strangely, that "a tear is an intellectual thing". We can, if we are not too corrupted by philosophy, feel the force of this: the philosophical challenge of music is to make such thoughts less strange. We owe a debt to Budd for having shown just how much philosophical work there is still to do.

Andrew Harrison, University of Bristol

A Hegel Dictionary
Michael Inwood
Oxford, Basil Blackwell
347 pp.; ISBN 0-631-17533-4; £14.95

A Rousseau Dictionary
N.J.H. Dent
Oxford, Basil Blackwell
279 pp.; ISBN 0-631-17569-5; £14.99

These are two from a new series of 'Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries'. One problem with such a series must be that some philosophers litter their work with technical terms and neologisms, others present their arguments in language that is really quite straightforward. On the face of it, both Hegel and Rousseau need this sort of handbook, though for different reasons. Hegel is systematic, but often rather obscure; Rousseau is clear on the surface but his treatment of key issues is scattered unsystematically through his writings. The reader of Hegel is therefore in need of an elucidation of technical terms that he uses fairly consistently, the reader of Rousseau needs to be told that the discussion of, say, *amour propre* in the *Second Discourse* is misleading if not supplemented by *Emile*. Both Inwood and Dent are successful in these tasks, but at the end of the day it is Inwood's work that is the more necessary.

This was brought home to me recently. Faced with the problem of rendering the French '*presupposé posé*' into English, I was informed by an eminent French philosopher that the correct English translation is 'posited presupposition'. This may have solved one difficulty, but it at once presented me with another. What on earth is meant by 'positing', 'to posit', and so on? Luckily, a visit to our local bookshop provided the answer, for there I happened upon Michael Inwood's admirably clear guide to Hegelese and found an informative entry on 'positing and presupposition'. One of the great difficulties with Hegel is not that he uses words that are unfamiliar to us on the surface, but rather that he frequently assigns to them an unusual technical meaning. Inwood is a great help in deciphering all this. Hegel's use of language is further clarified by an admirable introductory essay on that very subject which charts the development of philosophical German from Wolff through Kant to Hegel. Not only is Hegel's idiosyncratic use of language well covered, Inwood also provides us with useful summaries of Hegel's principal works and an annotated bibliography. This is much more than a dictionary, it is an invaluable research tool for anyone trying to come to grips with some part of Hegel's thought or for that matter trying to decipher Hegelisms in the work of later writers outside the analytic tradition.

N.J.H. Dent's *A Rousseau Dictionary* is also an excellent work. Clearly presented with problems and discussions placed in context and the reader pointed towards worthwhile secondary literature, the book would be a must for any prospective inquirer into Rousseau's thought were it not for one thing. Dent has already done ninety per cent of the work in his excellent *Rousseau*, a book that is essential reading not just for the Rousseau scholar and student but for anyone interested in moral psychology or political philosophy. It is possible to learn a few extra things from the 'Dictionary'—there is more about Rousseau's life, about his music and fiction—but *Rousseau* is probably the better buy for someone who possesses neither book. In both the dictionary and the earlier work, Dent presents a Rousseau who provides a serious alternative both to Humean and Kantian views of practical reason. Views normally associated with Hegel, Marx or Sartre are found prefigured in Rousseau, who often has a grasp of the dialectics of interpersonal relations that exceeds in power and sophistication the work of his successors. Rousseau emerges not as a cranky worshipper of the 'noble savage' but as someone who at the very beginning of the modern age grasped many of the crucial implications of that age for social being.

Christopher Bertram, University of Bristol

Consciousness Explained
Daniel C. Dennett
Allen Lane, 1992, £20 hb, forthcoming,
Harmondsworth, Penguin £7.99

The Problem of Consciousness
Colin McGinn
Oxford, Basil Blackwell
1992 pb £13.99

As you lie asleep your body tosses and turns. It does not do this at random but in response to signals that muscles are becoming cramped and joints damaged. These signals use the same pathways that when you are awake cause you to feel pain. They are pain sensations that you are not aware of. Do your limbs hurt when you are asleep, without your being aware of the pain?

