Abstract
In recent work on context-dependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. I will argue that the sentences that apparently give rise to relative truth should be understood by relating them in a certain way to the first person. More precisely, such sentences express what I will call ‘first-person-based genericity’, a form of generalization that is based on an essential first-person application of the predicate. The account differs from standard relative truth account in crucial respects: it is not the truth of the proposition expressed that is relative to the first person; the proposition expressed by a sentence with a predicate of taste rather has absolute truth conditions. Instead it is the propositional content itself that requires a first-personal cognitive access whenever it is entertained. This account, I will argue, avoids a range of problems that standard relative truth theories of the sentences in question face and explains a number of further peculiarities that such sentences display.
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Notes
The use of believe in (5a) suggests that the agent does not himself have the experience. To get the non-subjective first-person-based reading, know would be the right verb:
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(1)
John knows that white chocolate tastes good.
But then faultless disagreement is actually hard to get, see Sect. 5.
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(1)
It appears that also certain presupposition triggers allow for sharing, for example expressions like another time, a second time, or again:
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(1)
John believes that he won in 2006.
Mary believes that she won in 2005.
John and Mary hope to win another time/a second time/again.
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(2)
a. John and Mary hope for the same thing.
b. John and Mary have the same hope.
Such presuppositional expressions are generally held to be anaphoric to some element in a preceding textual or mental representation. But obviously, the identity of the antecedent element does not bear on the identity of the content. The present paper will not try to offer an account of the phenomenon.
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(1)
Egan (2007) discusses the same distinction with a sentence like my pants are on fire and sentences with epistemic modals. He argues that my pants are on fire cannot be asserted when expressing a self-locating proposition and gives a pragmatic account of why this is so. It is fairly clear, however, that the distinction is not a pragmatic one but resides strictly in the formal distinction between type 1 and type 2 expressions (expressions like pronouns interpreted de se as opposed to expressions giving rise to relative truth).
On MacFarlane’s (2005a, b) account, the context of assessment is uniquely determined by whoever assesses the truth value of the proposition. This obviously would not predict an identity of the intended meaning of white chocolate tastes good and white chocolate tastes good to d (for d being the relevant judge).
Stephenson (2007) attributes the disagreement in faultless disagreement to the aim of (some) assertions to establish a sort of single shared judge as part of the common ground in the context of conversation. The problem of such a discourse-related explanation of faultless disagreement is that it could not be carried over to faultless disagreement that arises with beliefs.
MacFarlane (2003) actually takes the intuitions of relative truth to require a modification of the notion of assertion, truth not being the aim of assertion anymore.
For observations and a proposal concerning de se status in the case of epistemic modals see Stephenson (2007), fn 15.
See Stephenson (2007) for an equivalent account.
Stalnaker (1981) takes the behaviour of sentences with de se interpreted pronouns to be grounds for rejecting Lewis’ account of such sentences as expressing properties. Stalnaker instead takes them to express propositions like any other sentences.
In Moltmann (2003a), I argue that attitudinal objects should be considered prior to propositions and to be the primary bearers of truth values.
For a linguistically much more detailed discussion of what follows see Moltmann (2006).
There are contexts, however, in which generic one imposes no restriction on the predicate whatsoever, namely when occurring as a bound variable, as in (1) and in conditionals as in (2):
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(1)
a. Sometimes one forgets that one has a nose.
b. One can doubt that one has a soul.
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(2)
a. If one lives in a big city, one lives in a city.
b. If one has a nose, one can breathe.
See Moltmann (2006) for discussion.
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(1)
Note that the relative-truth intuition about generic-one sentences could not be due to the presence of the modal. There is no such intuition about (1a, b) below:
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(1)
a. Everyone can sleep on this sofa.
b. Everyone cannot sleep on this sofa.
Also, relative truth intuitions arise with generic-one sentences without a modal:
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(2)
a. One often meets celebrities in this café.
b. One does not often meet celebrities in this café.
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(1)
Greenberg (2007) gives a more refined analysis of singular generics in that spirit, without using qua objects. On her account, singular generics involve an ‘in virtue property’, a property that follows from the restriction of the singular generic and that ‘causes’ the predicate to hold.
An account in the same direction is suggested by Koelbel (2003), who proposes that chocolate tastes good be relativised to a ‘perspective’ quite simply because the conditions on the possession of the concept tastes good involve a first-person application, which means the content of chocolate tastes good could not be grasped otherwise than by a self-application. However, again, unless a perspective is something other than a centred world, it is not obvious how the content of chocolate tastes good could be conceived differently on a standard relativist account.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank audiences at the University of Barcelona, New York University, Arché (St Andrews), the IHPST (Paris), and in particular Paul Boghossian and Bob Stalnaker for stimulating discussions.
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Moltmann, F. Relative truth and the first person. Philos Stud 150, 187–220 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9383-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9383-9