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Can small groups avoid the tragedy of the commons?

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Abstract

In this research, an agent-based simulation seeks to discuss the tragedy of the commons, collective intelligence and institutions developed by social groups. The concept of the tragedy of the commons states that you can always expect environmental degradation when many individuals freely exploit a scarce resource of common use. Hardin (Science 162:1243–1248, 1968) proposes two alternatives to deal with it: state or privatized administration. However, it is possible another alternative of self-coordination when the social groups are small. That is, the tragedy of the commons could be faced when the synergy within the group—collective intelligence—develops. The focus of this paper is to analyze small groups who promote their coordination to achieve collective goals, aimed at the preservation and perpetuation of scarce natural resources of common use. The results of this research show that the extreme exhaustion of the environment and consequent dissolution of the group that depends on it, is easily observed in many circumstances. However, in small groups, the self-coordination through the development of strong institutions may avoid an eventual tragic outcome of total environment degradation. Additionally, it has been found that social identity influences the behavior of the individuals, determining the social structures.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. UNIFESP-Federal University of São Paulo, Rua São Nicolau, 210-4o Andar, Diadema, São Paulo, 09913-030, Brazil

    Rogerio Scabim Morano

  2. Centro Universitário FEI, Rua Tamandaré, 688-6º Andar, São Paulo, São Paulo, 01525-000, Brazil

    Edmilson Alves de Moraes & Rafael Ricardo Jacomossi

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  1. Rogerio Scabim Morano
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  2. Edmilson Alves de Moraes
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  3. Rafael Ricardo Jacomossi
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Correspondence to Rogerio Scabim Morano.

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Morano, R.S., de Moraes, E.A. & Jacomossi, R.R. Can small groups avoid the tragedy of the commons?. AI & Soc 33, 71–80 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-017-0720-9

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