You are sitting in a comfortable chair reading. In the background an electric fan is whirring, but you are not aware of it. The fan stops. Suddenly you are aware of the silence. And you are aware of the fan's pattern during the past several seconds, the rhythmic changes in its timbre. How can the fan's stopping make you aware of sounds that happened before it stopped?

These are questions about

awareness, about being *awake*, about *feeling*. They can also be expressed using the c-word. Do you have un*conscious* pain when you are asleep? How can a present event change your *consciousness* of the past? Consciousness is what being awake, being aware, and having feelings have in common. McGinn's and Dennett's books are about consciousness. They are very different: they cannot both be right. McGinn's main claim is that the problem of understanding consciousness is insoluble. It's too hard for us. Dennett, on the other hand, not only thinks it is soluble, he thinks he's solved it! Or perhaps dis-solved it. In each case the claims are made with great panache, and the general line is simple and appealing. And in each case there are details that are supposed to fill in the big picture, but which can't quite be squeezed into exactly the shape the author intends.

According to McGinn we know roughly how the brain operates, and we know a lot about the psychology of perception, memory and thought. Moreover, some specifically philosophical questions about the mind seem now to be under control. In particular, we are beginning to be able to say in clear and unconfusing terms what makes a particular thought be about a particular thing. (That is the problem of intentionality, or at least one side of it, and it no longer seems the philosophical mystery that it did thirty years ago.) But if you put all these pieces together they make a jigsaw with a big blank spot in the middle. We just cannot see how they could add up to an understanding of what makes some mental processes *conscious*. They do not for example explain the difference between conscious and unconscious pain. Moreover it is hard to see how more pieces like those we already have could be put together to fill the gap. Or so McGinn argues.

Why is the problem so hard? McGinn's main aim is to suggest that it corresponds to some blind spot in our ability to understand things. The world is a very complicated place, and we are small relatively unevolved organisms, so it would be very surprising if our tiny little brains could give us answers to all questions. Or even all questions that we are capable of framing. (Presumably the beings who will be around in only five million years, supposing that evolution goes on for that long, will be able to ask and answer many questions we could not even understand.) One of the things we are just not capable of understanding is how brain activity results in consciousness.

Here is an analogy. Cats are pretty smart; they can often outwit humans. But cats don't understand where kittens come from. The connection between sex and birth is too indirect for them to grasp. To see the pattern they would have to have concepts like that of a month, which they are just not capable of having. (Humans would not be capable of having such concepts either, if they did not have language to boost their thinking power. But human languages fall into definite patterns, perhaps creating limitations as great as the gaps they fill.) So, similarly, there may be very simple patterns relating what happens in the brain to the conscious experience that results. But to see the patterns we might need concepts we lack, perhaps even concepts we are incapable of having.

McGinn is fairly convincing that this *may* be the case. There is a very abstract possibility of it. But what reasons are there for thinking that the problem actually is insoluble? McGinn points mostly to the fact that philosophers and psychologists have not solved it. But there was little sense that there was a problem of consciousness until the seventeenth century, so the 300 years we have had is not very long compared to the amount of time it took to, say, get a grip on gravity or the causes of diseases. And, in fact, there are reasons to think that even granting there are problems that are too hard for the human mind, the origin of consciousness is not one of them. For as McGinn thinks of the problem it is one that remains even if we accept that the mind is a manifestation of the brain. So the problem of consciousness is a problem about the working of the brain. But there is nothing about the working of the brain that makes its physics or chemistry unusual. So if there are deeply incomprehensible aspects of its functioning we would expect them to be particular cases of mysteries in physics and chemistry. Yet, while quantum physics in particular is full of puzzles and open questions, all attempts to make clear and helpful connections between these puzzles and those of mind have failed.

