



Abstracts of Comments: The Saturation of Dyspepsia: Comments on Wilson

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ABSTRACT OF COMMENTS

The Saturation of Dyspepsia: Comments on Wilson

By Adam Morton

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Wilson argues that, because of the way the world happens to be, a predicate like 'dyspeptic' must have just two places, for a person and a time, and not (for example) three places, for a person, a time, and a place. The relevant fact about the world, which is never made very explicit, seems to be that people and the like are at only one place at one time (but can of course be at two times at the same place). Thus the history of the individual plus a time-index pins down the time of an event, while the same history and a place-index need not pin down its time. This explains why we can get along with only two-place predicates to express such things; it does not show that we *cannot* use three-place idioms to say the same things. I give some reasons for not being convinced by Wilson's arguments for the stronger conclusion—that we cannot construe our languages as referring irreducibly to times. (Essentially, the arguments seem to depend on question-begging principles about the ways propositions can be related to one another.) And I give some reasons why it might be useful to keep some spare argument-places in reserve.

ABSTRACT OF SYMPOSIUM PAPER

Knowledge and Skepticism

By Robert Nozick

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

An account of knowledge is proposed, and two of the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, formulated subjunctively, are applied to illuminate the power of the skeptic's position, showing wherein it is right and wherein it is incorrect. Other applications of the conditions are given.