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A Non-Compositional Inferential Role Theory

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Abstract

I propose a version of inferential role theory which says that having a concept is having the disposition to draw most of the inferences based on the stereotypical features associated with this concept. I defend this view against Fodor and Lepore’s objection that it violates compositionality. I show that it is possible to account for productivity and systematicity without assuming compositionality.

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Correspondence to Martin Montminy.

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Montminy, M. A Non-Compositional Inferential Role Theory. Erkenntnis 62, 211–233 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-0899-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-0899-2

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