Abstract
The type-type reductive identity of the mental to the physical was once the dominant position in the mental causation debate. In time this consensus was overturned, largely due to its inability to handle the problem of multiple realizability. In its place a nonreductive position emerged which often included an adherence to functionalism. Functionalism construes mental properties as functional states of an organism, which in turn have specific physical realizers. This nonreductive form of functionalism, henceforth called role functionalism, has faced a number of criticisms itself. Chief among these is the concern that the realizer of the functional role is causally sufficient, so the role property does not make a contribution of its own. In this paper I argue that there is a way for unreduced functional properties to play a role after all. This is done by conceiving of functional properties as higher level functional properties of a macro system which determine that its realizers will play the roles that they play.
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Notes
Although this particular example is popular in the literature, it should be noted that bulls are colourblind, so cannot actually see the redness of the cape. The same example could be reworded to make much the same point however. For example, Block and Kim can argue that it is the movement of the cape that causes the bull to charge rather than the provocativeness of the cape. In this case the cape’s first order motions are sufficient to cause the bull to charge, thereby excluding the provocativness of the cape. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this difficulty.
Or possibly, the provocativeness is a property of the redness of the cape. Armstrong, for example, takes second order properties to be properties of the properties that are instantiated (Armstrong 1978, p.133ff). This nuanced position would not change the basic point that second order properties are in some way properties of the same object as the first order properties. For even if provocativeness is a property of the redness of the cape, the redness is still a property of the cape, so the provocativeness is still indirectly a property of the cape.
Although these functional roles exist in the most common mousetraps, there are other mousetraps which do not have all of these functional parts. For example, some mousetraps simply have sticky material that traps the mouse. In this case the ‘hammer’ which plays the killing role is not a metal rod, but is a sticky material. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to my attention. This possibility, of course, underscores the multiple realizability of the killing mechanism. Since most common mousetraps have the functional parts listed above, I will assume that this is the variety of mousetrap under discussion.
Some have objected to functionalism on the grounds that there are law-like generalizations from the physical realizer to the effect, so the functional role property is not necessary (Malcolm 1968; Kim 1989). On higher level functionalism, however, there is a simple response to this objection. Namely, there is no law-like generalization from the neural configuration and Frank eating broccoli. As we have seen, if this neural configuration is placed on a scientists table and prodded to fire, this would not result in Frank eating broccoli. Rather, this neural configuration, only after it is appropriately placed within Frank, bares a law-like relation with the effect of Frank eating broccoli. But, this added caveat states that this neural configuration, once instantiating the role property, stands in a law-like relation with the effect, so the role property is necessary in order to secure the nomological relation.
Properly speaking, the supervenience relation is looser than this. Donald Davidson popularized the idea that mental properties supervene on physical properties. By this he meant that any two events that are alike in all physical characteristics are alike in all mental characteristics (Davidson 1980, p. 214). Jaegwon Kim then spent some time analyzing the supervenience relation before eventually defining it as follows: “Mental properties strongly supervene on physical/biological properties. That is, if any system s instantiates a mental property M at t, there necessarily exists a physical property P such that s instantiates P at t, and necessarily anything instantiating P at any time instantiates M at that time” (Kim 2005, p. 33). One property is in a supervenient relationship with another property if they always appear together. Thus, everywhere the physical properties are, the mental property will be as well; and everywhere the mental property is, some physical properties are sure to be as well (Kim 1993, p. 85ff). There must be more to supervenience than mere property co-variation, however, for even parallelists and epiphenomenalists accept this property co-variation thesis. Indeed, supervenience also implies that the mental co-varies with the physical because the mental depends on the physical, and the physical determines the mental: “I take supervenience as an ontological thesis involving the idea of dependence ... a mental property is instantiated in a given organism at a time because, or in virtue of the fact that, one of its physical ‘base’ properties is instantiated by the organism at that time (Kim 2005, p. 34; See also Kim 1993, p. 67)”. Mental properties co-vary with physical properties because physical properties determine the nature and existence of mental properties. Thus, for example, a shadow co-varies with a person because the shadow depends upon, and is determined by, the person who casts the shadow (though the shadow is not the person). Or, to use Kim’s example, the goodness of a person depends upon, and is determined by, the courage, benevolence and honesty of the person—but is not identical to these traits (Kim 1993, p. 65).
Hume’s argument has had such an intuitive appeal that it led a number of philosophers to use the logical connection argument to demonstrate that mental events are not causal (Ryle 1949; Melden 1961). The argument states that causes and effects are independent, but reasons are inseparably linked, so reasons cannot be causes.
It is possible to press the point further: but aren’t all the parts in their arrangement sufficient to cause the effect? For example, aren’t the pipes in their arrangement sufficient to cause the water to flow to the basement? If so, then we can exclude the causal efficacy of a structural property. But, on the model presented here, a structural property is the arrangement of parts, so the causal exclusion problem does not arise in this way. One could also object that these structural properties are necessary background conditions which can be bracketed out. But, recall that these structural properties are functional role properties which define and determine what work is done. It would be strange to rule out functional role properties a priori.
I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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Moore, D. Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism. Philosophia 39, 511–525 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9302-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9302-0