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Mental Structures as Biosemiotic Constraints on the Functions of Non-human (Neuro)Cognitive Systems

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Abstract

This paper approaches the question of how to describe the higher-level internal structures and representations of cognitive systems across various kinds of nonhuman (neuro)cognitive systems. While much research in cognitive (neuro)science and comparative cognition is dedicated to the exploration of the (neuro)cognitive mechanisms and processes with a focus on brain-behavior relations across different non-human species, not much has been done to connect (neuro)cognitive mechanisms and processes and the associated behaviors to plausible higher-level structures and representations of distinct kinds of cognitive systems in non-humans. Although the study of (neuro)cognitive mechanisms and processes can certainly be revealing, (neuro)cognitive mechanisms and processes are underspecified with respect to internal structures and representations of non-human cognitive systems because multiple such mechanisms can target, or be mapped onto, the same internal structure or vice versa. This paper outlines a biosemiotic approach to this linking problem in order to bridge the gap between functions of (neuro)cognitive systems in different species and the higher-level cognitive structures and representations. It is contended that the higher-level internal structures and representations of various cognitive systems are biosemiotic constraints on the (biological) functions of (neuro)cognitive systems that serve to restrict the range of functions (neuro)cognitive systems have or are selected for. This turns out to have implications for issues on the convergent evolution of cognitive traits.

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Notes

  1. These include conception, conceptualization, association, categorization processes that are delinked from immediate sensory stimuli.

  2. Even a strictly situated approach to cognition for non-human species does not rule out the possibility of representations or internal structures because certain cognitive tasks such as transitive inference, comparison, spatial search in non-humans etc. cannot bypass a reference to representations (see Cheng 2018). Neurocognitive functions are almost always at the interface between internal representations and forms and patterns of the external world as neural processes relate to actions in the external world.

  3. Since indices include icons as well, as pointed out by Emmeche (2004), it would not be surprising if some signals in animals and organisms turn out to be iconic with respect to the actions/responses (as in mimicry relations, for example).

  4. An analogy with research in language typology can help understand the concept better. Some regularities of linguistic categories are recurrent across languages all over the world. These recurrent regularities exist independently of parameters of geographical closeness, family-relatedness and the like. Strong recurrent patterns become universals (see Haspelmath 2019).

  5. Admittedly, the firm distinction between sign processes and mental structures may turn out to be relative due to the time-varying correlations of mental structures to behaviors, as pointed out by one anonymous referee. This may pose some difficulty in figuring out whether a given behavior in some species or in some individual member of the species always reliably permits the ascription of a certain mental structure. That is so because a given mental structure once identified or recognized cannot be recognized in the same way because the relevant behavior(s) that correlated with it once no longer remain(s) the same, or maybe the mental structure itself has changed. In such cases other plausible explanations for the changes may be warranted. One explanation is that either the mental structure has not changed but the relevant behavior has, or the behavior concerned has not changed but the mental structure has drastically changed. If the former holds true (that is, when the mental structure does not undergo any alteration but the behavior does), the sign relation(s) that the mental structure activates may not remain preserved as the responses/actions as part of the sign relation will change. But in the latter case the relevant relation specified in a mental structure will itself change and the sign relation(s) it activates may not change as the same responses/actions are produced. The former applies to cases such as the habituation of automatization of a cognitive process as a creature ceases to produce the same (re)action after encountering it repeatedly in its habitat. Even though the internal state remains the same, the responses/actions change. The latter may apply to situations in which a creature does produce the same responses/actions but the internal state must have changed due to changes in environments, motivation, time, emotions, and/or consciousness. Due to higher levels of motivation or heightened levels of consciousness in a short learning period a creature may produce the same response towards a class of objects but the internal state may change due to learning. For instance, domestic chicks have been observed to choose to go near an occluded triangle (as opposed to a triangle-like object with a piece missing) after being imprinted on a triangular shape. The explanation provided for this is that chicks, just like humans, do a sort of ‘filling in” for the occluded part of the triangle (see Marino 2017). Hence the internal state must change (after the filling-in), but the responses would not change (much). In any case, when both a mental structure and its linked sign relation change together, identifying or recognizing the mental structure may become harder and their boundaries may become fuzzier. Such cases may demand extensive observations over a long period for the detection of the sign relations recurrently in a cluster of similar and different circumstances so that the actual mental structure can be identified. Since the consideration of various factors in this regard is beyond the scope of this paper, we leave this matter open.

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Mondal, P. Mental Structures as Biosemiotic Constraints on the Functions of Non-human (Neuro)Cognitive Systems. Biosemiotics 13, 385–410 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-020-09390-z

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