Abstract
Qualia Epiphenomenalism is the view that qualitative events lack causal efficacy. A common objection to qualia epiphenomenalism is the so-called Self-Stultifying Objection, which suggests that justified, true belief about qualitative events requires, among other things, the belief to be caused by the qualitative event—the very premise that qualia epiphenomenalism denies. William Robinson provides the most sustained response to the self-stultification objection that is available. In this paper I argue that Robinson's reply does not sufficiently overcome the self-stultification objection.
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Notes
To maintain consistency with William Robinson, the target of this paper, I define qualia epiphenomenalism in terms of qualitative events lacking causal efficacy. Some qualia epiphenomenalists prefer to argue that mental properties of events lack causal efficacy (Jackson 1982; Staudacher 2006). This distinction will not be relevant to what follows, as similar issues are generated in both contexts.
In this paper I follow Robinson in supposing that the relevant effect is a report. The arguments of this paper will apply no matter whether reports are construed internally (i.e., beliefs, self-reporting), or externally (i.e., utterances, overt behaviour). It should be pointed out, however, that external reports are physical effects, so qualitative events are certainly excluded from making a causal contribution to them for the epiphenomenalist. On the other hand, internal reports are mental effects, which some epiphenomenalists think are capable of being caused by qualitative events. Robinson, however, does not make this move. Moreover, those who make this move are quickly confronted with a slightly different problem. Namely, this belief (M 2) is determined by its subvenience base P 2, so the qualitative event M 1 is unnecessary, and can therefore be excluded. For these reasons, it does not matter whether my subject matter is beliefs or utterances. Thus, I have followed Robinson in focusing largely on reports.
For the sake of the argument, I include Robinson’s claim that the relation from P 1→M 1 is causal rather than determinative. A number of authors, including myself, prefer to argue that P 1 determines rather than causes the M 1. Reasons include (1) the synchronic mereological dependence of M 1 on P 1, while causes are typically considered diachronic and independent; (2) if P 1 causes M 1, but M 1 does not in turn cause anything, then it is possible that qualitative events act like a black hole, taking causal energy out of the system but never bringing energy back in to the system. I leave these concerns aside for the sake of this paper, however.
Note that the belief under discussion is “the belief that I was in pain”, rather than “the belief that I am in pain”. This is done in order to bracket out the influential reply to the self-stultifying objection that appeals to direct acquaintance with occurrent qualitative events (Gertler 2001, 308; Butler 2011, 137; Chalmers 2003, 248–250). As Robinson does not appeal to this acquaintance model, I need not discuss it here. Thus, the examples used in this paper are in the past tense, where direct acquaintance does not apply.
Michael Watkins, for example, says, “If qualia are not causally efficacious, then my beliefs and memories would be just as they are whether there were qualia or not” (Watkins 1989, 160). Similarly, Daniel Dennett argues that, “The postulation of the non-physical effects is utterly idle, for ex hypothesi were the effects to cease to occur people would go right on making the same sorts of introspective claims, avowing their pains and taking as much aspirin as ever” (Dennett 1978, 252; see also Medlin 1967, 110–111; Place 1988, 218).
For simplicity, I assume that P 2 is a report of pain that is always and only caused by P 1. It should be noted, however, that the report of pain, P 2, is also dependent on a number of other factors, such as whether the reporter believes that the reporting is appropriate at the time, as well as the fact that there are likely causal intermediaries between P 1 and the report of pain P 2. It is also possible that a break in the causal chain will occur, or P 2 will mistakenly occur without P 1, as in the case of slips of the tongue. In an effort to simplify the causal process from P 1 to P 2, however, I assume ideal and constant background conditions, in which case P 2 is always and only caused by P 1.
Perhaps the epiphenomenalist can respond by saying that there is a psychophysical law, P x→M x, from some prior physical state P x to the relevant memory M x, which guarantees that the memory of the law was justified. This response quickly leads to an infinite regress however, for we can then ask how this new psychophysical law was known.
Michael Pauen (2006) raises the concern that we cannot know that this world is one in which the requisite psychophysical law P 1→M 1 holds as well. His argument differs from mine, however. He argues that psychophysical laws can only be proven through empirical observation, where these empirical observations need to be falsifiable. If qualitative properties are epiphenomenal, however, there will be no observable differences between the conscious person and the zombie, so there can be no empirical evidence that the law P 1→M 1 holds. This renders the psychophysical law unfalsifiable, so it cannot be proven empirically. Appeal to first-person evidence is of no avail, since recognizing psychophysical laws depends upon functional/causal differences (Pauen 2006, 138–139), which the epiphenomenalist cannot help themselves to. Thus, Pauen concludes that the epiphenomenalist cannot establish the requisite psychophysical law P 1→M 1. It is important to note that Robinson argues that qualia epiphenomenalism cannot be proven through appeal to a third-person standpoint, but can only be proven to from the first-person, to oneself. Therefore, contrary to Pauen, I have provided an argument that demonstrates that qualia epiphenomenalism cannot be proven to oneself, even without presupposing that knowledge requires some third-personal component.
Robinson claims that his response has two parts, and I only mention the first. The second part involves his book-length project of demonstrating that epiphenomenalism is true, which, he thinks, entitles him to presume that humans have qualitative events.
The epiphenomenalist may respond that the requisite psychophysical law P 1→M 1 is knowable a priori, and thus does not require memory for evidence. Alexander Staudacher, for example, suggests without endorsing this strategy (Staudacher 2006, 167). But a priori knowledge is typically self-evident knowledge such as ‘A=A’ or ‘all effects have causes’. What is it about P 1→M 1 that is self-evident? Why is it obvious that C-Fibre firing has to necessitate pain rather than, say, bliss or itchiness? It is tempting to incorporate the effect P 2 into a possible answer: pain hurts so it is self-evident that it will correlate with avoidance behaviour, itchiness is bothersome so it is self-evident that it will correlate with alleviatory scratching behaviour. This move is not available to the epiphenomenalist however, for the mental property M 1 is only guaranteed to correlate with the appropriate behavioural effect P 2 if we presuppose that the appropriate psychophysical law holds, which is what we are trying to establish. Without recourse to the appropriately related effects, there is simply no reason to suppose that P 1→M 1 is knowable a priori.
It is possible to argue that the epistemic mechanism is reliable by virtue of the fact that every time I believe I was in pain I can know that I felt itchy, so I can know at that moment that I felt itchy. However, assuming that epiphenomenalism is true, the physical cause P 1 necessitates the instantiation of the belief that I was in pain, so the true belief that I was feeling itchy would never cross the mind.
I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions and comments. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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Moore, D. On Robinson’s Response to the Self-Stultifying Objection. Rev.Phil.Psych. 3, 627–641 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0118-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0118-z