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Trust in the Shell

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Knowledge, Technology & Policy

Abstract

This paper advocates the importance of an ethical choice in the design of a given technology. As—among various possible examples—the history of the Internet shows, the intersection between trust, law, and technology can become either an empowering factor for business and individuals or a tool for infringing human rights. It is of utmost importance not to lose focus on the fact that every technology is a human byproduct, and that when a technology fails, it is mainly a human fault.

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Notes

  1. Little Britain Series 2—http://www.youtube.com/watch?v = 0ZAoMv_QnAU

  2. EU Directive 31/00/CE, also known as “E-commerce directive”, Sect. 12 defines “mere conduit” as a service that consists of the transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service, or the provision of access to a communication network.

  3. A sort of “hand shake” were each computer “introduce” itself to its peer and “acknowledge” it.

  4. One of the oldest “tricks” played by the malicious attackers of a network is to “spoof” an IP number actually assigned to a certain computer, so that the whole network is induced to trust a different machine than the legitimate (spoofed) one. One of the early papers dealing with this issue is authored by Bellovin (1989); see also Wright (2000).

  5. For a comprehensive history of the subject, see: Diife and Landau (2010); Kahn (1996) and Singh (2000).

  6. In very rough and simplistic terms, Public Key Cryptography works on the assumption that each party (typically named “Alice” and “Bob”) owns a pair of encryption keys. One is made public and the other is kept secret. Each key works one-way: one key encrypts the message, the other one decrypts it. Thus, if Alice needs to send a message to Bob, she will encipher the text with Bob’s Public Key, and the mathematics behind this cryptographic system guarantees that only Bob (with his private key is able to read the message.) Things (and problems) are often more complicated, but for the sake of this analysis, we can stick to this basic explanation.

  7. Actually, the Ebay feedback system has been criticized—see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_eBay—but, from a methodological standpoint, the issue is not relevant.

  8. Data can be handled only if his owner positively consented.

  9. ibidem.

  10. Lundblad and Masiello 2010, page 162.

  11. “Low level” is a technical lingo for whatever is related to issues closer to the machine rather than to the user. For instance, Assembler is defined as “low level” programming language since its “syntax”, “grammar”, and “vocabulary” are designed to be immediately “understood” and executed.

  12. The nickname is after US Sen. Fritz Holling (D-SC) who, in the TC early days, pushed strongly to have a law passed making the use of Trusted Platform Modules mandatory. Hence, the “Fritz Chip” is synonymous.

  13. The Kill Switch is a feature allowing Apple to remotely disable any application running on “its” mobile phone.

  14. “The Trusted Computing Group was formed in 2003 to develop and support open-industry specifications for trusted computing across multiple platform types. To enable open specification development, the group is incorporated, has a patent policy, and provides industry advocacy programs, including marketing programs.” See, What is the Trusted Computing Group (TCG)? at http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/media_room/faqs v. Apr. 15 2010.

  15. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society.

  16. Under Sect. 102 quarter of Italian Copyright Law (Law 633/1941) as successively amended to enforce EU directives, the production, import, selling, rent, and provision of services allowing a backup of a copyrighted, protected work is “rewarded” with an imprisonment of a minimum of 6 months up to the 3 years and a fine of 2.382,00 up to 15.493,00 Euros. Similarly, the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act criminalizes technologies and products that allow the circumvention of the digital rights management systems.

  17. Tribunale di Milano—Sezione specializzata per la proprietà industriale e intellettuale, Sentenza n. 8787/09, available at http://www.ictlex.net/?p = 1102 v. Apr. 14, 2010.

  18. Italy to ban on-line anonymity? available at http://www.alcei.org/?p = 55 v. Apr. 14, 2010.

References

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Correspondence to Andrea Monti.

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Monti, A. Trust in the Shell. Know Techn Pol 23, 507–517 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12130-010-9131-7

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