Abstract
In his response to my ‘Why There Are No Mental Representations’, Robert Cummins accused me of having misinterpreted his views, and attempted to undermine a crucial premise of my argument, which claimed that one could only define a semantic type non-semantically by stipulating which tokens should receive a uniform interpretation. I respond to the charge and defend the premise.
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References
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Morris, M. Beyond interpretation: Reply to Cummins' response. Mind Mach 2, 85–95 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00261291
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00261291