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Subjective Situations and Logical Omniscience

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Abstract

The beliefs of the agents in a multi-agent system have been formally modelled in the last decades using doxastic logics. The possible worlds model and its associated Kripke semantics provide an intuitive semantics for these logics, but they commit us to model agents that are logically omniscient. We propose a way of avoiding this problem, using a new kind of entities called subjective situations. We define a new doxastic logic based on these entities and we show how the belief operators have some desirable properties, while avoiding logical omniscience. A comparison with two well-known proposals (Levesque's logic of explicit and implicit beliefs and Thijsse's hybrid sieve systems) is also provided.

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Moreno, A., Cortés, U. & Sales, T. Subjective Situations and Logical Omniscience. Studia Logica 72, 7–29 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020513024572

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020513024572

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