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Emergence, Reduction, and Theoretical Principles: Rethinking Fundamentalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Margaret Morrison
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Abstract

Many of the arguments against reductionism and fundamental theory as a method for explaining physical phenomena focus on the role of models as the appropriate vehicle for this task. While models can certainly provide us with a good deal of explanatory detail, problems arise when attempting to derive exact results from approximations. In addition, models typically fail to explain much of the stability and universality associated with critical point phenomena and phase transitions, phenomena sometimes referred to as “emergent.” The paper examines the connection between theoretical principles like spontaneous symmetry breaking and emergent phenomena and argues that new ways of thinking about emergence and fundamentalism are required in order to account for the behavior of many phenomena in condensed matter and other areas of physics.

Type
Reduction, Emergence, and Condensed Matter Physics
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 73 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers. Edited by Miriam Solomon , December 2006 , pp. 876 - 887
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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