acknowledges that Lobatchewsky’s geometry “may, for all we can yet observe, be the system of nature” (W8: 217, 1892).

  21. For great discussions about Peirce’s revisions to his early pragmatic maxim, see Misak (2004, pp. 2–5) and Atkin (2016, Chapter 2). In my following discussion, I heavily draw on these works, especially on Atkin’s.

  22. I do not suggest that Peirce values “applies science” more than “pure science.” Quite conversely, he thinks that the latter is more valuable than the former. In fact, he encourages investment in applied sciences, because they make a great profit so we can spend more money on pure science (NEM4: 63, 1902). I just want to make it clear that Peirce cares about the economic aspects of scientific research.

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Acknowledgements

Thanks to Anjan Chakravartty, Sara Bernstein, Daniel Nolan, Ryan O’Loughlin, and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments. I also thank Ashton Green for her helpful suggestions.

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  1. Reilly Center for Science, Technology, and Values, University of Notre Dame, 453 Geddes Hall, Notre Dame, IN, 46556, USA

    Mousa Mohammadian

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Mohammadian, M. Abduction − the context of discovery + underdetermination = inference to the best explanation. Synthese 198, 4205–4228 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02337-z

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