Ask Dennett why we don't have a clear enlightening theory of consciousness and he will say 'because we want it to explain things that just aren't true'. His book takes consciousness apart and considers the different aspects of awareness, memory, and self-knowledge that we label as conscious. In each case there is something real going on in our brains, which we mythologise, turn into a story. Some of the myth-making is a cultural artefact, a perhaps perverse by-product of philosophy. But much of it is an inevitable result of a fundamental human trait, our need to make sense of our lives. We make sense of ourselves, originally to others and then automatically to ourselves, by telling stories. And when we squeeze the millions of simultaneous events going on throughout the brain into a single simple narrative line one result is the invention of something that does not really exist, the stream of consciousness. Dennett supports this conclusion with a wealth of real and imaginary experiments. For example there is the 'cutaneous rabbit'. A subject's arm is tapped at locations about a foot apart at a suitable rhythm. For example five at the wrist followed by two near the elbow then three on the upper arm, with 100 millisec

onds between taps. Subjects feel the taps as if they were spread out at much smaller intervals along the arm, as if a little animal were hopping up it. But this is very puzzling. The pattern in accordance with which individual taps at the beginning of the sequence seem to be placed is mostly in the future. How does the brain know what the pattern is going to be, so that it can fit the first few taps into it?

Dennett's answer is that we must separate consciousness *of* a time and consciousness *at* a time. One is conscious of the taps fitting into a pattern—this one at this time here on the arm and the next one a moment later slightly further up the arm—but the consciousness itself does not happen at those times. It is a story made up later to make sense of earlier data. Consciousness is story telling and the story can re-arrange times to make a manageable pattern. So there is no intrinsic quality of consciousness that an event can have; anything can be conscious if you can weave it into the story you tell yourself.

Dennett invokes consciousness as story-telling to handle many mysteries. It is a powerful and attractive line. One of its many virtues is that it gives an answer to McGinn. We *can* understand consciousness, if that means understanding the many ways in which we turn our experiences into stories. And we cannot, if that means explaining how conscious experiences have all the features they seem to, because many of these features are illusions. Yet there must be more to say. The story-telling mechanisms Dennett invokes are very varied. Some happen automatically at a very low level of perceptual processing. Some are associated with mechanisms of selective attention and short term memory. And some are results of socialization, features of actual stories we tell each other out loud. The mystery of consciousness seems to attach to the second of these—memory and selective attention. Is there some distinguishing unifying feature here? And suppose we understood better how some of this crucial and central story-telling works. We might then be able to know what in someone else's brain makes them narrate their life the way they do. Then we would have a real handle on something that seems now like one of McGinn's too-hard problems: what it is like to be another person. Can the neurology of story telling really do this for us?

Adam Morton, University of Bristol

Editor's Booknotes

J. Dancy & E. Sosa
A Companion to Epistemology
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1992, £65

Hard on the heels of Peter Singer's admirable *Companion to Ethics* comes this successor, the *Companion to Epistmology*, under the transatlantic co-editorship of Jonathan Dancy (Keele) and Ernest Sosa (Brown). Future *Companions* are promised on aesthetics, political philosophy, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, logic, philosophy of science and philosophy of language. When completed, the series will provide an invaluable reference guide to modern philosophy.

How is one to assess the value of such a substantial reference work (527 pp.) in a concise booknote? Clearly, this is a volume to have on the library shelf and consult from time to time, not a book to be read from cover to cover.

Where to begin? First of all, one could cast a critical eye over the list of contributors. Here we find such names as Peter Achinstein, William Alston, Michael Ayers, Roderick Chisholm, Jonathan Cohen, John Cottingham, Edwin Curley, Fred Dretske, . . . and we've only reached the Ds. Much of the *Companion*, clearly, has been written by genuinely first-rate people, authoritative figures from both sides of the Atlantic.

The next thing to do, perhaps, is to sample some topic entries. I looked up 'induction', and found (pp. 200–206) a beautifully lucid article by Gilbert Harman on different types of non-demonstrative reasoning and the roles played by such factors as simplicity, coherence, and conservatism in our everyday inductive practices. What I missed was a discussion of Hume's inductive scepticism and the subsequent attempts to overcome it. Here the system of cross-references came to my aid. At the end of the article, 'Induction', there are references to related articles on Bayesianism, inference to the best explanation and problems of induction. Turning to the latter heading, we find an article by Laurence Bonjour (pp. 391–395) on Hume's problem and on the main attempts to justify induction: pragmatic (Reichenbach), analytic (Strawson) and inductive (Skyrms). So far so good.